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The study analyses the functioning of the Kenyan domestic maize 
and Yearns marketing system with special regard to the interaction of the 
formal (controlled) and informal (uncontrolled) sub-systems. It attempts 
to reduce the uncertainty as to what effects relaxation of present controls 
would have. The relaxation of controls has been suggested in the last 
three Development Plans but no actions have yet been taken. 
Initially the determinants of the marketing systems' performance — 
framework for maize and beans marketing operations, structure and conduct of 
the marketing systems — are described and analysed': This is followed by 
an evaluation of the performance guided by the stated objectives of the 
controls:, to benefit producers and consumers. To this end, more specifi-
cally, the analysis includes an evaluation of the extent to which the 
marketing systems operate at lowest possible costs (achieve pricing > 
efficiency), prevent exploitation of farmers and consumers (achieve pricing 
efficiency) and provide secure outlets for producers and sources for consumers. 
Survey information of the Central Bureau of Statistics and data gathered by 
"a Maize and Beans Trader Survey carried out in markets of Western, Central 
and Eastern Kenya! with the assistance of the FAO/Kenya Government Marketing ' 
Development Project provided the empirical base for the analysis. 
In summary, the analysis suggests that..the objectives of controls 
are not being achieved and in fact that the present system of controls con-
tributes to marketing inefficiencies. The control legislation has created 
a marketing framework which is conducive to low operational efficiency 
as reflected in high marketing costs; low pricing efficiency as reflected in 
poor market and seasonal integration and relativelv high excess profits; 
and high instability of market conditions. The analysis further indicates 
that those most affected by the controls are smallholders and rural and 
urban low-income consumers whereas those that benefit most are large scale 
farmers. The result is a negative income distribution effect. In conclusion, 
it is recommended that controls be relaxed in conjunction with other measures 
to improve the situation. This would further one of the major objectives of 
the present development strategy?-to alleviate rural and urban poverty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives of the Study' 
The marketing of maize in Kenya has long been a subject for study.1 
Past discussion has centered around the imperfections and inefficiencies of 
the system in which the Maize and Produce Board (MPB), a parastatal marketing 
organization? holds the monopoly on handling almost all maize beyond district 
requirements. Recently, maize surpluses have been an additional matter for 
discussion. These two issues are interrelated and each tends to aggravate the 
other. However, while separate measures must be undertaken to resolve each, 
neither can be solved in isolation, 
The present study examines the effect of the maize marketing 
system on marketing costs, profits, producer and consumer prices and income 
distribution. The marketing system for beans is also analysed. The marketing 
problems of both crops are similar, and furthermore, maize and beans are the 
major staple foods of the low-income sections of the rural and urban population. 
2 In addition, the major production of both crops is by smallholders. 
Smallholders, who with their families account for over 70% of the total 
population (see Casley and Marchant 1978, p. 5), belong mainly to the low-
3 
income sections of Kenya society. Most of them are affected twice vby the 
maize and beans marketing system, as producers and as consumers. Since these 
smallholders usually cannot grow or retain enough of these staples for home 
consumption, they rely on food purchases for a considerable part of the year. 
1. The most recent reports includes: V.A. Alvis and P.E. Temu. 1968. 
Marketing Selected Staple Foodstuffs in Kenya; Kenya. 1966. Maize Commission 
of Inquiry; Kenya. 1972, Final Report of the Working Party Studying the Maize 
and Produce Board;Kenya. 1973. Report of the Selected Committee on the Maize 
Industry; M. Hanrahan. 1974. Maize' Marketing Scheme at Luanda Market; F.T. 
Kariungi. 1976 . Kitui Local Maize Market1;- F.K. Ireri. 1976. Kutus Maize Market; 
0. Hesselmark and G. Lorenzl. 1976. 'Structure and Performance of the Maize 
•Marketing System in Kenya'; 0, Hesselmark. 1977. The Marketing of Maize and Beans 
in Kenya; R.A. Odinga. 1977. Decision Making in Food Marketing in Kenya; 
G. Schmidt and E.S. Mbugua. 197 6. Aspects of Marketing Effectiveness for 
•Selected Food Crops; H.G. Gsaenger and G. Schmidt. 1977Decontrolling the 
Maize Marketing System in Kenya. 
2. The Kenya Integrated Rural Survey defines a smallholder as a person who 
operates an agricultural holding of upto 20 acres although only 2>5% of smallholdings 
exceed 5 acres (Casley and Marchant 1978, p. 8). 
3. The results of the first Integrated Rural Survey (IRS-I) suggest that 
about 90% of smallholders have an income of less than KShs. 1500 per adult equi-
valent, per year; 45% have an income of less than KShs. 500 per adult equivalent, 
per year which is barely enough to provide adequate caloric intake; and 15% had 
negative cash balances. See L.D. Smith. 1978. Low Income Small-Holder Marketing 
and Consumption Patterns 55. 
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Inefficiencies in the maize and beans marketing systems doubly affect these 
vulnerable smallholders, first when they sell part of their maize or beans 
harvest to meet other basic needs and second when they buy either 
product for their own consumption. 
Clearly, the critical effect of maize and beans marketing on low-
income groups underscores the importance of thoroughly examining the operation 
of the two marketing systems. The present systems are subject to relatively 5 
strict controls intended, as the respective regulations state, to protect the 
interests of producers and consumer? (see Kenya. 1972. The maize Marketing Act, 
p. 5). In light of these underlying interests, the regulations are designed: 
(1) to guarantee a market at reasonable prices to producers in 
surplus areas, 
(2) to guarantee sufficient supplies at reasonable prices in deficit 
areas, 
(3) to guarantee fixed prices to producers and consumers, 
(4) to prevent exploitation of producers (smallholders) and consumers 
(5) to perform marketing functions at lowest possible costs. 
Earlier case studies and investigations which suggested that these 
objectives were not being achieved recommended relaxation of controls to allow 
free movement of maize and assignment of a new role to the MPB (See note 1 
kfccve). Similar recommendations were also made in the last three Development 
Plans. The 1974-78 Plan, for example, states: 
The 1970-74 Plan anticipated that major changes would be made to 
the system of maize marketing in Kenya, in particular that the 
internal maize market would be freed of all restrictions. These 
changes have not yet been made but will be introduced early in the 
new Plan period. Under the proposed marketing system maize 
millers will be free to purchase their requirements direct from 
farmers without going through the Maize and Produce Board. The 
Board will purchase any maize offered to it at a guaranteed floor 
price. It will also be responsible for maintaining the strategic 
maize reserve and for all imports and exports. (Kenya. 1977, 
Development Plan, p. 234). 
The 1973-83 Plan also expresses the intention to relax internal maize movement 
restrictions as a measure to improve marketing efficiency. It declares the 
4. In 1976/77, maize and beans accounted for 28.5% of total farm sales. 
Maize alone accounted for 25.6%. See Casley and Marchant 1978, p. 28. 
5. For a short period, from October 1977 to June 1978, the regulation 
that all surplus maize must be sold to the MPB was relaxed because MPB storage 
capacities were exhausted and it was hoped that the pressure on the MPB would 
be reduced by this measure. In June 1978 the old controls were reintroduced. 
See Kenya. 1972. The Maize Marketing Act, Laws of Kenya, Cap. 338, p. 5. 
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intention to intervene directly only where co-operatives and the private sector 
cannot or do not perform essential functions and services adequately or 
competitively, (Kenya, 1979, Development Plan, pp. 226/227). 
Despite the officially stated intention of introducing major changes, 
no definite action has been taken so far. The government's reluctance to 
introduce recommended reforms perhaps reflected lack of information on the 
workings of the private sector and suspicion that the private sector might be 
unable to assume certain functions of the MPB or that it might exploit small-g 
holders and consumers. To throw light on these questions this study, taking as 
its frame of reference the stated reasons for the controls, focuses on the 
present and potential performance of the private sector in maize and beans 
marketing and attempts to quantify the effects of controls and envisaged 
decontrol. Special emphasis is placed on the so-called ' nformal" sub-
systems and their relation to the "formal" or controlled system. Research 
in this area has not been emphasized in the past, with the result that 
neither sufficient nor accurate information has been available as a basis 
for recommending appropriate improvements. 
1, 2. Data Base 
The data for this study are drawn from various surveys carried 
out by the Marketing Development Project (MDP) through the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS). These include the Integrated Rural Surveys 1974/75 and 
1976/77 (IRS-1 and IRS-2), the Market Information Survey, and the Market 
8 Structure Survey, Data from these sources supplement the author's Maize and 
6. Private traders (middlemen) are often blamed by the people as well 
as politicians of being exploitative- See, for example, the statements of the 
Vice President and Minister for Finance, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, in Parliament on 
October 18th, 1978, discussed in an editorial of the Standard, "Exploitation 
of Small Farmers", October 23, 1978 and the letter of a farmer to the Daily Nation, 
"Maize price needs control," August 11, 1978, p. 7. 
7. Thus, for the new Development Plan period "an assessment of the 
institutional and legal framework required for the implementation of Government 
agricultural and marketing policies" is envisaged (Kenya. 1979. Development 
Plan, p. 227). 
3. Data of the surveys are published in Kenya. 1977. -Integrated- Rural 
Survey 1974-5, Basic Report; D.J. Casley and T.J. Marchant. 1978. Smallholder 
Marketing in Kenya, Price data are regularly published in the Market Information 
Bulletin of the Central Bureau of Statistics. For the survey methods see the 
individual publications. 
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Beans Trader Survey, which includes a sample of producers selling in survey 
markets, carried out in 1977 with the assistance of the MDP. The results of 
this survey may be taken as fairly representative of the total population 
within the sampling area. 
Data for the Maize and Beans Trader Survey were collected in three 
maize or beans growing areas or zones. The basic sample zones, which comprise 
9 seven zones of the Integrated Rural Survey , may be described as follows: 
(1) Western Kenya—High and medium potential agro-ecological 
zone (Coffee, Tea and Cotton West of Rift Valley) 
which comprises Nyanza and Western provinces and parts 
of Rift Valley Province (Kericho, Nandi); 
(2) Central Kenya—High and medium potential zone East of 
Rift Valley which comprises mainly Central Province 
and part of Meru and Embu districts of Eastern 
province. (Machakos District was excluded because 
it is geographically separate from the other areas.); 
(3) Eastern Kenya—Low potential zone East of Rift 
Valley which comprises the major parts of Eastern 
Province (Meru, Embu, Kitui and Machakos districts). 
The first two zones are considered surplus or self-sufficient areas, while the 
third is a major rural deficit area for maize. All zones are smallholder areas 
which is particularly interesting with regard to the declared development 
policy of Kenya. 
The results of the sampling process for these areas are shown in 
Table 1. For market traders and producers, a random sample was drawn of 69 
markets (Map 1) evenly distributed across the zones and stratified by IRS zones 
9. These zones are: Tea in West of Rift Valley; Coffee in West of 
Rift Valley; Upper Cotton in West of Rift Valley; Tea in East of Rift Valley; 
Coffee in East of Rift Valley (except Machakos); and Lower Cotton in East of 
Rift Valley. The former large farm areas were excluded. See map Al, Appendix. 
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and by market size (big, medium, small). 10 
Table 1: Sample of Producers and Traders in Sample Markets by Basic Sample 
Zonesa„ 
Type of Trader Western Central Eastern Total 
Kenya Kenya Kenya 
Producer 37 31 25 93 
Market Maize 80 87 37 204 
Trader Beans3 47 76 36 159 
MPB agent 39 24 39 102 
Lorry Trader 6 6 8 20 
Note: 
bcurce: 
The sample of market traders was roughly stratified by 
size (small, big) in order to get a sufficient sample 
size for big (weekly turnover 10 bags or more). 
Own Compilation 
10, The sampling of markets, let alone the subsequent sampling of market 
traders, was not an easy task. For- this purpose all County Councils of the 
respective districts (17) were visited and, as far as data were available, the 
market revenue for 4 months was recorded. Later the markets were grouped into 
three size categories; because sizes differed considerably between zones, each 
zone was grouped separately. Where information on revenues was scanty or not 
accessible within reasonable time limits, the classification of markets was made 
with the assistance of the market inspector of the County Council, Markets with 
no or negligible revenues (less than KShs, 100 per year) and "market centres" 
without an "open market" were not included in the sampling frame. The strati-
fication of the frame developed is as follows: 
Market 
Category Western Kenya Central Kenya Eastern Kenya Total 
Large 10 6 6 22 
Medium 56 25 28 109 
Small 312 88 36a 436 
Total 378 119 70 567 
Note: a. In Machakos District a large number of market centres were 
listed, but no revenue was collected in these centres because 
no real "open market" on special market days was in operation. 
The total number is higher if the Coffee Zone is included. 
For Eastern Kenya, only the dry, deficit areas were sampled. 
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Subsequently, selection of a random sample of producers and market traders 
within each market was drawn. With regard to market traders, however, it 
should be kept in mind that interviews with persons who may be involved in 
illegal transactions are rather difficult to obtain. Therefore, at times the 
copperation of respondents was considered more important than random selection. 
A further constraint on the intended sample occurred in Zone 3, where throughout the 
survey period maize and beans marketing was banned in the open markets of Kitui 
District. The results for that zone therefore do not represent free produce 
marketing conditions in Kitui. 
For Maize and Produce Board agents, the objective was 100% interview 
coverage in the selected markets.11 For each zone, the target sample size was 
a minimum of 30 interviews per type of trader, evenly distributed as far as 
possible across the zones. An exception was the so-called "lorry trader" or 
"independent produce wholesaler" who is involved largely in illegal transactions 
and who plays an important role in the marketing system. Sampling for this type 
of trader was not possible, but whenever there was an opportunity to meet such 
traders and to gain their confidence and cooperation an interview was taken. 
Interviews were carried out with standardized questionnaires (except 
for lorry traders) by closely-supervised enumerators. During intensive on-the-
job training in test markets, the enumerators first tested the original question-
naires, which they afterwards helped to redesign. Interviews with lorry traders 
were taken by the author hinself and the survey supervisor. In these cases, 
the standardized questionnaire was taken as an interview guide. Whenever it 
seemed promising certain questions were discussed extensively with the respondents. 
In addition to data obtained from individual trader interviews, information on 
the disposal of maize and beans was collected from each Maize and Produce Board 
depot. 
11. Originally a different approach for sampling agents had been planned. 
It was the intention to use lists of agents, supplied by MPB depots operating 
in the sampling areas, as a sampling frame. This plan had to be abandoned when 
it was discovered that the lists obtained from the first depots visited were 
incomplete or that only a very low proportion of agents listed were really active. 
The majority who had licenses did not operate. Sagana depot, for example, listed 
286 agents in 167 markets of Murang's Nyeri and Kirinyaga district, but only 
about 25% were indicated as being active. After checking the supplies for the 
previous season, it was evident that only about 10% of the listed agents had 
really supplied the MPB depot regularly! Though the lists might have been more 
accurate elsewhere, the Sagana example nevertheless indicated that a license 
does not necessarily mean that the licence-holder acts in fact as an MPB agent. 
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The survey was carried out from April to October 1977. The study 
therefore reflects the situation before that relaxation and as it exists presently 
after the reintroduction of controls in June 1978. 
Analysis of the survey data was carried out with the Statistical 
12 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). It generated a weighted data file 
in the case of market traders and MPB agents for whom a reasonable stratified 
random sample was obtained; this was not the case for data on producers and 
lorry traders. The frequencies and parameters given in the study therefore are 
usually weighted figures except when statistical tests were applied. All 
figures, tables and charts are derived from the author's Maize and Beans 
Trader Survey, 1977 unless otherwise indicated. 
12. Not all data gathered is presented in this report. File documentation 
with all primary data including basic statistics is available to interested 
researchers in the IDS Library. 
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2. FRAMEWORK OF MAIZE AND BEANS MARKETING 
2.1 Production Patterns 
It was pointed out earlier that smallholders play an important role 
in maize and beans production. Of an estimated total number of 1,704 million 
smallholders in Kenya (see Casley and Marchant 1978, p. 8), almost 90% grow 
maize and 70% grow beans (Kenya, 1977. Integrated Rural Survey 1974-75, p.80). 
On average in 1074/75, they planted 0,93 hectares of local and/or 0.67 hectares 
of hybrid maize and 0.75 hectares of beans. Beans are grown in a large 
number of varieties, the most common ones being Rose Coco, Red Haricot, Mwezi 
Moja and Canadian Wonder (Van Rheenen 1976, p. 6). The area devoted to maize 
and beans increases slightly with holding size. In the smallest size group 
(below 0,5 hectares) the mean area was, for example, 0.43 hectares for local 
maize and 0.33 hectares for beans. In the second largest size group (5.0-7.9 
hectares), the mean area was 2.09 hectares for local maize. In the largest 
size group (8,0 hectares and above), the mean area was 1.43 hectares for beans 
(see Table AL, Appendix), 
The estimated total smallholder production of maize for the period 
197 5-78 lay between 1.3 and 1.5 million metric tons (Kenya, Crop Forecast 197 8, 
pp. 2, 5). Smallholder production accounts for more than 80% of total maize 
production according to figures available on large scale production (see 
Table A2, Appendix). This estimate, however, seems too high and does not 
agree with the Maize and Produce Board intake during 197 5-197 8, One 
reason for the discrepancy might be that a large number of medium scale farmers, 
whose contribution to total maize production is quite substantial, are covered 
neither by the smallholder survey nor by the large farm survey."'" If large 
scale production figures are adjusted by taking into consideration the estimated 
consumption figures (see chapter 2.3), smallholder production seems to account 
for about 70% of total production. 
Smallholder production of beans for the period 1975-1978 was in 
the range of 150,00-165,000 metric tons. This figure virtually represents 
total production because this crop is rarely grown on a large scale basis 
(Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1977, pp. 124-29). 
1. The large farm survey sample frame of the CBS is currently under 
review. So far, only farms from 50 acres and above are covered. Thus, medium 
sized farms of 20 to 50 acres are neither covered in the small farm nor in 
the large farm surveys. 
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Cotton Zone (See Table 3). The same pattern holds for Central and Eastern 
provinces, where the Cotton Zone, with 19.94% of total smallholder production, 
was the major maize production zone, followed by the Tea Zone and Lower Cotton 
Zone. All zones in Central and Eastern provinces contribute about 30% of the 
value of total maize production. The production in the coastal zones is pre-
dictably relatively low, accounting only for about 3% of total production. 
The regional distribution of beans production is seen in Table 4. 
It shows that, contrary to maize, beans production is mainly concentrated in 
Eastern and Central provinces, where about 86% of farmers (Eastern) and 98: 
(Central) grow beans. These two provinces account for around 70% or more of 
total production, depending on the harvest. Again, the major contribution 
within these provinces comes from the Coffee Zone which in the IRS-I sample 
had a share of 47.46% of the total output value for beans. After the Coffee 
Zone in output comes the Lower Cotton Zone with a share of almost 20%, followed 
Table 4: Distribution of Smallholder Beans Production by Province 1974/75 
and 1976/77. 
Province 1974/75a 1976/77 
'000 MT % '000 % 
Central 38.33 26.00 63.90 37 .77 
Coast 0.91 0.62 - -
Eastern 75.70 51.34 50.40 29.79 
Nyanza 15.26 10.35 14.94 8.83 
Rift Valley 0.74 0.50 14.94 8.83 
Western 16.50 11.19 26.10 15.43 
TOTAL 147.44 100.00 169.20 100.00 
Note: a. Excludes pastoral and large farm area. 
Source: Kenya. 1977. Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75, p. 82 and 
Crop Forecast 1978, p. 6. 
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iy the Tea Zone with approximately 17%. For western Kenya too, the most 
important beans production zone in agro-ecological terms is the Coffee Zone 
(12.16% of output value), whereas all other zones contribute only marginally, 
as is the case with the coastal zones. In terms of provinces, Western Province 
is the major beans producer west of the Rift Valley. 
The geographic distribution of production should be examined 
together with the seasonal distribution of production which has important 
implications for the operation of the marketing systems. Tables A3 and A4 
(see Appendix) show that harvest times for maize and beans differ considerably 
between provinces and even between adjacent zones within provinces. Both 
crops are harvested throughout most of the year somewhere in the country. 
Harvest times in different regions and zones therefore complement each other 
to some extent so that interregional and interzonal flows of produce may 
reduce the necessity of longterm storage. 
Intraregional-interzonal flows seem to be as important as inter-
regional, long-distance flows. Apart from Rift Valley, all maize growing districts 
have zones with a second short-rain crop enabling them to supply nearby zones 
that do not have a second crop. Furthermore, the long-rain crop within one 
region is usually harvested at different times in different zones, often with 
a time lag of one or two months between zones. 
Intraregional flows may be supplemented by interregional ones if 
4-
supply m one region is not sufficient or in regional slack seasons. 
Particularly important in this regard is the time lag of the Rift Valley 
long-rain maize harvest and the times of beans harvest in Western and Nyanza 
provinces. These harvest times lag about three to four months behind the 
harvests in other parts of the country. Correspondingly, maize and beans are 
harvested in Central, Eastern and Western Kenya during the Rift Valley slack 
seasons. 
4-. In zones with two harvests, the short-rain production was only about 
35% of the long-rain production (1976/77). See Kenya. Crop Forecast, 197 5, p. 2. 
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2.2 Supply Patterns 
The supply or sales patterns to a large extent reflect the production 
system. Because of the high share of smallholder production, the marketing 
system is faced with an extremely dispersed supply structure, except in some 
parts of Rift Valley. The very high number of small holdings, 75% comprise less 
than 2 hectares (see Casley and Marchant 1978, p. 8), together with the fact 
that maize and beans are food crops grown mainly for personal subsistence, 
explains that on average only about 30% of total maize production and 25% of 
beans production are marketed by smallholders (see Tables 7 and 8). For maize 
which is also grown on a large scale, this means that total smallholder 
marketed maize production ranges between roughly 45% and 50% of the total 
marketed maize production. In other words, though large scale producers con-
tribute only 25-30% of total production, their share in marketed production is 
about 50-55%. 
In addition, not all smallholders participate equally in the marketing 
of maize. The distribution of sales of maize and beans is rather skewed, as 
Table 5 reveals. 
Table 5: Value of Sales of Maize and Beans by Percentage of Producers and 
Value of Sales 
Mai ze Beans 
Value of Sales % of % of % of % of 
of Each Crop Producers Sales Producers Sales 
(KShs.) 
Less than 20 63.1 0.3 75.2 0.3 
20 - 49 9.2 1.4 7,2 2.6 
50 - 99 6.0 1.9 5.2 4.2 
100-499 12, 4 13.7 9,1 21.6 
500-999 3.4 11.4 0.9 7.2 
1000-and more 5.8 71.4 2.3 64.1 
Maize Beans 
No. of Producers 1,429.1 988.9 
Value of Sales (MiHi on 
KShs.) 310.0 84.0 
Source: L.D. Smith. 1977. The Kenya Integrated Rural-Phase 1, p. 77. 
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the majority of smallholders sell very little in value terms. About 71% of 
maize and 64% of beans marketed in 1974/75 were sold by only 5.8% (maize) 
and 2.3% (beans) of maize and beans producers. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that these farmers all fall into the larger farm size 
categories. Rather, it seems to be the case that relatively high sales are 
made across more or less all size categories (see Table 6). 
T&ble 6: Percentage Distribution of Producers and Value of Sales by 
Size of Holdings 1974/75a 
Size Group 
(hectares) % of Producers Value of Sales as % of 





Maize Beans Maize Beans 
Below 0.5 14, 34 12.21 12.13 5.59 7.85 24 22 
0.5 - 0.9 17, 84 15,55 17.41 16.62 9.62 27 20 
1.0 - 1.9 28.13 23.81 29,92 21.07 31.31 26 23 
2.0 - 2.9 15.59 15.51 15.02 17.54 18.90 34 37 
3.0 - 3.9 8.54 11.01 9.04 6.78 10.20 25 23 
4.0 - 4.9 7.65 6.80 7.41 15.76 8.98 42 29 
5.0 - 7.9 5.20 9.68 6.29 9.01 12.72 30 35 
8.0 and ab ove 2.72 5.42 2.75 8.12 0.42 39 7 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 31 26 
Notes: a. Excluding pastoral and large farm areas. 
b. Rounded to the nearest whole percentage. 
Source: Derived from Kenya, Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75 and 
unpublished IRS-1 data. 
Smallholder maize producers with more than 5 hectares (8% of local 
maize and 15% of hybrid maize producers) account for only roughly 17% of total 
sales, whereas maize farmers with less than 3 hectares (75,9% of local and 
about 67% of hybrid maize growers) have a share of nearly 61% of total maize 
sales. The same pattern holds true for beans farmers. Those with more than 5 
hectares (9.04% of total beans producers) account for about 13% of total sales, 
whereas those with holdings below 3 hectares (around 75%) account for about 68% 
of the total sales value. Thus, the distribution of maize and beans sales by 
size of holdings is not as skewed as one might expect when looking at Table 5. 
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Similarly, the number of sales transactions by quantity sold in one transaction 
is more equally distributed. More than 50% of maize and 60% of beans sales, by 
number of transactions, are in amounts of 30 kilograms (maize) or 40 kilograms 
(beans) or less (see Casley and Marchant. 197 8, pp. 52, 54). 
Table 7: Percentage Distribution of Market Supply (Quantity) of Maize and 
Beans by Province 1974/753 
Maize Beans 








































TOTAL 30.98 100.00 25.69 100.00 
Notes: a. Excluding pastoral and farm areas, 
b. Taking the national production figures of 1976 to 1978 into account, 
Rift Valley would be in much the same position as Nyanza in 1974/75, 
and vice versa. In 1977/78, smallholders in Rift Valley marketed 
about 38% of the total production and contributed 63.6% to total 
national marketed production. Nyanza, faced with a bad harvest, sold 
only 18.6% of the production, which accounted for only 9.7% of the 
total marketed production. See Kenya. Crop Forecast 1978, pp. 2-3. 
Source: Derived from Kenya. Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75, pp. 80, 82. 
Table 7 and 8 show the regional pattern of smallholder maize and 
beans supply in 1974/75. In that year, smallholders in Nyanza, Rift Valley and 
Western provinces marketed on average a higher proportion of their maize 
production relative to smallholders in other provinces. Thus, because these 
provinces accounted for the highest national contributions, the supply patterns 
became even more pronounced than the regional production pattern. The 1976-78 
figures, which include the former scheduled areas in Rift Valley, show that this 
tendency continued to hold true for maize. The difference, however, is that in 
the later years Rift Valley overtook Nyanza as the dominant smallholder maize 
supplier. In 1977/78 smallholders in Rift Valley Province sold the highest 
proportion, 38%, of total production; because of relatively high production 
figures, these sales accounted for 63.6% of total marketed smallholder production 
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(see footnote b, Table 7). If in addition, the large farm supplies are taken 
into consideration, Rift Valley Province, particularly the western parts (High 
Altitude Grassland Zone), definitely becomes the major surplus area. It is followed 
by the Coffee Zones of Nyanza, Western, Central and Eastern provinces (see Table 
8). 
Table 8: Percentage Distribution of Market Supply of Maize and Beans by 
Major Agro-Ecological Zones 1974/75a 
Maize oans 
Zone % of Value 
of Pro-
duction 




% of Value 
of Pro-
duction 




West Tea 22.82 9.45 25.00 0.59 
of Coffee 44.10 61,56 46.98 22.24 
Rift Upper 
Cotton 24.62 8.26 27.27 1.78 
East Tea 11.63 2.16 5.01 3.33 
of Coffee 22.67 14.51 16.68 30.80 
Rift Lower 
Cotton 28.57 3.93 52.91 41.14 
Coastal Zones 1.27 0.13 3.03 0.12 
TOTAL 31.14 100.00 25.67 100.00 
Note: a. Excluding pastoral and large farm areas. 
Source: Derived from L.D. Smith. 1977. The Kenya Integrated Rural Survey, 
Tables 6 and 7. 
The outstanding position of Rift Valley in maize supply seems to 
be so pronounced that not even adverse weather conditions in that province 
would change the basic regional supply pattern. Of course, the effect on the 
level of national supply might be crucial in such a case, were it not balanced 
out by favourable production conditions in other areas. This was the case in 
1974/75 when a good harvest in Nyanza balanced out bad harvests in the Rift 
Valley. This example also indicates that the marketing system must be very 
flexible to cope with changes in regional supply patterns; one cannot just 
concentrate on the marketing system in one major supply area. 
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The marketing system for beans is also faced with changing regional 
supplies (see production figures in Table 4). Compared to maize, there seems 
to be a difference in that the areas and zones with the highest production sell 
a lower proportion of it than areas with lower production. In 1971/75, for 
example, Nyanza accounted for only 10.35% of national production but marketed 
more than 60% of it. In contrast, Eastern Province, the major producer with 
a share in total production of 51.35%, sold only 26.87%. For beans, then, 
the regional supply pattern is less pronounced than the production pattern. 
In particular in Western Kenya, the Coffee Zones of Nyanza and 
Western provinces (see Table 8) become more important in terms of supply 
(22.24%) than in terms of production (12.16%), Farmers there sold about 
47% of their production, The major differences between production and supply 
patterns, however, can be observed in the Coffee and Lower Cotton zones East 
of Rift. Compare smallholders in the Coffee Zone, who as the major producers 
(47.5% of total production) sold only about 17%, with smallholders in the Lower 
Cotton Zone, who sold roughly 53% of their production to account for only 
20% of the national total. In 1974/75 therefore, the Lower Cotton Zone East 
of Rift became the major supply area for beans, followed by the Coffee zones 
East and West of Rift, The high marketed proportions in the Lower Cotton Zone 
East of Rift and the Coffee Zone West of Rift suggest that a considerable number 
of farmers in those areas grow beans as a cash crop. 
The seasonal pattern of supply follows the pattern of harvest 
times shown in Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix. Variations between years 
may be considerable depending on the timing of the rains. For maize, the 
sales usually peak after a time lag of one to three months from harvest. 
The major supplies of maize therefore appear from January through March in 
Rift Valley and Western provinces, September through December in Eastern 
Province, and from October through December in Central, Nyanza and Western 
provinces (see Casley and Merchant 1978, pp. 36, 39, and Hesselmark and 
Lorenzl 1976, p. 163). April through June are slack months for all provinces. 
The peaks for beans sales are usually earlier by approximately one to two 
months.5 
Major determinants of the seasonal and regional supply patterns 
are the diversified production conditions in Kenya. It will be seen later 
that these are to a great extent responsible for the complex structure of the 
5. Often beans are interplanted with maize and need only three months 
to mature. 
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marketing systems. As mentioned earlier, another important factor is the high 
proportion of smallholder production which leads to an extremely dispersed 
supply structure. This dispersed structure is moreover rather unstable because 
the subsistence demand for food, especially maize and beans, has a tendency 
to intensify the effects of weather conditions on harvests. Bad harvests, 
for example, often result in an absolute as well as a relative decline in mar-
keted output because subsistence requirements must first be satisfied. 
Supply in these cases is a residual of demand. 
2.3 Demand Patterns 
Maize and beans are the major staple food crops particularly for 
the low-income sections of the population. Their importance naturally g 
varies from region to region. Maize is usually consumed as maize meal 
7 
(flour) and whole maize, green or dry. Only a very low proportion is 
consumed in the form of breakfast cereal and corn oil or is processed to g starch. Maize is also used as animal feed, though so far on a very low scale. 
Table 9: Estimated Rural and Urban Demand for Maize and Beans 1975 
Maize Flour a Beans 
Total Per Capita Total Per Capita 
'000 MT Kg/year '000 MT Kg/year 
Ruralb 1,465.63° 122.79 134.38 11.26 
Urban 147.3 5 90.18 17.12 10.48 
TOTAL 1,612.98 118.86 151.50 11.16 
Notes: a. Based on home produced consumption only. 
b. Under the assumption that 80% of "Other Cereal Flour" purchased 
was maize flour. 
c. Under the assumption that all home produced maize grain is 
consumed as maize flour. 
Source: Derived from M.M. Shah and H. Frohberg. 1979. Tables 17-23. 
6. See Tables A5 and A6 (Appendix) and Shah and Frohberg. 1979, Tables 
17, 25 and 31-36. In urban areas, beans are less important than in the rural 
areas. 
7. Unfortunately, up to the present no breakdown of figures is available 
to specify the consumption of green maize, milled maize (posho and sifted), or 
other forms in common use. 
8. One of the major reasons is the relatively high price despite the 
subsidy. 
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9 Beans are usually consumed m various cooked forms without prior processing. 
Because of their high protein content, they are particularly important 
nutritionally. 
Since the majority of Kenyans live and work in rural areas,10 the 
demand there far exceeds the urban demand. Rural Kenyans account for 
approximately 90% of the total demand for maize and beans (see Table 9); 
this figure includes subsistence demand- However, even in terms of market 
demand rural areas dominate. An interesting fact which emerged from the 
IRS-1 data is that food retained from production for subsistence needs accounts 
for only 50% of total food consumption (see Table A5), Appendix). As far as 
maize is concerned, on average approximately .-5-40% of total consumption seems 
to have been based on purchases. In other words, only around 60-65% of 
consumption was covered by retained production, which corresponds to about 56% 
of production,11 The high retention of beans production (77.2%) indicates that 
the percentage of purchased beans must be lower than that of maize, probably 
12 
around 15-20%. The figures suggest that on average smallholders seem to sell 
maize and beans despite the fact that the remaining amounts are insufficient 
to meet their own requirements and that they must buy back considerable quantities 
of those crops later. 
This pattern is particularly true for the poorer smallholders. 
They buy back a greater proportion than the higher-income groups (See Table 
A5, Appendix). Assuming the above percentages, altogether the rural market 
13 demand for maize or maize flour accounts for about 80% of total demand. 
9. Only the variety Mexican 142 is grown exclusively for processing. 
•Other varieties are processed only if there is surplus. 
10. The estimated rural population accounted for 87.9% of total popu-
lation in 197 5. Shah 1978, Tables An 1 and An 2, 
11. Derived from Table A6 (Appendix) and from Shah and Frohberg 1979, 
'Table A17, Table A17 contains the category "Other Cereal Flour" which was 
derived from IRS data where cereal purchases were not differentiated. In their 
calculation of per capita consumption of maize or maize flour, they assumed 
that 80% of other cereal was maize. 
12. Derived from Table A6 (Appendix) under the assumption that beans 
account for less than 10% of purchases, 
13. Separate figures for demand of maize and maize flour were not 
available. 
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Table 10. Distribution of Rural Demand for Maize and Beans by Province 1975a 



































TOTAL 1,465.63 100,00 134.38 100.00 
Note : a. Under same assumptions as Table 9. 
Source: Derived from Shah and Frohberg 1979, Tables 17-23, 33. 
This is approximately 3.5 times the demand in urban areas (see Table 9). For 
beans, the rural market demand ranges between 55% and 60% of total demarfd. 
These percentages demonstrate that the rural marketing sib-systems for maize 
and beans are important not only as outlets but also as sources. 
Comparing Table 10 with Table 2, it can be seen that the regional 
distribution of rural demand follows the distribution of production, except 
for maize in Eastern Ecovince,. The major producers (Rift Valley for maize 
and Eastern for beans) are also the major consumers. Furthermore, the tables 
show that rural areas in all provinces, except Eastern and Coast provinces, 
could meet their maize requirements through smallholder production unless af-
fected by bad harvests. Typically there has even been a small surplus, the 
highest being in Rift Valley. In beans, all areas except the Coast Province 
seem to be self-sufficient, although Eastern Province may fall short during a 
low harvest as happened in 1976/77. With regard to Eastern Province, it should 
be kept in mind that consumption figures are based on the favourable 1974/75 
results. Assuming that consumption patterns vary with harvest results, per 
capita consumption may have been lower in 1976/77. The same condition applies 
to maize consumption in Nyanza during 1976/77. 
IDS/OP 31 
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Consumption patterns are likely to vary not only with harvest results 
but also with time. Consumption can be assumed to follow seasonal production 
14 
and supply patterns but supporting figures are not yet available. These 
figures would indicate the seasonal periods of surplus and deficit for each 
region and show the pattern of potential marketing flows over time and space. 
In this regard, the overall figures per province and year are of limited use. 
2.4 Marketing Infrastructure 
The term marketing infrastructure is used in this study to refer 
to that part of the national infrastructure which determines and facilitates 
marketing operations. Especially important are the spatial organization of 
settlements, the transportation and communication networks, and access to 
financial institutions. 
As mentioned earlier, the degree of urbanization in Kenya is still 
relatively low. Only about 12% of the population lives in urban centres, the 
major ones being Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru. The rural settlement 
structure is largely dispersed with smallholders usually living on their farm. 
Rural market or trading centres prpvide the necessary central services which 
naturally increase with the size of the centre. Although there are no 
statistics on population by size of rural centres, the sample frame (see 
Section 1.2) suggests that about 80% of these market centres are relatively 
small. Bigger market centres, including townships such as Nyeri, Karatina, 
Embu, Meru, Kisii, Kisumu and others, are greatly overrepresented among CBS 
sample markets. Nevertheless, a majority of these sample markets (52%) had no 
15 
more than 20 shops. The relatively small size of rural centres corresponds • 
to the findings of the 1969 Census that over 70% of the existing localities^ 
(sublocations which often have more than one market centre) had a population of 
less than 5000 (Kenya. Statistical Abstract 1977 p~ 15). The'high market 
density, however, means that smallholders usually have fairly easy access to 
the basic marketing infrastructure, that is, markets16 and transport facilities 
such as bus and matatu, which are used to transport small quanties of commodities 
(see Table 11). 
14. The new IRS data are supposed to include the seasonal consumption, 
demand and supply patterns. 
-15. Casley and Marchant 1978, Table 5.2. The table refers to satellite 
communities of shops in or around the markets because major townships are 
included. For the smaller market centres, however, these shops are usually 
the only ones . 
16• It is not clear whether the figures refer to real so-called barter 
markets or only to market centres, which do not necessarily coincide. As 
mentioned earlier, there are numerous small market centres with shops but with-
out barter markets. 
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Table 11: Access of Smallholder Households to Marketing Infrastructure by 
Percentage of Households 
Market Centre 
Province Below Above 
2 Miles 4- miles 
Central 41. 71 19, .62 
Coast 22. 38 56, ,29 
Eastern 25, 23 43, .76 
Nyanza 46. 34 9, .63 
Rift Valley3, 34. 90 25, .53 
Western 38. 36 24, ,35 
TOTAL 37.09 25.66 
Bus Route Matatu Route 
Below Above Below Above 
2 miles 4 miles 2 miles 4 miles 
64.95 14.08 73. 88 10. 67 
68.12 9.23 66. 57 15. 06 
34.98 44.61 64. 92 12. 00 
70.93 10.16 78. 93 6. 06 
26,75 49.92 46. 50 27. 19 
53.86 11.08 67. 02 10. 51 
55.30 23.08 69.88 12.15 
Note: a. Excludes pastoral and large farm areas. 
Source: Kenya. Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75, p. 40. 
In the densely populated areas of Central, Nyanza and Western provinces, 
40% or more of smallholders find market centres within 2 miles and 75-90% find 
centres within 4 miles, Bus and matatu routes are even closer to the holdings 
since -they can be found at the nearest possible road. Areas with lower 
population density, such as Eastern and Coast provinces, generally have less 
fetvourhble access to the basic marketing infrastructure. , 
Most roads that link small markets with each other and with bigger 
17 • -rural and urban centres are not tarmacked. During the rainy seasons,'they 
are often virtually impassable. This fact has important implications for the 
interregional exchange of commodities in rural, particularly remote, areas. 
18 The major market centres usually are connected by tarmac roads. 
In addition to road transport, the railway is very important, parti-
cularly for transport of larger quantities over longer distances. Historically,, 
the rail "network has "had a major "impact'~on the spatial structure"of public 
procurement centres and storage facilities. Most of them are located along 
the main lines from Western Kenya and Nanyuki via Nairobi to Mombasa and they 
largely serve the former scheduled large farm areas. 
17. Only about 10% of all roads including international and national 
bank roads were tarmacked by 1977. See Kenya. Statistical Abstracts 1977, 
p. 211. 
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Like the transportation infrastructure, access to communication and 
banking facilities is not very conducive to marketing in rural areas. With the 
exception of the larger urban market centres, communication largely depends on 
personal contacts. Newspapers are not widely distributed in rural areas although 
this fact is partly due to the high rate of illiteracy. More revealing is the 
fact that radios are not yet common in rural smallholder households. The 
average ratio of radios per household is 0.23 (see Kenya Integrated Rural 
Survey 1974-75, p. 41). 
Telephones do exist in a number of the larger market centres. Among 
the CBS sample markets, 62% had a telephone within the trading centre in which 
the market was located (Casley and Marchant 1978, par. 5. 18). But telephones 
are not necessarily available to the public and connections are often 
difficult. In general, however, the potential exists for secondary and 
terminal markets to be linked by telephone. Access to banking facilities 
seems likely to remain limited for some time. In 58% of the CBS market 
centres, for example, banks were located more than 10 km away (Casley and 
Marchant 1978, par. 5, 18). This is not unexpected in view of the settlement 
structure described above. 
2.5 Marketing Regulations and Controls 
As pointed out early in this discussion, maize marketing, and to 
a lesser degree beans marketing, are subject to regulations and controls 
execut d primarily by the Maize and Produce Board (MPB). The MPB was 
19 established in 1966 under the enabling powers of the Agricultural Produce 
20 
Marketing Act. The Act, which dates to 1936, specifies the constitution, 
powers and regulations of Marketing Boards; delineates the powers of the 
Minister of Agriculture to fix maximum, minimum or specific producer prices 
for regulated produce; and contains the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Maize 
and Produce Board) Order which led to the establishment of the MPB. 
The regulations, their execution and the degree of control over maize 
18. Among the CBS sample markets, small ~.nd big, about 43% had tarmac 
connections. 
19. The MPB was preceded by the Maize Control and Maize Marketing Board. 
For a brief history of maize marketing legislation, see Hesselmark 1977, pp. 1-4. 
20. Kenya. The Agricultural Produce Marketing Act. Laws of Kenya, Cap. 
320. The objectives stated are '"to control and regulate the marketing of 
agricultural produce, to enable Marketing Boards to be established for 
marketing such produce and to provide for the powers and functions of 
Boards, and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto". 
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marketing are laid down more specifically in the Maize Marketing Act.21 Their 
general provisions apply also to beans and other scheduled produce. The-basic 
regulations are summarized below (see Kenya. Maize Marketing Act, p. 5). The 
primary functions of the MPB, as stated in the Maize Marketing Act, can be 
described as follows: 
1. to regurate, control and improve the supply, distribution and 
all other maize marketing activities including storage; 
2. to carry out all operations including import and export in 
order, so far as possible, to fulfil the requirements both of 
consumers and producers in Kenya; 
f 3. to advise the Minister of Agriculture on production, import 
and export of maize. 
In order to carry out its functions the MPB is empowered to appoint agents to 
act on its behalf within certain limits. Among other conditions, the Board 
- - 2 2 controls the definition of the area m which the agent is allowed to operate. 
With. the. .consent of the Board, agents may appoint subagents. 
Section 15 of the,.Act..grants the ME£- a monopsony and ..monopoly position . 
for all maize above subsistence requirements as well as beans and other produce. 
Subsection 1, subject to the exemptions of subsection 5 dealing with subsistence 
consumption, states as follows: 
All maize grown in Kenya shall, subject to the provisions of this 
Act, be purchased by and sold to the Board, and shall, without pre-
judice to the Board's liability for the price payable in accordance 
with section 18 of this Act, vest in the Board as soon as it has 
been harvested: 
Provided that the Board's liability for such price shall be 
conditional upon the delivery of the maize in accordance with 
subsection (2) of this section, and upon its acceptance by the 
Board. 
The MPB is empowered to specify the terms of delivery. The maize must be delivered 
in a "fit state". The risk up to the time of delivery lies with the producer 
unless the Board, with the concurrence of the Minister of Agriculture, specifies 
a date after which the Board accepts liability for the crop and compensates the 
owner for any loss or deterioration where the delay in delivery is due primarily 
to the action or non-action of the Board (see subsection 4). Although the MPB 
21. The Act is—described as "an Act of Parliament to make provisions for 
regulating the collection„tpnurchase, storage, marketing, distribution and supply 
of maize and maize products and to provide for the registration of certain maize 
millers, to establish a Maize Marketing Board and presribe its functions, powers 
and duties, and for matters incidental to and connected with the foregoing". 
Kenya. The Maize Marketing Act,p. 4-. 
22. See The Maize Marketing Regulations, Form A, Certificate of Appointment 
of Agent for Purposes other than the'-handling of Maize and Maize Products for 
Expert. Kenya, Maize Marketing~Act, p. 32. 
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"may specify", it is not obliged to do so, and the author is aware of no such 
case in the recent past. The practice seems to be that producers are obliged 
to sell or deliver maize (and other produce) in a fit state as soon as possible 
after harvest, but are not compensated if the MPB fails or is not able to absorb 
all surpluses. The same condition applies to most MPB agents: they must deliver 
all maize and produce as soon as possible. 
To ensure the MPB's monopoly position over all movements of surplus 
maize, controls are imposed by subsidiary legislation under section 24, the 
Maize Marketing (Movement of Maize and Maize Products) Order (see Kenya. Maize 
Marketing Act, p. 28). According to this Order, all movements of maize, with 
some exceptions, require a movement permit valid for only 24 hours which must be 
obtained from the MPB or another authorized person. Movements at night are 
generally prohibited. Exempted from these regulations are: the movement of 
maize or maize products within the boundaries of the farm, the movement of not 
more than 2 bags (180 l.g) accompanied by the owner, and the movement of not more 
than 10 bags within the boundaries of a district accompanied by the owner and 
intended for consumption by the owner or his family. With regard to district 
boundaries, the Board may declare that two or more contiguous districts shall 
be treated as one (Kenya. Maize Marketing Act, pp. 27-28). If contiguous dis-
tricts are not declared as one and a farmer wants to take 3 bags to the market 
or to an agent located in the adjacent district, he first must obtain a permit, 
often from a place farther than the market he wants to reach. The same movement 
regulations apply to beans. The above regulations, prescribed under terms of 
the Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, are the major rules governing domestic 
marketing of maize grain. The Act also provides for import and export of 
maize and maize products, the registration and duties of mills, the operation 
of the Maize and Produce Board and penalties for violation of the Act. 
The Price Control Act should be mentioned within the context of 
marketing regulations and controls (Kenya. Price Control Act). The Agricul-
tural Produce Marketing Act and the Maize Marketing Act regulate the fixing 
of producer prices by the Minister of Agriculture. This applies to both maize 
and beans. In addition, the Price Controller, housed in the Ministry of Finance, 
fixes the MPB depot, wholesale and retail prices for maize and maize flour. 
(So far beans have not been price controlled by this office). Consequently, 
except in the informal subsystem, prices for maize are fixed at all levels of 
the marketing system. The District Commissioner as Deputy Price Controller has 
the power to adjust prices if local conditions require it. He apparently even 
has the power to ban all maize and other marketing activities in markets within 
his district as occurred in Kitui. Further controls are thereby added to those 
imposed by the marketing control legislation. 
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3. STRUCTURE OF THE MAIZE AND BEANS MARKETING SYSTEMS 
3.1. Marketing Functionaries 
The Maize and Produce Board (MPB) is the dominant marketing institu-
tion in the maize and beans marketing systems. The following main functionaries 
also can be distinguished: market traders, produce stores or MPB agents and 
produce independent wholesalers (lorry traders) and processing enterprises. 
Of lesser importance are cooperatives, only some of which are involved, often 
to a very limited extent, in maize and/or beans marketing. The same is true 
for general wholesalers and retail shops which as far as maize is concerned 
are more involved in the distribution of maize flour (see Spliet. 1978). 
Market traders are members of the so-called informal marketing sub-
system. They usually operate on a local level in the open-air markets where 
transactions are exempt from any direct controls. Table 12, which summarizes 
the basic characteristics of the major marketing functionaries, shows that the 
majority of market traders for maize and beans are women between 30 and 50 
years old. Their standard of formal education is usually very low. More than 
50% of maize traders and more than 60% of beans traders never attended school, 
though a few of them (10.3% and 3.4% respectively) reached Form II or higher. 
Before they engaged in trade, most of them had been with the family, either un-
employed or farming. Fewer than 10% (maize) or 5% (beans) had been previously 
employed, and fewer than 1% had been in any other trade or business. On 
average they had 6 to 7 years experience in maize and beans trade. The median 
value, however, was 3.1 years (maize) and 2.8 years (beans) showing that 
fluctuation within the trader population must be relatively high. 
Market traders usually work alone and concentrate on maize and/or 
2 
beans trade. Especially in Western Kenya, many maize traders (45.3%) dealt 
solely in maize. By contrast, the number of beans traders handling beans only 
was relatively small (12.6%). The majority of beans traders (71.4%) also 3 
handled maize; 16.8% handled millet and/or sorghum; 19.3% dealt in other 
produce such as cow peas, green grams and groundnuts; and 11.6% handled other 
crops or food items, such as potatoes, other vegetables and fish. Only 39.1% 4 
of maize traders, mainly those in Central Kenya, also traded m beans. Millet 
and/or sorghum were handled by about 19% of maize traders, other produce by only 
8%, other crops or food items by 11.3%, and non-food items (such as hides and 
skins) by only 0.1%. 
1. For the marketing of maize and beans by cooperatives in Kenya, see in 
particular J. de Graaff. 1978. 
2. . In Western Kenya 72.5% of all maize traders handled only maize. They 
accounted for 76.3% of all "pure" maize traders, 
3. In Western Kenya the member of beans traders who handled millet and/or 
sorghum rose to 5.9%. 
4. Central Kenya accounted for 57.8% of maize traders who handled both crops. 
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Table 12. Basic Characteristics of Major Marketing Functionaries 
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Market Trader Produce Store Produge Whole-
(MPB Agent) saler 
Maize Beans (Lorry Trader) 
Sex (%) Male 29.2 12.4 78 .1 65.0 
Female 70.8 87 .6 21.9 35.0 
Age (%) Below 30 37.2 13.3 8.4 10.0 
30 to 50 54.8 73.8 71.6 85.0 
Above 50 8.0 12.9 20.0 5.0 
Education (%) Illiterate3 52.9 61.7 29.5 15.8 
Standard 4 - 8 36.7 34.8 61.1 68.4 
Form 2 and above 10.3 3.4 8.3 15.8 
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Partnership 1.8 1.4 22.0 40.0 
Product mix Maize/Beans only 45.3 12.6 21.4 10.0 
% of Maize and Beans 39.1 71.4 56.5 90.0 
traders Sorghum/Millet 18.9 16.8 13.8 25.0 
with Other Produce 8.0 19.3 8.4 3 5 , 0 C 
Other Food 11.3 11.6 44.3° 40.0 
Non-Food Items 0.1 - 6.5 15.0 
Income from Maize and Beans as n n n 0 cn n co n O, j= J- J- i J- J • 8b.U II.1 b/.y bd.y -8 of total trade income 
Mobility % Resident trader 3 5 - 4 N>A_ N # A < 
(not moving) 
Itinerant trade % of traders50.8 55.8 N.A. N.A. 
within 50 km Mean radius 24.8 21.8 N.A. N.A. 
radius 
Mobility Itinerant trader % of tradersl3.8 9.9 N.A. N.A. 
above 50 km ,, ,,-,, n „ . ,T . Mean radius 77.9 154.8 N.A. N.A. radius 
Mean working capital (KShs.) 759 1,042 7,620 48,988 
Mean Turnover per year Maize 350 414d 3,020 27,994 
(bags) Beans 332 280 753 9,920 
% of Traders with other Farm 69.3 70.2 58 .2 35.0 
sources of income Non-farm 3.2 9.3 23.8 25.0 
Total 70.2 70.9 18.6 58.8 
Trading income as 
(mean) 
of total income 50.0 45.0 55.5 56.9 
"Notes: a Without formal education. b Unweighted. 
c Including processed food. d Only traders handling beans/maize, 
e For traders with other sources of income. 
Source: Own compilation. 
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Overall, the degree of specialization in the informal maize and 
beans trade is relatively high, both crops contributing 86% (for maize 
traders) and 77.2 for (beans traders) of the total trading income. Trade 
in other products is usually a sideline of the main business, probably to 
bridge slack seasons. Many traders stop trading for a period of the year. 
Among maize traders, 49.2% average 10 weeks without trading, while 34.1% 
of beans traders halt for an average 15 weeks. However, this does not mean 
that they are idle during these periods. Around 70% of the market traders 
have other sources of income, usually a small farm which may require their 
labour 69.3% of maize traders and 70,2% of beans traders derived an income 
from farming; 3.2% and 9.3% respectively had income from non-farm sources. 
In terms of income generation, trading and nontrading activities seem to be 
equally important for those maize traders, each contributes 50% total income. 
For beans traders with other sources of income trading activities seem to be 
somewhat less important, accounting for 45% of total income generated. 
The trading income depends largely on the scale of operation. 
Because of the working capital at hand, the scale is generally quite low. 
Maize traders operating with an average working capital of about KShs. 760 
had an annual turnover of 350 bags of maize. For beans traders, with a 
working capital of KShs 1,042, the annual turnover was 280 bags. Traders 
handling both maize and beans had a relatively higher turnover in both crops 
(414 bags of maize and 332 bags of beans). 
For the majority of traders, however, the scale of operation is much 
lower than the average figures indicate. The distribution of both variables, 
working capital and turnover, is heavily skewed. Most traders (75%) operated 
with a working capital of less than KShs 500 in maize and less than KShs 600 
in beans trade. The median values were KShs 402 (maize) and KShs 302 (beans). 
Figures on turnover show that 75% of maize traders handled fewer than 340 bags 
and 50% handled fewer than 240 bags of maize annually. The corresponding 
figures for beans traders show that 75% handled fewer than 280 bags and 50% 
handled fewer than 100 bags of beans annually. 
There are considerable regional variations, however, as Table 13 
reveals. Traders in maize and/or beans in Eastern Kenya, the major rural 
deficit area, on average seem to have significantly higher working capital 
and turnover than traders in other parts of the country. The figures should 
be regarded with caution, however, since the sample was affected by the 
banning of maize and beans trade in markets of Kitui District. In Western 




Table 13. Average Working Capital and Turnover of Maize and Beans 
for Market Traders by Basic Sample Zones, 1977. 
ZONE Turnover (bags) Working Capital (KShs.) 
Maize Beans Maize Trader Beans Trader 
Western 312 113 338 269 
Central 34 r 315 975 1, 184 
Easterna 1,012 658 4,457 3, 225 
TOTAL 350 280 759 1, 042 
ote. asampie not representative because maize and beans marketing were 
banned in Kitui District. 
Source: Own compilation. 
The majority of market traders are mobile and move between two or 
more markets, usually taking advantage of price differences for arbitrage 
5 
activities. Only about one third of maize and beans traders do not move and 
therefore could be termed resident traders. The rest are itinerant traders 
who can be further differentiated with regard to either their catchment area 
or the distances they bridge. Though the differentiation is somewhat arbitrary 
market traders who bridge no more than 50 km between markets can be viewed as 
intraregional traders; those who travel more than 50 km to the next selling or 
buying market tend to link different regions and therefore can be called inter-
regional traders. The latter, who largely belong to the group of bigger 
traders, account for approximately 14% of maize traders and 10% of beans 
traders; they travel an average distance of around 78 km (maize) or 155 km 
(beans) respectively, Apparently, interregional beans traders travel longer 
distances which most likely reflects the production situation. 
The largest category is that of intraregional traders who account 
for 50.8% of maize traders and 55.8% of beans traders. They travel to the 
next market which is an average distance of about 25 km (maize) or 22 km 
(beans). Distances recorded for Eastern Kenya are comparatively higher for 
7 
xntraregxonal as well as interregional traders. This is largely explained 
by the effects of relatively low population density on market centre density 
(see sample frame, chapter 1.2). 
5. Around 20% of maize and beans traders had more than two buying and/ 
or selling markets. When moving, they often cross district boundaries. 
6. The travel distance is in part of a function of population density. 
V. The mean travel distances (km) of traders for the basic sample zones 
were as follows: Western Central Eastern 
Maize traders 32 33 189 
Beans traders 35 21 190 
IDS/OP 31 
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In view of the regional and seasonal patterns of supply and demand 
which necessitate constant intraregional and interregional trade flows to 
link surplus and deficit areas, itinerant market traders who perform this 
function play an important role within the marketing system for maize and 
beans. Their position is especially vital since other private marketing 
functionaries are generally not permitted to participate in these marketing 
flows except through the MPB. Without controls, MPB agents would increasingly 
involve themselves in these marketing transactions. 
MPB agents refers in this study to private individuals appointed by 
and acting as agents of the MPB. Not covered by the survey are certain other 
institutions which may act as MPB agents: cooperatives and, in Rift Valley, 
the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) with its many stores throughout the province 
In typical smallholder areas, however, the individual MPB agent is the predominant 
feature. He is a trader, sometimes with partners (22%), who operates one or 
more (22.7%) licensed permanent stores in market, trading or other centres. 
The MPB agent's business is frequently registered even as a 'produce store'; 
even without the legal MPB monopoly the owner would probably continue to 
perform the same functions which he does as an agent but he would not sell 
exclusively to the MPB. In practice, certain agents violate the Maize Marketing 
Act by selling to other outlets. 'Produce store' is therefore a more neutral 
term for these marketing functionaries and allows for the fact that whether 
or not they are official MPB agents, they may or may not sell to the MPB. 
Produce storeholders (MPB agents) are characterized in Table 12. 
Unlike the market traders who are usually women between 30 and 50 years old 
with little formal education, most (about 72%) of the produce storeholders 
are men between 30 and 50 years old with comparatively high education. Only 
29.5% had no formal education; 51.1% had reached Standard 4-8; 8.3% attended 
school to Form II or above; and 1.2% had additional training of some sort. At 
g 
the time of the interviews, the average number of years in business was 8.4 
Before starting the produce store business, 11% had been employed and 5.4% had 
been engaged in other trading or business activities. Most of them, however, 
had been farming (48.7%), had stayed with their families or had been unemployed 
(28.5%), and only a few had started in business right after school (6.5%). In 
addition to trading, 81.6% of produce storeholders derived an income from other 
sources: 58.2% from agriculture and 23.8% from non-agricultural sources. Trade 
however, was still the major source of income, contributing an average of 55.5% 
of total income. 
8. The median value is 3.9 years. 
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Most produce storeholders were active throughout the year. Only 
9.4% closed down, usually during the off-season, for an average period of 
about 7 months. The major share of their trading income (67.9%) 'was derived 
from maize and beans sales). Only 21.4% of the agents dealt in maize only, 
56.5% handled both crops, 13.8% dealt in millet and/or sorghum and 8.4% in 
other produce. Besides being active in maize, beans and other produce trade, 
a relatively high number of produce storeholders (44.3%) ran a retail shop 
g 
that sold other food and non-food (6.5%) products. Thus, the product mix of 
their business was diversified. Their average working capital for maize and 
beans was KShs 7,620. However, 50% worked with less than KShs 5,000 (though 
none had below KShs 400 of working capital) .1<~> 
The average amount of maize and beans handled per year was 3,020 
bags (maize) and 753 bags (beans).11 As usual, the size distribution is 
rather skewed. 75% of the agents (produce stores) annually handled fewer 
than 2,760 bags and 50% handled fewer than 1,440 bags of maize. The respective 
figures for beans are 320 bags (75%) and 81 bags (50%). The highest average 
annual turnover for maize and beans was recorded for Central Kenya with 4,417 
bags of maize and 1,294 bags of beans. Western Kenya followed with 2',"993 bags 
of maize and 79 5 bags of beans. In lastern Kenya, agents averaged 2,603 bags 
of maize and 487 bags of beans. The regional distribution of working capital 
does not follow exactly the same pattern. Although it was highest in Central 
Kenya at KShs 14,794, agents in Eastern Kenya came next with KShs 11,231; 
agents in Western Kenya, with only KShs 6,113, came last. One reason for 
discrepancies might be higher prices in Eastern Kenya. 
Whereas market traders are members of the informal marketing sub-
system, MPB agents belong to the formal marketing sub-system. The third major 
type of marketing functionary operates more or less illegally in or between 
both sub-systems. This is the independent produce wholesaler or lorry trader. 
Officially, this type of trading does not exist since it is illegal. Similar 
to the interregional market traders, though usually bridging more distant 
12 . 
regions, independent produce wholesalers move directly between surplus areas 
and/or within deficit areas and take advantage of existing high price differen-
tials between areas to earn a profit. Beyond the control of the MPB, they 
operate on a much larger scale than MPB agents. They use their own or hired 
lorries and operate from one or more stores. For the purposes of this study, 
9. In some cases they were even linked to a wholesale business. 
10. The median value was KShs 4,971. 
11. Refers only to agents who handled beans. 
12. On average lorry traders travelled more than 200 km for buying and/or 
selling. 
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wholesalers who had a weekly turnover of more than 50 bags of ipf,ize. and 
beans, who channeled 25% or more of this turnover by evading the MPB, and 
who provided their own transport were defined as "independent produce 
wholesaler" or "lorry trader". 
The majority of lorry traders interviewed were men (65%) but the 
13 
proportion of women among them (35%) can be considered relatively high. 
Most (85%) were between 30 and 50 years old and their level of education on 
average was the highest for all functionaries: 15.8% had attended school to 
Form II or above and 68.4% attended to Standard 4-8. Compared to higher 
figures for the other groups, only 15.8% lacked formal education; even these, 
however, were definitely not illiterate. Before joining maize and beans 
trading, only 11,1% had been unemployed or with their family. All others 
were either farming (33.3%), engaged in other trade or business activities 
(16.7%), or were still attending school (5.6%). 
On average, independent produce wholesalers had almost 10 years of 
business experience in maize and beans marketing. Most operated throughout 
the year, although some (20%) stopped transactions for a period of about 20 
weeks. Most of them (90%) handled both maize and beans; 25% also traded in 
sorghum and/or millet; 35% in other produce; and only 10% handled maize only. 
Furthermore, 40% sold other food products, including processed food, and 15% 
even sold non-food products at the retail wholesale level. For some of them 
(16.7%), maize and beans trade was only a sideline business, though on average 
it accounted for 68.9% of total trading income. Additional sources of income 
were mentioned by 58.8% of lorry traders. 35% had a farm and 25% had non-farm 
income. These sources contributed an average 43% of total income. 
The large scale operations of lorry traders result in much higher 
working capital and turnover. The working capital used for maize and beans 
marketing transactions exceeded KShs 20,000 in 50% of the cases and KShs 40,000 
in 25%. The maximum figure was above KShs 300,000, leading to an average of 
'almost KShs 50,000. Disregarding that extreme value, however, the average 
'working capital was about KShs 27,000. The average annual turnover, reflecting 
the amount of working capital, was about 30,000 bags of maize and 10,000 bags 
• 14 » of beans, including extreme values. Without the extreme values, lorry traders 
on average handled 16,836 bags of maize and 3,790 bags of beans. Although the 
13. Since proper sampling methods could not be applied, figures are not 
representative (see section 1.2). 
14. The maximum given was 240,000 bags for maize and 108,000 for beans. 
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majority handled less, 50% still had a turnover of more than 10,000 bags of 
maize and 2,350 bags of beans and 25% handled more than 15,000 bags of maize 
and 4,000 bags of beans. Clearly, the scale of operation is usually far 
greater than that of other individual marketing functionaries and even of 
15 
cooperatives, which handled an average of 2004 bags of maize and 252 bags 
of beans (see de Graaff 1978. Table 10, p.14). The highest turnovers were 
recorded for Central and Eastern Kenya, whereas those for Western Kenya were 
considerably lower. This finding corresponds to the regional distribution 
of turnover for the other marketing functionaries. 
The most important functionaries of the maize and beans marketing 
system, market traders, produce stores or MPB' agents and lorry traders have 
now been described. The following section shows how they interact with each 
other and with other marketing functionaries. 
3.2 Marketing Channel Structures 
The structures of the maize and beans marketing systems are complex 
and difficult to identify. Furthermore, they vary with changing market 
conditions. The proportion of produce handled by each marketing channel as 
presented in Figure 1 and 2 is based on respondents' estimates as to their 
sources of supply and their outlets during different seasons. They provide 
a rough, though not a bad, approximation of the relative importance of 
individual marketing channels at the time of and prior to the survey. 
3.2.1 Marketing Channels for Maize: Outlets are different for smallholders, 
on the one hand, and for large-scale and medium-scale producers, on the other.; 
Whereas the marketed volumes of the larger producers enable them to sell to 
MPB depots, smallholders are dependent on MPB agents, cooperatives or traders 
whom they meet in the markets or who come to their holdings. One can speak 
therefore of a dualistic maize marketing structure for small-scale and large-
scale farmers. 
According to the IRS 1976/77 data, the major outlets for smallholders 
are traders of the informal sectors who account for about 60% of maize sales 
(Casley and Marchant 1978, p.42). These include "other local traders" who 
were not further specified, but some of them must be lorry traders who buy 
at the holding. The lorry trader share was estimated to be on the order of 3%. 
15. Handling maize and/or beans. 
16. Because the sample of lorry traders was small and not necessarily 
representative - most important lorry traders were met in Central and Eastern 
provinces - no regional distribution is given. 
17. This does not include purchases from medium-scale farmers. 
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Only 20% of smallholder sales go to MPB agents and 8% to cooperatives; 12% 
is sold directly to consumers. 
Figure 1 shows that market traders resell a major share of their 
maize to other market traders before it reaches the consumer. By so doing, 
they perform wholesale functions. This practice is particularly common 
during the peak season when there is a limited retail market because most 
rural customers consume their own maize. Then, the maize is sold to inter-
regional and intraregional traders who take it to a market where a less 
favourable supply situation prevails. In this way, maize often passes 
through three or more marketing channel stages, especially when "primary 
18 buyers" buy at the farm gate or roadsid and sell in the market. Other 
important outlets for market traders during the main supply season are lorry 
19 
traders and to a lesser extent MPB depots. Minor shares go to posho mills 
or brewers. 
During the off-season the picture changes. The same traders who 
previously acted as wholesalers now act as retailers. Maize bought from 
farmers is for the most part sold directly to consumers. The farmers' 
supply at this time, however, is usually not sufficient to meet the market 
demand. Therefore, traders rely heavily on supplies from other distant 
markets with sufficient supplies and thus lower prices. Only a minor supply 
role is played by shops and by lorry traders, who could bring in supplies 
from major surplus areas. Moreover, the MPB plays almost no part in supplying 
maize to rural markets. Its role increases only if shops and produce stores 
are included as competitive sources for consumers and this condition occurs 
more in urban centres than in rural areas. 
MPB maize sales to wholesalers, retailers and other traders accounted 
for ..only about 18% of their total sales. This figure includes agents who like 
market traders act as retailers during the off-season. The major proportion 
of MPB sales goes to big commercial mills (66%) and other processor such 
as stock-feed and starch manufacturers (6%); 4% was exported and 6% was used 
for the famine relief programme. 
The Board gets its maize supplies primarily from the large farm 
sector. Less than 25% originates from smallholders, if production estimates 
18. About 16% of maize bought from farmers by market traders in the survey 
area was bought at the farm gate (15.5%) and roadside (1%), mainly by smaller 
traders. In Central Kenya a considerably higher percentage (about 31%) was bought 
at the farm gate. 
19. Those market traders overlap with storeholders. 
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Figure 1: Marketing Channels for Smallholder Marketed Maize 1976/77 
* Marginal part ic ipation (below 1%) 
a Smallholder marketed maize output accounted for about 30% of total smallholder out-
put and roughly 45-50% of total marketed production including large scale marketed 
production. 
b During off-season agents sold about 6% of their turnover to other retai l shops, 
lorry trader with general wholesale business sold more than 75% to retai l shops. 
c Stock feed, starch etc. 
d Exports, Famine Rel ief, Cooperatives, Ins t i tut ions (schools, hosp i ta l s , prisons etc.) 
e Including In s t i tu t ions , which accounted for about 1-2 per cent. 
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20 are correct. This gives the MPB a market share of 30% in the smallholder 
maize market. Apart from agents and cooperatives, who respectively accounted 
for 57% and 20% of this share, the MPB was supplied by lorry traders (13%) 
and by market traders (10%). The smallholder market share of the MPB would 
be higher if, as the regulations stipulate, all maize beyond local requirements 
was supplied to the depots. But agents and cooperatives admitted selling about 
25% to other outlets, partly because of the inefficiency of the MPB. For lorry 
traders this proportion was (per definition) much higher:- those interviewed 
sold an average of 60% to non-MPB outlets, mostly to shops (40%), with minor 
amounts to market traders (10%) and to mills (10%). 
» r. 
Mills got an estimated 2% of smallholder-marketed maize from 5 
channels bypassing the MPB, which accounted for almost 10% of their intake 
from smallholder sources. However, because the MPB, with more than 75% of 
i • 
their} supply from large and mediumr.scale farmers, is the main supplier of the 
mills, it is difficult to use survey data to estimate the overall magnitude 
of illicit supplies to the milling sector,21 Altogether, flour mills and 
other processors received about 24% of maize marketed by smallholders which 
means that, neglecting exports, roughly-75% -reaches. 4:he Q&naiaer hqse?. distribu-
tors without prior processing. Part of the maize purchased from the MPB by 
wholesalers and other traders is for- a fee into posho by small 
posho mills before it is sold to consumers, but usually coiMRirjieJra:: buy the maize 
and go themselves to a posho mill if they want it to be ground. This is parti-22 cularly true for maize bought from market traders, 
So far, national averages have been given for channel proportions. 
There are, of course, regional differences stemming from production conditions,, 
market structures and infrastructure. In some areas, for example, especially 
within the Coffee Zones, seasonal supply patterns are not"as pronounced as in 
other areas. Therefore, market traders and storeholders in these areas are 
able to get supplies from farmers throughout the year, making them less 
dependent on sources such as the MPB and lorry traders during the off-season. 
,'•20. The relative importance of wha3Le,salen and retail shops indicated in 
".Figure 1 therefore increases if the supplies of medium- and large-scale farmers 
.-are considered*..,. However, it. should tfeLkept „ia mind..that-..after„.1.976/7-7 a con-
siderable portion of the MPB supply could not be sold and had to be stored. 
21. This depends largely on how much maize from large- and medium-scale 
.farmers reaches mills without being channelled through the MPB. That this 
lhappens was confirmed by lorry trader respondents. 
-22. Due to various constraints, posho mills could not be included in the 
'survey. Consequently, no exact channel figures can be given with regard to 
maize milled by posho mills. 
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On the other hand, deficit areas like Kitui which were affected by drought 
for several years were almost exclusively dependent on the MPB or on more 
competitive supplies by lorry traders. After the ex-depot price at Kitui 
was raised from KShs 84.70 to KShs 116.80 in March 1977, sales of the MPB 
in that area dried up almost completely. From that time onwards, the whole 
district was supplied by lorry traders. 
The importance of various types of outlets for farmers is highly 
dependent on the conditions in local markets and on the marketing infrastruc-
ture. In Western Province, for example Bungoma District, many market and 
trading centres were observed where either no markets operated or maize and 
beans were not handled in these markets; this left produce stores as the 
only legal outlets for smallholders and, together with retail shops, the 
only shopping facility for maize and beans consumers (see chapter 3.3). The 
situation was similar in Kitui and parts of Machakos District because of the 
banning of all maize transactions in the markets. 
The pattern also differs in the former large farm areas of Rift 
Valley Province, that is Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu. and Nyahururu. There, 
smallholder marketing infrastructure is often very poor. Only a few markets 
exist, mostly on major trunk roads, and the network of feeder roads is poorly 
developed. In these areas, market traders play a less important role than in 
the traditional smallholder regions; the major outlets are storeholders and 
23 lorry traders. 
These areas are particularly attractive to lorry traders and it is 
not surprising that a number of such traders mentioned them as among their 
24 . . 
major supply areas in Rift Valley Province. Meru, Embu and Kirmyaga 
were other supply areas mentioned, mainly by the lorry traders serving Kitui 
and Machakos. Those areas have been neglected by the MPB marketing infra-
structure, which is limited in capacity and oriented towards the railway 25 
line from Nanyuki via Nyeri to Nairobi. There are no direct links between 
the above mentioned areas and adjacent deficit areas. 
Supply and sales areas reported by lorry traders are major surplus 
and deficit areas respectively. They thus give some indication of the illicit 
interregional channel pattern. Major flows originate in the production areas 
of Rift Valley Province and move towards the deficit areas in the northern 
23. Despite the fact that lorry traders do not act as MPB agents according 
to the legislation, they often sell a major portion of their maize to the MPB. 
24. One lorry trader in Western Kenya mentioned that they deliberately went 
to places with bad infrastructure. 
25. Thus, in 1976/77 for instance, MPB agents (produce storeholders) in Meru 
sold about 70% of their sales to lorry traders; only about 30% was delivered to the 
depot. 
and eastern parts of the country. Flows to the southwest (Western and 
Nyanza provinces) also take place but seem to be of minor importance. Other 
major flows can be observed between the Coffee Zones East of Rift, particularly 
Meru and Embu, and areas of Kitui, Machakos and adjacent districts. For the 
2 6 latter areas, Meru, Embu and similar areas of Central Province were said to 
27 
rank second to supply areas of western Rift Valley districts and Nyahururu. 
Some supplies came from the Machakos and Oloitokitok area. Districts of 
Central Province also received supplies from surplus areas in Meru and Embu; 
these were supplemented by other flows, particularly from Nyahururu. Altogether, 
these interregional flow patterns indicate that, despite the controls, private 
illicit channels have been developed which for certain regions play an important 
role and sometimes outrank the MPB role in terms of volumes shipped. 
3.2.2. Marketing Channels for Beans. The basic channel structure for marketing 
of beans, shown in Figure 2, is quite similar to that for smallholder-marketed 
maize. The most important channels are those of the informal sub-system in 
local markets, followed by MPB channels, lorry traders and cooperatives. There 
are, however, differences with regard to the relative importance of individual 
channels. The most striking difference is that a considerably higher proportion 
of marketed beans was either retailed by market traders immediately after being 
bought from farmers (approximately 30%) or was sold directly by farmers, to 
2 8 ' consumers (.28%). Since in additiqn MPB agents sold to consumers about 18% 
of beans obtained from farmers, around 60% of the beans were marketed directly 
or passed through only one intermediate channel step. 
A further major difference observed at the initial stages of the 
29 2-
marketing system is that cooperatives seem to be only marginally involved. 
Furthermore, MPB. agents got-only-16% and MPB depots-received only 14% of the 
marketed beans. Thus, the formal sub-system in general seems to be even less 
important than in the case of maize. This was true despite the comparatively 
favourable prices offered by the MPB at the beginning of and prior to this 
survey. Earlier and again later the MPB offered lower prices and as a result 
were virtually out of the market, except for one variety, Mexican 142, which 
.26. These areas were referred to as "Kikuyuni™ by ""several respondents but 
could not be specified further. Sometimes it was not quite clear whether it was 
the traders who came from there or the maize, which of course could have been 
bought elsewhere, or both. 
27. One big distributor in Kitui estimated that supplies from Rift Valley 
accounted for approximately 50%, Meru and Embu 40% and other areas 10% of total 
supply. Another respondent even claimed that supplies from Western Kenya, includ-
ing Kisii, were channelled via Nyahururu into Central and Eastern provinces. 
28. One reason for this might be that beans are not as widely grown as maize 
and therefore have a better market locally. 
29. A special survey on cooperatives showed that especially in "Western and'^ • 
Eastern provinces some cooperatives handle beans, though according to IRS data no 
beans were sold to them. See de Graaff-1,978, p.14 and Casley and Marchant 1978,p.42, 
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Figare 2: Marketing Channels for Smallholder Marketed Beans 1976/77 
* Marginal part ic ipat ion (below 1%) 
a Smallholder marketed beans production accounted for about 25% of total small-
holder beans output which is almost 100% of national beans production. 
b During off-season agents sold 6% of their beans turnover and lorry traders 
with general wholesale business almost 90% to retai l shops. 
c I n s t i t u t i on s , Cooperatives 
d Including in s t i tu t ions accounting for about 1 - 2 per cent. 
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, . . 3 0 is used for canning. 
j .. ' ^ s . i 
Most beans (86%) received by the MPB are sold to processors (canners) 
on tender basis at Nairobi. Minor amounts are sold to wholesalers and shops 
(14%), market traders, institutions or are used for famine relief and similar 
programmes. The MPB's market share in the distribution of unprocessed beans 
therefore is rather low even when it is supplied with beans. Consequently, 
it accounted for only 20% of beans purchases made by wholesalers and shops, most 
cf :.• which operate in urban areas, particularly Nairobi. In rural areas the 
• 
contribut ion of the MPB is even less. Furthermore, since only negligible 
amounts of beans channelled through the MPB reach rural markets, beans consumers 
in these areas are almost exclusively dependent on supplies from non-MPB 
sources. Beans obtained from shops were mostly supplied by market traders or 
lorry traders who accounted for 30% and 50% of supplies respectively. 
Lorry traders got most of their supplies from producers (37.5,%), ? it 
market traders (37.5%) and agents (215%). They then sold mainly to whole-
salers and shops. They also supplied market traders, but even during the 
off-season market traders .bought. mostly from..farmers., and other..market-..traders . 
In Central and Eastern Kenya lorry traders, shops and stores were of soine 
relevance to market traders, though their contribution in volume terms was 
! E 
relatively unimportant. In markets^ direct marketing by farmers and !j 
retailing by traders prevail. On average, only about 18.5% of beans handled 
in the informal, local marketing sub-system reached a second or third stage 
within the market trader channel, whereas for maize the proportion was about 
32%. About 76% of beans purchased by rural consumers in markets did nojt go 
through any wholesale stage. 
>< ! 
Regional differences correspond to findings on maize. In""areas 
like Bungoma and Kitui, where neither beans nor maize was handled in markets, 
the importance of stores and lorry traders as outlets and sources increases. 
Western Kenya and Rift Valley Province, however, are not major production 
or demand areas, and lorry traders were generally of little significance 
there. Beans sold to stores usually were delivered to the MPB. In Eastern 
Kenya, a major production and supply area for beans, stores, shops and lorry 
traders were important1 outlets, at least for market" traders, in"places*where 
beans were handled in markets. During the season, about 35% of their sales 
31 were to such outlets and 28% went to MPB depots which indicates major 
30. In Eastern and Central provinces for example, where beans production 
is most important, only 843 bags (other than Mexican 142) were delivered to 
the Board in 1973/74. See Maize and Produce Board, Eighth Annual Report, 1973/ 
1974. 
31. Because of the nature of the sample, this figure might not be rep-
resentative (see chapter 1.2). 
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surpluses. During the off-season the stores, shops and lorry traders were 
significant in supplementing supplies from farmers. This pattern was even 
more pronounced in Central Kenya, where during the off-season these sources 
accounted for about 38% of supplies to market traders, that is, 7 5% of 
supplies from non-farm sources. 
Although lorry traders were of little significance for Western 
Kenya, the opposite was true for Central and Eastern Kenya. Depending on 
32 
the season, these areas supplied each other with beans. The respective 
flows were mainly facilitated by lorry traders. For stores (agents) in 
Central Kenya, lorry traders were the major outlet during the season and 
the major source during the off-season accounting for more than 50% of both 
sales and purchases. In Eastern Kenya, most surpluses were said to be 
supplied to the MPB but, as in the case of maize, checks on records of depots 
showed that this was not always correct. The same was true with regard to 
supplies during the off-season. Interviews with lorry traders showed that 
at last in Kitui, they supplied those areas where stores claimed to buy 
33 
from the MPB. Overstatement of sales to and supplies from the MPB was a 
general problem with interviews of agents or produce stores; if they admitted 
using different channels they were admitting violations of the marketing 
legislation. Thus, it is possible that the MPB role as a marketing channel 
is even less than indicated by the proportions given in the flow charts. 
3 . 3 Market Structure 
The market structure in terms of market concentration (number and 
size of market participants), market transparency (information) and market 
entry is a major determinant of the performance of marketing systems. 
According to the concept of competition, performance is expected to be 
satisfactory under the following conditions: 
(1) if a sufficient number of buyers and/or sellers exist to 
provide alternative outlets and/or sources without one of 
them having the market power to dominate the others; 
(2) if market transparency with regard to product quality, 
varieties, grades and prices is given; and 
(3) if no serious barriers to market entry exist. 
The following sections will examine these conditions for different channel 
levels of the maize and beans marketing system. 
32. Sales of beans usually precede those of maize which, in 1976/77 they 
were at peak during July - September in Eastern Province and during October— 
December in Central Province. Sales in Central Province remained significant 
from January-March, but this was not the case in Eastern Province (Casley and 
Marchant 1978, p.36). 
33. Lorry traders reported that 65% of their supplies to Kitui came from 
Mpr^ n n^rl TvTnKn pnH namo -Pv^ m V^o 
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3.3.1. Degree of Market Concentration: Market concentration varies 
considerably with the points of sales or purchases, markets, regions and 
time. According to IRS data for 1976/77, about one third of maize and 
beans was sold at the holding or roadside not at a market or trading 
34 
centre. This agrees with the results of the Maize and Beans Trader 
Survey which showed that a number of market traders, produce stores and 
especially lorry traders buy at the holding or roadside (see Table 14). 
For market traders, this is particularly true in Central and Western 
Kenya with regard to maize, and in Central and Eastern Kenya with regard 
to beans. As far as stores are concerned, purchases at the holding or ; 35 roadside are relatively more important in Western and Eastern Kenya. 
Table 14: Point of Purchase for Major Marketing Functionaries During 
the Supply Season (%) 
Point of Market Trader MPB Agent Produce Store Lorry Trader 
Purchase Maize Beans Maize Beans Maize Beans 
Holding 17.2 18.0 20.3 16.3 40.0 
|i 
36 .8 
Roadside 1.9 4.6 0.1 0.3 15.0 15.8 
Market 86.0 81.7 26.4 35.4 30.0 26.3 
Shop N. A. N.A. i 100.oa 100.ob 26.3 36.8 
Notes: a Not applicable. 
b 52.2% of storeholders claimed that they bought maize only at the 
shop. The respective figure was 50.1% for beans. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Farmers selling at the holding or roadside are usually faced with 
a buyer holding a monopsony .or quasi monopsony, position at the time of. trans-
action, although over a period of time, the number of buyers may be numerous. 
34. See Casley and Marchant 1978, p. 30. The proportion includes sales 
to consumers. 
35. See Table A7, Appendix. The percentage of maize and beans bought 
by market traders at the holding and roadside is as follows: 
Western Central Eastern Total 
.Maize 11.4 24.8 8.5 16.4 
keans 1.4 30.0 39.1 21.1 
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Unless the farmer has a good knowledge of market conditions and possible 
outlets in a nearby market or trading centre, his/her alternatives are 
limited or non existent, which reduces his/her bargaining position 
considerably. This is the case especially during the peak supply season 
where rural markets or assembling centres also face a buyers' market, 
though the number of outlets, traders and stores is usually high. 
In general, large and small markets handling maize and beans 
in surplus areas have an atomistic structure during the peak season. In 
other words, they provide sufficient numbers of outlets for sellers, that 
is, farmers and market traders. In most markets visited where maize and 
beans transactions took place, more than 10 traders were operating at a 
time (see Table 15). At major markets during peak months, usually more 
36 than 30 maize traders and sometimes as many as 100 or more are present.. 
The respective number for beans traders is generally lower but more than 
37 20 traders and even as many as 50 is not rare. 
During these peak periods, one finds primarily wholesale trans-
actions. Later, when local supplies from farmers'go down, markets turn 
mainly into retail and sellers' markets with a considerably lower number 
of retailing and supplying traders. At Luanda and Limuru markets, for 
example, the large number of peak-season traders fell to only 19 and 13 
maize traders and 12 and 16 beans traders respectively at a later time 
3 8 of the season. Thus, In many of the smaller markets, oligopolistic or 
i' even monopolistic market structures can emerge, particularly for beans 
39 
marketing (see Table 15). However, in the majority of markets where maize 
and beans trading continues throughout the year, one can expect 5 or more 
traders (at least for maize). In CBS sample markets handling maize and/or 
beans, only 13.5% had fewer than 5 maize traders and 31.1% fewer than 5 
40 
beans traders. Moreover, market traders at the retail level during the 
off-season had to reckon with shop and storeholders as competitors. 
From the above it can be concluded that markets handling maize 
and/or beans tend to provide competitive structures in terms of the number 
of traders, though this is true to a lesser degree during the slack season. 
As Table 15 reveals, however, markets do not provide laternative outlets 
36.' ""•*..• The highest number of maize traders (341) was counted at Luanda 
Market, Kakamega District; the second highest (210) at Limuru. 
37. The highest number of beans traders were counted at Luanda (50) 
and at Limuru (67). 
38. Unpublished data of CBS Market Structure Survey. 
39. Reliable figures cannot be cited because market structures could 
not be monitored throughout the survey period. 
40. Unpublished data of CBS sample markets. 
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Table 15: Number of Market Traders In Sample Markets At Day of 
Visit by Basic Sample Zone (%) 
Crop Zone 0 1 - 5 6 - 1 0 11 - 20 21 - 30 Above 3C 
Maize Western 45.2 - 6.5 19.4 6.5 22.6 
Central 11.1 5.6 11.1 5.6 22.2 44.4 
Eastern 63.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 10.5 10.5 
Total 41.2 2.9 7.4 13.2 11.8 25.0 
Beans Western 45.2 16.1 12.9 6.5 16.1 p.2 
Central 11.1 16.7 5.6 11.1 22.2 33.3 
Eastern 57.9 5.3 10.5 5.3 10.5 10.5 
Total 39.7 13.2 10.3 7.4 16.2 13.2 
Source: Own compilation. 
i 
for farmers or sources for consumers as often as is commonly thought. 
41 
Numerous markets did not trade in maize and/or beans. Thus, in about 
40% of sample markets, particularly in Western and Eastern Kenya, no maize 
or beans traders were found. The percentage might be slightly lower if 
only the peak seasons were taken into account, because not all markets 
could be visited at that time. But sthe difference should be only slighj:, 
since ••according to the time schedule for the survey, maize and beans 
transactions were to be expected in these markets, especially those in ,i 42 . " Western Kenya. Furthermore, for most of the markets it was ascetained 
that the situation was no different at other times of the year. ij 
In places where no maize and beans markets operate, farmers and 
consumers rely mainly on MPB. agents,'individual storehoiders or. shops.... 
43 
This condition applied to 64.3% of the sample markets. In 14.3% of them, 
a cooperative performed the functions of an.agent, but elsewhere neither 
market traders, individual storeholders, nor a cooperative could be identified. 
Reasons for their absence might include the presence of these outlets in 
nearby larger centres or, as in the case of Kericho Market, KFA stores which 44 were supposed to deliver the necessary services. 
41. In addition, it should be kept in mind that in quite a number of 
market or trading centres no regularly operating markets exist (see section 2.4). 
42. During the slack season in Western and Central Kenya, interviews 
were carried out in Kitui where marketing of maize and beans was banned through-
out. Even later on, despite a relatively good harvest, the ban on marketing 
in Kitui continued. 
43. This situation is likely to. occur also in the former large farm areas 
which were not covered by the Maize and Beans Trader Survey. 
44. At least in Sotik, such outlets did not exist. Members of the dairy 
and pyrethrum cooperative reported that they had to sell to lorry traders. 
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In the majority of centres where produce stores or MPB agents 
were found, two or more stores provided alternatives within this group 
of marketing functionaries (see Table 16). Only in 16.7% of these centres 
\ • 
was only one active agent identified. Even in these centres, if intertype 
competition exists, that is, if market traders or cooperatives are alter-
native marketing channels, the negative impact of only one active agent was 
mitigated. In all the sample centres, this was found to be the case. 
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that except for Eastern Kenya the 
market centre density was relatively high. Storeholders in adjacent 
centres therefore might be regarded as competitors. 
Table 16: Percentage of Sample Markets with MPB Agents (Produce Stores) 
by Number of Stores and Basic Sample Zones 
Number of Western Central Eastern Total 
Stores Kenya Kenya Kenya 
0 44.8 50 10.5 36.4 
1 6.9 11.1 15.8 10.6 
2-3 34.5 16.7 42.1 31.8 
4-5 6.9 11.1 21.1 12.1 
5 and above 6.9 11.1 10.5 9.1 
Source: Own compilation. 
Agents, however, should not be viewed as ordinary competitors. They 
are meant to perform a special role within the marketing system: to guarantee 
a minimum price fixed by the Government in contrast to open market prices which 
fluctuate according to supply and demand. Taking this special role into con-
sideration, the picture is less favourable than it appears initially. In 30.4% 
of the sample markets — in Western Kenya 44.8% and in Central Kenya 50% — no 
active MPB agent or produce storeholder could be identified. Consequently, in 
quite a number of market centres, no alternative existed to the informal open 
45 
market system, or to lorry traders. This conclusion holds true even if one 
considers that in a few cases (6.7%) cooperatives assumed the role of an agent. 
Moreover, it is supported by the fact that 52.8% of producers interviewed in 
the sample markets did not know any MPB agent in the vicinity of the market. 
'45. This statement does not consider that market prices might be permanently 
above the MPB prices so that no agent could compete. 
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The situation turns out to be critical, especially at the assembly 
stages of the marketing channel, if there is no outlet other than lorry traders, 
even though there might be competition among lorry traders. No reliable 
information exists regarding how often this condition occurs. However, though 
sample markets with no operating maize or beans market and no storeholders or 
i i 
agents were not major surplus areas, the survey shows that in one case farmers 
had no choice but to sell to lorry traders. The respondent in this case did 
not know how many lorry traders were competing with each other. 
With regard to the competitive situation of lorry traders, the only 
information available is that given by the lorry traders themselves. Their 
responses indicate that in 75% of the places where they bought maize or beans 
they competed with two or more lorry traders, and in 47% of the places with four 
46 
or more. But it should be kept in mind that at a given time they might 
enjoy a quasi-monopolistic situation, particularly in areas with bad infra-
structure . 
On the distribution side, the situation is usually less problematic, 
since lorry traders at least come into competition with the MPEL^ Disregarding . 
the MPB, they usually competed with more than one distributor. In Kitui, one 
of the major distribution areas for lorry traders, during peak periods maize 
47 
was distributed by 50 to 100 lorries- usually belonging to different traders. 
Thus, the structure In terms of number of lorry traders can be termed atomistic. 
Even with respect to lorry traders, in most cases alternatives seem 
to be available to buyers and sellers at the distribution and assembly stages, 
regardless of whether or not other types of marketing functionaries compete 
with them. Often they do. ?' u % at all channel levels a sufficient number 
of market participants usually can be assumed, though i-ntertype--competition, 
especially from MPB agents, cannot be guaranteed in all rural centres. More-
over, usually no one competitor is big enough to control the actions of the 
others.. This holds true even if the skewed size distribution described earlier 
'is taken into consideration. Though the overall distribution is rather skewed, 
it does not necessarily apply to the same extent for specific centres or markets. 
Larger differences in the size of operation were more evident between different 
places and regions than within one centre or market. Furthermore, if the 
number of traders in markets decreased and the market turned into a retail 
and sellers market, all remaining retail traders were generally small. Usually 
no operation was big enough to dominate the market. 
46. As Table 14 shows those competitors might even be MPB agents who buy 
at the holding roadside. 
47. This figure corresponds to. the weekly requirements of the Kitui popu 
lation. At that time, the MPB was selling virtually nothing. It provided maize 
only under the famine relief programme".- ~ 
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There are, however, exceptions to the rule which are difficult to 
quantify.. Some market traders, for example, complained that during the off-
48 
season, supplies of maize and beans dry up and become very erratic. Under 
such conditions a major supplier is likely to enjoy a monopolistic situation 
on specific market days. Lorry traders might enjoy similar monopoly powers 
when supplying storeholders. Apart from this, certain lorry traders operate 
on such a scale that they are probably in a position to control the market 
in their area of operation. Such control, however, seems to occur mainly in 
supply areas; in major sales areas they have to compete with many other 
traders, as the example of Kitui shows. In these cases, the degree of market 
concentration is rather low despite the fact that some traders operate on a 
considerably higher scale than others. 
3.3.2 Market Transparency. Market transparency affects the intensity of 
competition. If buyers or sellers do not have proper knowledge about market 
conditions, the intensity of competition is low despite a sufficient number 
of market participants to ensure competition. In open markets, the pre-
conditions for a high degree of market transparency are rather poor. There 
are no uniform measurements or weights or standard grades. Market traders 
tise a multitude of different tinsf^kalabashes, cups, debes, baskets and bags 
so that direct price comparisons are very difficult. Although the price 
within the market usually tends to be uniform, the amount sold for that price 
differ greatly: price variations are replaced by quantity variations. Test 
weighing revealed that at the retail level, weights varied from 20% to more 
49 
than 100% at a given price. Similar weight variations of around 20% can be 
assumed at the market wholesale level especially considering the number of 
debes (4 gallon tins) whose sides are deliberately pounded in or out to affect 
volume. In addition, bags used were not uniform. 
Lack of standardized grades adds to the possibly deliberate confusion 
over containers used for measuring. Because of the numerous varieties handled, 
the problem is more severe in the case of beans. The MPB distinguishes 15 
different varieties, but a survey by Van Rheenen found 78 different types of 
food beans differentiated by colour, size and shape (Van Rheenen 1976, pp. 5.6). 
Among them he identified 10 types common to almost all beans growing areas, of 
which 6 belonged to the Rose Coco group. Despite this reduction a smaller 
number of common types, the heterogeneity among t": e beans is so great that 
48. 16.1% of all maize traders and 19.1% of all beans traders complained 
of lack of or irregular supplies during the off season. In addition to this, 
11.3% and 7.7% of maize and beans traders respectively complained of general 
lack of supplies. 
49. These samples cannot claim to be representative. 
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market transparency is definitely diminished. 
! 
Transparency is reduced still further by such factors as impurities 
infestations, treatment with insecticides, and so forth, that increase the 
differentiation of the commodity handled. Such conditions affecting product 
quality also obscure market transparency for maize, though the issue ofs 
variety is less important. The major distinction in terms of consumer 
preference is that between white and yellow maize. Because yellow maize is 
viewed as inferior, it is not found very often in markets; where it occurs i 
it is usually mixed with white maize. Another major factor of differentiation, 
particularly for maize, is moisture content. It varies considerably and, 
with the other differentiating factors, aggravates price comparisons for all 
market participants. 
The effects of poor market transparency are not limited to the 
markets but also have implications for the interaction between the informal 
and formal sub-system. Because standardized weights and measures used in the 
formal sub-system are different from those in the informal system, comparisons 
between the two system. Grades are rather broadly defined. The- MPB.--e-ecepl3s-
a "fair average quality" (FAQ) and rejects any supply below that standard 
but pays no premium for higher quality. Furthermore, grading of maize and 
beans by agents or storeholders is subjective and therefore may allow tjfiem to 
influence market conditions in their favour. Such problems also exist at 
depots, where managers may try to take advantage of their power to determine 
whether maize or beans can be classified as FAQ or not. This practice was 
emphasized by 50.2% of all MPB agents interviewed. Moreover, the MPB depot 
managers often sell without repeating the grading or weighing process which 
is necessary because of infestation, shrinkage, and so forth. Thus, even 
within the formal MPB channels market transparency is limited because grades 
and weights often are not reliable. 
Insufficient market transparency is a more serious problem for 
^farmers and consumers who buy in the market. Consumers who buy from formal 
sources such as shops do not face big problems with regard to market trans-
parency unless they want to compare 'conditions with those in markets. Those 
buying in the market, however, usually have less knowledge about market 
-conditions than do traders. The same distinction applies to farmers as 
opposed to traders. Unlike farmers and consumers, traders have their own 
measurements, tins, kalabashes. etc, and know exactly how much each contains 
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when it is filled.^ For every transaction, therefore, they only use their 
measure which they easily relate to other standard measurements. 
Farmers and consumers, faced with a multitude of measurements, 
clearly suffer under the imperfections described. When buying from farmers, 
for example, traders (including lorry traders and storeholders who buy at the 
farm or roadside) often use debes whose sides have been pounded out. When 
I 1 ;• 
selling, they exchange them for "debts whose sides are beaten. Another 
example was given by a woman trader who used a small kalabash in order to 
impress farmers by the large number of measuring transactions. As she 
explained, farmers thought she paid much more for a given amount than the 
MPB agent, who poured all the maize at once into one container and thus had 
only one measuring transaction. In fact she paid less. In this case farmers 
were misled psychologically. The same deceptions happen with consumers. 
Traders, too, are affected by the lack of standardization if they 
do not visit other markets to exchange market information. They can be 
particularly hampered in assessing quality standards, which under the present 
marketing systems requires personal inspection. As far as standard measure-
ments are concerned, those mentioned above, can and do serve as common * 
denominators for traders. 
i | 
Apart from the degree of standardization or differentiation, market 
transparency depends on the extent to which market participants are informed 
about prevailing market conditions. i Farmers and traders were therefore asked 
about their knowledge of market prices. The majority of producers selling 
in markets showed that they were aware of the importance of this question. 
Most of them (65.6%) claimed that they knew prices in advance before going 
to the market to sell. Information was obtained by prior visits or from 
51 others who returned from the market. However, only 13.7% of them were also 
informed about prices in adjacent markets, and only 4-5.6% knew about prices 
52 
paid by the MPB agents in the vicinity of the market. Because their infor-
mation generally was confined to the conditions of one place, their bargaining 
50. In one market a woman trader was observed trying to find a new small 
kalabash exactly the same size as her old one which was broken. As she explained, 
she1knew how many of her kalabashes filled both-a Kimbo tin and one standard debe. 
She wanted the same size in order not to change her basis of calculation. 
"51. In Western Kenya, however, farmers were significantly less informed than 
in the other zones. Only 4-1.7% had prior knowledge about market prices compared 
to 87.1% in Central and 73.9% in Eastern Kenya. 
52. In Western Kenya only 39.1% and in Central Kenya 30.7% were informed about 
MPB prices, whereas for Eastern Kenya the figure was 61.9%. These percentages, how-
•ever, should be regarded with caution because the relevant question was originally 
designed to find out whether farmers knew the official MPB prices. Farmers often 
referred instead to the actual prices paid by agents. Since in this way it was 
possible to detect that certain agents- bought far below the official prices, the 
question was not changed-taking into account that there would be no consistency 
with regard to the price mentioned. 
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position was comparatively weak. It was weakened further if they were not 
f • ? ' "t aware of selling prices of other farmers at the time of sale. Only 41.6% 
claimed to have this information which was mostly obtained by observation 
(64.9%)'.' 
As expected, the degree of information among market traders was 
higher.: Excluding a minority of about 10%, all maize and beans traders 
obtained - ihore^ TOthantfe.gui'tBt one price information before buying; over 
75% also had such information before selling. For agents, the question 
was relevant only if they bought from sources other than farmers or the 
MPB. Where this occurred, most of them (72%) had received prior price 
information from other than the actual supplier. The same pattern applied 
to lorry traders. 
Even more important than knowledge of prices at the point of purchase 
pr sale is information about conditions in other places. In general, such 
informat 
ion is very limited. Table 17 suggests that almost no intermarket or 
interregional exchange of information takes place except that based on , 
r personal contacts and observation. In the oa&e of-farmers, knowledge of • 
'l market conditions is confined to the specific market or area of operation. 
Table 17. Knowledge of Marketing Functionaries About Market Prices (%)l 
Criterion of Degree of Price Market Trader Produce Stores Lorry 
Information :Maize Beans (MPB Agent) trader 
Knowledge about prices in , 
other Marketsa 55.6 45.8 47.5 $7.9 
Radius of Price Adjacent 
Information markets •59 .6 81. 2 80 .9 45 .5 
Not adjacent, -
othe districts ! 39 .9 17. 8 18 .8 27 .3 
Not adjacent, 
other provinces 0 .5 1. 1 0 .3 27 .3 
Method of Obtaining Observation 71 .4 74. 9 56 .0 72 .7 
Trice Information Personal Commu-
nication 28 .4 24. 7 23 .7 9 .1 
Both „t "0 .2 P. 4 _ .... 20 .3 . . _ ... 9 
Other Method 9 .1 
•NO"t S * cl . Market traders were asked whether they knew prices in markets other 
than the one at which they Were interviewed. 
(Source: Own compilation.. 
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For1 all marketing functionaries, observation and personal 
communication are virtually the only sources of information, the former 
being more important than the latter. Moreover, only slightly more than 
50% of maize traders and even fewer beans traders are informed about prices in 
other markets, mainly prices in adjacent markets. Maize traders, particularly 
in Western Kenya (Table A8, Appendix), are relatively better informed, but 
most of their price information is for markets in other districts in which 
they themselves operate. Information on prices in markets of other provinces 
is generally lacking. Only in Eastern Kenya were traders found who had 
• 53 knowledge of prices in other provinces (see Table A8, Appendix). 
For MPB agents and to a certain extent for lorry traders the 
situation is similar. Market prices are known by only about 50% of agents 
and 60% of lorry traders. Furthermore, the knowledge of agents is also 
mostly confined to home or adjacent markets. This is more or less the ..case 
54 . . . 
in all zones. Only among lorry traders is the knowledge about prices: m 
markets of . other districts and provinces significantly higher. The figure 
in Table 17 actually underestimate their degree of market information t, . 
because they refer only to prices in open markets. Lorry traders who buy at 
the farm, roadside or store are certainly aware of prices in those places, 
if not in markets. ' ' 'i 
It is clear that, except for lorry traders, the knowledge of 
marketing functionaries about prices and market conditions beyond their home 
or adjacent areas is not very great. Hence, as far as market information is 
concerned, the network of markets constituting the informal system is not 
well integrated. Furthermore, the whole informal network is poorly integrated.' 
into the formal system since the MPB has no functioning market intelligence 
55 
service for its operations. Thus, it can be concluded that on a national 
level market transparency within the, maize and beans marketing system is rather 
limited and therefore not conducive to high marketing efficiency. 
3.3.3. Market Entry. Barriers to market entry reduce the threat of potential 
.competition and therefore impede marketing efficiency. Barriers can result 
•from limited know-how, capital requirements, institutional restrictions and 
non competitive reactions of established traders. Generally, market entry is 
53. See footnote -38", in which the mean travel distance of market traders 
by zones was given. Traders from Eastern Kenya travelled much farther than 
those of Central and Western Kenya. 
54. When comparing Eastern, Central and Western Kenya, the relative sizes 
of provinces and districts should be taken into account. 
55. So far only a crop forecast system has been introduced. 
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not a major problem within the maize and beans marketing system-though if 
asked, traders often complain of capital, experience and knowledge.56 But 
these factors do not really prevent traders from entering the market, as 
can be seen both from the high number of marketing functionaries at all 
channel levels and from the relatively high fluctuation of the trader 
population, except for lorry traders (see Section 3.1.). 
Furthermore, throughout the country and across all types of 
marketing, functionaries the reaction to "aggressive" newcomers conforms 
to the concept of competition. On average only a minority of less than 1% 
of market traders and 5% of storeholders (agents) were determined to use 
non competitive means to prevent a potential competitor from market entry. 
Most of those storeholders (5%) said they would defend the market area 
allocated them by the MPB by reporting a threat to the authorities. 
As far as know-how for maize and beans trade is concerned, no 
special training is required. The business is learned by doing. Only with 
increased scale of operation and diversification of the product line is 
knowledge of basic accounting and other skills of advantage. Courses offered 
by Trade Officers of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry were attended by 
40.6% of storeholders (agents) and 38.8% of lorry traders. 
The major impediments to market entry are usually the capital 
requirements. But even these barriers to maize and beans marketing are 
relatively low, irrespective of the zone (see Table 18). The highest 
average starting capital was recorded, of course, for storeholders and lorry 
traders, but 50% of them started with even less than the average KShs. 
2200 (storeholders) and KShs. 4000 (lorry traders). Generally the initial 
capital requirements are so low that sources beyond personal or family 
savings are unnecessary. This was the case for 95% or more of market traders 
and storeholders. Only lorry traders (11.8%) used credit facilities such 
as banks. Those who did were general wholesalers who used their general 
overdraft to enter maize and beans trade. 
Institutional restrictions to market entry are relevant for MPB 
•agents (storeholders) and lorry traders. The former are appointed by the 
MPB under the terms of the Maize Marketing Act which stipulates that agents 
56. These questions are therefore not very helpful and were only asked 
of market traders. They gave the expected answers as follows (percentage for 
maize and beans traders respectively): lack of capital (76.4; 86.8); lack of 
experience (49.9; 47.1); unknown (28.7; 20.0), established traders (10.7; 6.4) 
other (1.9; 6.5); and starting difficulties (0.6; 0.4). There were no major 
regional differences in answers. 
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be assigned a specific area in which to operate. The number of agents 
appointed for an area is at the discretion of the MPB. However, as 
mentioned earlier, a considerably higher number of storeholders hold< 
licences than actually operate, so that from a competitive point of view 
licencesins practices are not an impediment to market entry. Only if an 
. . . . . 57 agent wants to be licensed for more than one area might difficulties arise. 
Table 18: Mean Starting Capital of Marketing Functionaries by Sample Zone 
(KShs.) 
Sample Zones Market Trader Produce Store Lorry 
Maize Beans (Agents) Trader 
est era 
Kenya 87 52 3,488 N.A. 
Central 
.Kenya " 337 418 "'2,959 N.A. 
Eastern Kenya 265 213 3,858 N.A. 
TOTAL 166 237 3,517 9,805 
Source: Own compilation. 
In practice, then, market barriers are only a serious problem for 
lorry traders. The Maize Marketing Act absolutely prohibits lorry trader 
operations. Those who take the risk to operate are relatively few compared 
to the potential number who could function under a decontrolled maize and 
beans marketing system. In such a situation, lorry traders predicted a 
tremendous increase in competitors. As a group, they could then compete 
with the MPB which holds the legal monopoly for interregional exchange in 
which lorry traders currently are involved illegally. 
57. One respondent registered for additional shops with the help of 
dummies"("partners"). 
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MARKET CONDUCT OF MAJOR MARKETING FUNCTIONARIES 
! 
Market conduct is second to market structure as a major determinant 
of the performance of a marketing system. Analysis of market conduct entails 
an examination of the: buying and selling behaviour of various marketing 
functionaries; forms which competition amongst them takes (e.g. pricing, terms 
of payment, credit and the like); level of activity; and actions to avoid 
competition by, for example, collusion. 
4.1 Market Traders ; 
A survey of market trader perceptions of supplier and buyer moti-
vations was undertaken in order to ascertain their market conduct. The 
results summarised in Table 19 show that the basic pattern for maize and 
beans traders is similar. Both consider cash payment the major factor 
which attracts suppliers; this holds true for all zones (see Table A9 , 
Appendix).1 More than 90% of maize and beans traders claimed that they 
.J. 
always pay cash. It therefore seems to be an important factor of differentia-
! 
t'ion among market traders competing for supplies. This most likely reflects 
the importance suppliers and traders place on it as well as the' limited 
working capital situation of market traders. The absorptive capacity of 
an individual trader is snail; once she has spent her available cash, stje 
can no longer compete with those who; are still able to pay on the spot. " 
The supplier's priority for immediate cash payment reduces the 
necessity for intensive price competition. In fact, for beans traders, 
particularly in Western and Eastern Kenya, personal relations seem to play 
a more important role than price competition. However, for maize traders 
price competition ranked second to cash payment. If one in addition con-
siders that a number of traders were supplied because of prior arrangements 
(about 9%) or credit extended (between 5 and 9%), then one can safely 
conclude that pricing in buying competition (i.e. competition for supplies) 
is not a major factor of market conduct. This generalization holds at least 
tinder the conditions of a buyer's market after harvest; later on during the 
Reason, prices paid and charged do have some impact on the supply decision 
of-farmers. Some traders (4-6%) indicated that farmers may anticipaie buying 
maize or beans back from the market later in the season and therefore take 
the potential huy-back price into consideration when making their selling decision. 
i .... i ! 
1. Most answers referred to farmers and market traders as the major 
suppliers. 
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Table 19: Perception of Market Traders about the Motivation of Suppliers 
and Buyers (%) 
Motivations Maize Trader Beans Trader 
Suppliers Buyers Supplier s Buyers 
Price 30.3 23.7 19.1 16.3 
Cash Payment 69.2 N.A.a 68.3 N.A. s 
Credit 5.1 13.7 9.1 17.3 
Quality of Produce N.A. 21.6 N.A. 27.6 
Fairness^ 4.3 - 5.9 -
Socially with Buyers N.A. 67.5 N.A. 75.4 
Personal Relations 17.1 2.8 27.8 5.5 
Arrangements 8.8 8.6 9.7 5.2 
Lack of Supply N.A. 3.0 N.A. 8.9 
Other • o. ir- - 0.3 ' 0.7 0.~5 
Notes: a. Not applicable. 
b. Trader is charging reasonable price if supplier 1 is customer 
during off-season. 
Source: Own Complation. 
In regard to competition for buyers, being "friendly" or having 
social ties with buyers (mainly consumers) was by far most important 
factor mentioned by both maize and beans traders (see Table 19). Prices 
ranked second for maize traders and third for beans traders. Prices and 
quality of produce are interrelated. Quality of produce was mentioned as 
often as price as a determinant of buyers' preference by maize traders 
and considerably more often than price by beans traders. However, if one 
looks at the combined percentage for price ar.d quality, it still remains 
second to social relations with buyers. 
•.< The selling price as action parameter seems to loose importance as 
one goes from west to east. Whereas in Western Kenya prices rank second to 
"social behaviour", in Eastern Kenya they come last (see Table A9, Appendix). 
In fact, in Eastern Kenya price was not even -mentioned once by either mai-ze 
or beans traders as a decisive factor in attracting buyers. On the other 
hand, "lack of supply" increases in importance as a motive for buying from 
specific traders as one moves from west to east. This suggests that the 
supply situation relative to demand in Central and Eastern Kenya is such 
that no price reductions are necessary to sell trader stocks, conversely 
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due to a tight supply situation, buyers may have to offer higher prices 
to ensure being supplied. This situation reflects the conditions typical of 
ajsellers' market which prevails during off-seasons. 
In general, it can be concluded from this examination of market 
trader behaviour towards suppliers and buyers that they respond to market 
conditions. These conditions, however, are in their favour vis a vis suppliers 
t it 
(farmers) during the season and vis a vis buyers (consumers) during the 
off-season. This partly explains why price is often not an action parameter. 
The rest of the explanation rests with market structure conditions: when 
traders are numerous and run relatively small operations, they act as price-
takers^ e.g. no one trader has the power to influence the market price. In 
the face of passive pricing attitudes, other preference constituting factors 
such as personal relations, behaviour in conformity with social norms, and 
economic factors such as produce quality and scarce capital resources gain 
importance. These might give the individual trader some limited freedom to 
differentiate prices in her favour. This is particularly so if credit is 
— extended. Yet^credit extension generally plays, a minor role, slightly larger 
for consumers than farmers. Furthermore, according to traders, it was for 
the most part extended free of charge. Only 24.2% of maize traders and 13.7% 
of beans traders extending credit to ^ consumers claimed that they chargedJ either 
2 a higher price or interest. 
... r- • ™ j j, . 
Although Tables 19 and A9 (Appendix) suggest that pricing plays only a 
slightjrole in competition, they do not suggest that traders are reluctant to 
adjust prices to market conditions. Actually, Tables 20 and 21 support the '•> 
> 
opposite view. Market traders aim for a target margin which they add to the 
buying or subtract from the envisaged selling price (see Table 20).3 (This will 
be referred to as the costplus method.) Target prices arrived at in this way 
are subject to adjustments according to the market situation. This, however, 
is more true on the selling side since the price calculation is based on the 
expected selling price. Traders have no certainty about the actual selling 
price when buying which reduces their readiness to pay higher than expected 
prices to suppliers. Only in the case of better produce quality, which has some 
importance for selling competition (see Table 18), were the majority of traders 14 willing to pay higher prices to suppliers. A minority of traders also mentioned 
2. These figures may be understated. 
3. The margin is usually calculated in absolute terms. 
4. This was not the case for Eastern Kenya (see Table A9, Appendix). 
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Note: a. Adding or deducting target margin. 
Source: Own Compilation 
the market supply situation and longstanding business relations as reasons 
for purchasing at higher prices. Other motives such as increase of sales, 
credit, and market transparency of suppliers (farmers) were even less important 
or only important in certain regions.5 
Tkble 21: Percentage of Market Traders Using Price as Action Parameter in 
Buying and Selling, by Different Motives 
Motives for 
t 
Maize Traders- Beans 
j 
Traders 
Pricing Actions Buying3 Selling^ a Buying Selling13 
Market Situation 28,7 56. f. 26.9 55.7 
Large Transactions N.A. 26.2 N.A. 19.8 
Increase of Sales 0.2 42.3 1.3 44.3 
Longstanding 
Business Relations 12.2 27.9 6.0 22.9 
Quality of Produce 57 ,8 3.8 61.5 12.6 
Credit 5.9 N.A. 0.8 N.A. 
Other 0.9 - 4.8 -
% of traders using 





Higher buying prices. 
Lower selling prices. 
Not applicable. 
Own Compilation. 
5. Credit extension played a role in Western Kenya only, whereas 
market transparency of: farmers (e.g. knowledge of prices) was mentioned more 
frequently by beans traders in Eastern Kenya than any other motive. Increase 
of sales was mentioned in Western and Central Kenya (See Table A10). 
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I As stated earlier, once supplies have been purchased, the selling 
price is calculated on the basis of the actual purchase price. Under these 
conditions of greater certainty about costs, a relatively higher number of 
maize (89% versus 66%) and beans (78% versus 62%) traders were willing to reduce 
selling rather than raise buying prices in order to maintain or increase: 
their turnover. A majority cited the market situation as the motive; a^ 
smaller percentage indicated increase of sales and large transactions (see 
Table 21). Longstanding business relations and low quality were of mindr 
importance, t : i fr. 8 
Regionally, the percentage of traders ready to reduce selling price 
decreases from we"st to east (see Table A10, Appendix). This shows the same 
regional trend observed for general attitudes towards selling price. The 
trend is attributable to regional differences in the market supply situation. 
Maize traders in Eastern Kenya (deficit-area) showed the least inclination to-
red uce selling prices and when they did change prices were less motivated by 
the market situation or related motives such as increase of sales and large 
transactions than beans traders or maize traders of other zones. 
! " ' ! ( .» • ? ' 
1 Lack of motivation to change prices was not unique to maize traders 
in Eastern Kenya, it was found to varying degrees in all the sample zor^ es. 
* , . i This raises the question of whether collusive behaviour instead of or m 
addition to response to the market supply and demand situation was a major con-
tributing factor. This question is hot easy to answer since traders usually are ji 
not willing to disclose such practices to outsiders. Nevertheless, thos,e who stated 
that they did not raise buying or reduce selling prices were "innocently" asked^ 
whether they had arrangements with other traders. Surprisingly, quite a number 
did' not hesitate to admit such arrangements.—- —-- — - — • 
Table 22: Percentage of Market Traders with Price Arrangements in Buying and 

























TOTAL 11. 4 6,5 9.5 10.3 
Source: Own Compilation. 
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As Table 22 reveals, the largest percentage (16% for maize, 14,7% 
for beans) of traders involved in selling price arrangements were detected in 
Central Kenya, followed by Eastern Kenya (6,1% maize, 9,7% beans) and to a 
very limited extent Western Kenya (1% maize, 2.7% beans). Arrangements with 
regard to buying prices were most prevalent in Eastern Kenya whereas in Central 
and Western they were markedly lower.except for maize. In general, however, as 
already suggested by the data presented above, price arrangements or collusive 
i 
behaviour are not a predominant featiire in maize and beans markets irrespective 
of location. Furthermore, such collusive arrangements are usually successful 
for short periods only in small markets where small scale resident market 
traders dominate and competition from outsiders and other^types of traders is 
weak and depends on the seasonally determined supply and demand pattern. In 
most cases, under a favourable supply situation} collusion does not even work 
in such markets. 
On the basis of the available data, it can be concluded that 
although market traders for maize and beans have a relatively passive attitude 
- towards; pricing competitionthey do adjust to changing market conditions. 
They are oriented towards ensuring a target margin (in absolute terms) and thus 
should pass on price changes to the preceding or subsequent marketing channel 
level -(see section 5,2,1), 
-2 M-5 Agents (Produce Stores) 
MPB agents, wholesalers and retail shops are in a totally different 
situation with regard to competitive actions than market traders. Theoretically, 
price is not an action parameter since, except for beans at the wholesale selling 
and retail level, buying and selling prices are fixed by the government. In 
practice, however, prices paid to farmers and other suppliers are often below, 
the official prices (see chapter 5,3) so that prices may indeed play a 
competitive role among agents. 
Some indication for this lack of adherence to fixed prices can be 
derived from Table 23 which indicates; which methods agents used for determining 
buying prices. Only 43,2% of the agents stated that they had no choice but to 
— — • •• 
follow instructions of the MPB,- Except for Eastern Kenya, the majority of 
agents were applying the same methods as market traders: deducting a target 
6. The- author observed that those agents who claimed that -they had no 
choice but to buy at the MPB price, a majority in Eastern Kenya, were also 
those wh o seemed "to £>e mope misiipus'tf ul duping "tHe in"tepview. 
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As stated earlier, once supplies have been purchased, the selling 
price is calculated on the basis of the actual purchase price. Under these 
conditions of greater certainty about costs, a relatively higher number of 
maize (89% versus 56%) and beans (78% versus 62%) traders were willing to reduce 
selling rather than raise buying prices in order to maintain or increase 
their turnover. A majority cited the market situation as the motive; a 
smaller percentage indicated increase of sales and large transactions (see 
Table 21). Longstanding business relations and low quality were of minor 
importance. 
Regionally, the percentage of traders ready to reduce selling price 
decreases from west to east (see Table A10, Appendix). This shows the same 
regional trend observed for general attitudes towards selling price. The 
trend is attributable to regional differences in the market supply situation. 
Maize traders in Eastern Kenya (deficit area) showed the least inclination 
to reduce selling prices and when they did change prices were less motivated 
by the market situation or related motives such as increase of sales and large 
transactions than beans traders or maize traders of other zones. 
Lack of motivation to change prices was not unique to maize traders 
in Eastern Kenya, it was found to varying degrees in all the sample zones. 
This raises the question of whether collusive behaviour instead of or in 
addition to response to the market supply and demand situation was a major 
contributing factor. This question is not easy to answer since traders usually 
are not willing to disclose such practices to outsiders. Nevertheless, those 
who stated that they did not raise buying or reduce selling prices were 
"innocently" asked whether they had arrangements with other traders. 1 H'-Surpri-
singly, quite a number did not hesitate to admit such arrangements. 
Table 22: Percentage of Market Traders with Price Arrangements in Buying and 
Selling by Sample Zones 
Maize Traders Beans Traders 
Zone Buying Selling Buying Selling 
Western 12.4 1.0 7.4 2.7 
Central 8.9 16.0 8.0 14.7 
Eastern 14.7 6.1 18.8 9.7 
TOTAL 11.4 6.5 9.5 10.3 
Source: Own compilation. 
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As Table 22 reveals, the largest percentage (16% for maize, 14.7% 
for beans) of traders involved in selling price arrangements were detected in 
Central Kenya, followed by Eastern Kenya (6.1% maize, 9.7% beans) and to a 
very limited extent Western Kenya (1% maize, 2.7% beans). Arrangements with 
regard to buying prices were most prevalent in Eastern Kenya whereas in Central 
and Western they were markedly lower except for maize. In general, however, as 
already suggested by the data presented above, price arrangements or collusive 
behaviour are not a predominant feature in maize and beans markets irrespective 
of location. Furthermore, such collusive arrangements are usually successful 
for short periods only in small markets where small scale resident market 
traders dominate and competition from outsiders and other types of traders is 
weak and depends on the seasonally determined supply and demand pattern. In 
most cases, under a favourable supply situation, collusion does not even work 
in such markets. 
On the basis of the available data, it can be concluded that 
although market traders for maize and beans have a relatively passive attitude 
towards pricing competition, they do adjust to changing market conditions. 
They are oriented towards ensuring a target margin (in absolute terms) and thus 
should pass on price changes to the preceding or subsequent marketing channel 
level (see section 5.2.1). 
4.2 MPR Agents (Produce stores) 
MPB agents, wholesalers and retail shops are in a totally different 
situation with regard to competitive actions than market traders. Theoretically, 
price is not an action parameter since, except for beans at the wholesale selling 
and retail level, buying and selling prices are fixed by the government. In 
practice, however, prices paid to farmers and other suppliers are often below 
the official prices (see chapter 5.3) so that prices may indeed play a competi-
tive role among agents. 
Some indication for this lack of adherence to fixed prices .can be 
derived from Table 23 which indicates which methods agents used for determining 
buying prices. Only 43.2% of the agents stated that they had no choice but to g 
follow instructions of the MPB. Except for Eastern Kenya, the majority of 
agents were applying the same methods as market traders: deducting a target 
6. The author observed that those agents who claimed that they had no 
choice but to buy at the MPB price, a majority in Eastern Kenya, were also 
those who seemed to be more mistrustful during the interview. 
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7 margin from the expected selling price and/or following market prices. 
Table 23: MPB Agents' (Produce Stores) Method of Buying Price Calculation 
by Sample Zones (%) 
Method Western Central Eastern Total 
Deducting 
Margin 59,0 37,8 34.2 53.1 
Market 
Comparison 3,2 14.0 1.7 3.7 
Use MPB Prices 37,8 48.2— 54.2 43.2 
Moreover, target margins of MPB agents were similar to those of market traders. 
Given this background, "competitive pricing actions—•'offering better priqes than 
:  \ 
others buyers— are likely unless collusive arrangements or unconducive market 
conditions arise. Evidence of collusive arrangements was found in only one market. 
On average almost 50% of the agents did not know whether competing agents were 
paying more or less than they were, whereas 10,4% claimed others were paying less 
and 6,4% claimed that others were paying more. So, according to the data, collusion 
does not seem to be common among agents. An active pricing policy would require 
knowledge of competitors' prices, but this is not the case. Hence, agents adopt 
a more passive stand. ! 
i 
This is also suggested by Table 24 on agent perceptions of why|j suppliers 
sell to them. As in the case of market traders, cash payment ranked far above , 
price as a perceived motive for suppliers sales. Throughout the survey area, 
the majority of agents'"(*88.3%) paid cash and only in Western did the percentage g 
fall below 90. Apparently, agents to respond to the demands of suppliers in 
this area. Prices are second to cash payment as a source of preference for one 
agent over another; if personal relations and social behaviour are seen together 
7. Despite the fixed price, there was not necessarily certainty about 
the selling price since it was not known whether the MPB was able to absorb all 
supplies or whether bribes would be necessary. 
8., This may be explained by the fact that working capital of agents in 
Western Kenya is less than that in other zones. 
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as non-economic supply motives, however, the importance of prices decreases. 
Furthermore, the price importance is less if one takes into account quality of 
produce. The MPB price makes no distinction for "fair average" and better quali-
ties; the choice, although illegal, facing the agent was whether or not to adjust 
prices downward for lower quality produce. 45% of the agents admitted doing 
this. However, the majority of agents in Western Kenya (78.8%) and a significant 
Table '.',24: Perception of MPB Agents (Produce Stares) about Motivations 








Price 18 .5 29.1 22.7 r n o 19.1 
Cash Payment' 56.4 70.2 68.0 58.7 
Credit 9.5 - 17.0 9.6 
"Fairness" 17.9 10.1 7.5 16.2 
Social-ly with - , 
Suppliers 8.0 - - 7.3 
| 
Personal 
Relations > 18.3 17.1 20.8 18.5 
Arrangements 3.2 - 2.0 2.9 
Other 
i 
- 2.6 11.3 1.4 
Source: Own Compilation. 
number" in Central (39.3%) and Eastern Kenya (30.6%) claimed they rejected 
lower quality supplies. On the other hand, fairness with regard to off-season 
prices was mentioned by quite a number of agents and must be included under 
price considerations. Yet this does not affect the general picture derived from 
the data: agents cannot be assumed to pursue an active pricing policy. However, 
it must be emphasized that this stems from the framework within which they operate 
.rather than their unwillingness to be price responsive. In addition, it must 
be kept in mind that although they may not face price competition among themselves 
they do face it with other traders. 
A similar situation applies to distribution and retail activities 
which may be a part of an MPB agents activities as well. At these levels, as 
mentioned above, prices and margins for maize are fixed as well. Selling below 
the controlled price is either not possible because of the low margin or else 
not' necessary since the price is justified by the control. Provision of 
credit may reduce the readiness and necessity for competitive pricing actions 
at the assembly stage and increase the possibility of exploitation. This is 
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an often criticized practice in Asia. However, only 12.2% of MPB agents had 
9 
extended credit to farmers and only 9.5% in Western Kenya and 17% in Eastern 
Kenya saw this as a motive for supplier farmers to sell to them. The amount 
provided on credit was usually quite small and the number of cases so few 
that credit extension can not be viewed as an area which affects pricing 
behaviour towards suppliers. If credit is granted it is usually viewed in 
connection with retail activities as an additional means of increasing the 
number of customers and sales, not as a means of tying farmers to exploitative 
prices. 
4.3 Independent Produce Wholesaler (Lorry Trader) 
The most competitive marketing functionaries were found among the 
independent wholesalers or lorry traders even though they usually operated in 
an environment unconducive to open competition. This statement is based not 
only on data from standardized interviews, but also on impressions that the 
author obtained during personally-conducted interviews.10 
Like market traders and storeholders, lorry traders usually follow 
the cost-plus approach to determine target selling or buying prices; if the 
market situation permits, these target prices are then subject to bargaining. 
This is more often the case at the distribution that the assembly levels particu-
larly when, lorry traders buy from smallholders. When buying, lorry traders 
usually encounter a buyers' market in which they compete with other types of 
assemblers. Quite a lot have prior arrangements with farmers, storeholders or 
market traders. However, this does not mean that the question of price is 
unimportant. Only a quarter (23.1%) of the lorry traders agreed that-sometimes 
they paid less than other buyers, whereas nearly one half (46.7%) claimed to 
pay more. Furthermore, the majority of market traders (81% of maize traders and 
86.9% of beans traders) particularly in Central and Eastern Kenya confirmed that 
9. The amount granted in credit did not exceed KShs.1000 or KShs.50 
per farmer in 50% of the cases and it was usually used for consumption purposes 
In only three cases did the total. amoUnt exceed KShs. 10,000 which was used 
for non-consumption purposes. These three agents claimed to have extended a 
total of KShs. 15,000 (KShs. 100 per farmer), KShs. 20,000 (KShs. 200 per 
farmer) and KShs. 100,000 (Kshs. 400 per farmer) respectively. They were all agents 
from Machakos District. The agent extending KShs, 100,000 credit had a bank loan and 
was engaged in various other businesses. It was not clear whether he belonged to 
the category of lorry trader or that of MPB agent. 
10. Because of the limited time lorry traders had for interviews, the standar-
dized questionnaire often was followed for the most important data and questions 
on market conduct were skipped. This is why the following discussion contains 
few figures. If time was left after completing the questionnaire, the interview 
was continued. This often created a very relaxed atmosphere which made it possible 
to get a much deeper insight into the whole business than can be obtained by a 
formalized set of questions. 
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there was scope for bargaining when selling to lorry traders.11 The lorry ? . 
traders are usually ready to pay relatively favourable prices in order to get 
sufficient supplies to fill their lorries without wasting too much time. 
Lorry traders sometimes arrange for market traders to perform the 
initial assembly functions for them; they are paid in cash or sometimes receive 
a cash advance. Storeholders are also used in this way. Farmers are sometimes 
provided with production credit, but, like advances to primary assemblers, 
this is not a common practice. The highest recorded amount extended was KShs. 
25,000, or KShs. 2,500 per farmer. 
Apart from cash payment, pricing is the major field of action for lorry 
traders. As expected, indications of collusive behaviour were not found since 
the buying and selling situation cannot be controlled by competitors. The compe-
titive attitude of lorry traders towards pricing is even more pronounced in selling 
than in buying. This conclusion is borne out by selling prices in Kitui during 
the survey period. As buyers confirmed, prices for maize went down as far as i - • 
KShs. 75 per bag compared to the official MPB ex-depot price of KShs.115.50 
Our information supports the impression that lorry traders were fully aware of 
the relation between the size of the margin and the rate of turnover as deter-
minants of total profit to be earned. In a competitive environment, they were 
more oriented towards a high rate of turnover than towards a high margin. This 
finding is supported by the fact that 7 5% of those operating in markets claimed 
that they did not always sell for cash. This was confirmed by market traders. 
When their financial capacity to buy was exhausted and only a couple of bags were 
left for distribution, lorry traders would often give market traders the bags 
without cash payment rather than try to sell them in another place. The pay-
ment was then collected on the next trip. In summary, lorry traders showed much 
more dynamic marketing behaviour than market traders or storeholders. 
4.4 Maize and Produce Board. 
The Maize and Produce Board is supposed to operate in a manner which 
brings market stability and security for the benefit of producers and consumers 
The conduct of the Board is almost the opposite of lorry traders in that it is 
the most passive marketing functionary within the whole maize and beans marketing 
system. Based on its legal monpoly position, it announces procurement times 
11. The Lowest percentage (59.4%) was found for maize traders in Western 
Kenya whereas in all other areas and for beans traders it was above 80%. 
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(periods for accepting deliveries), buying conditions and the fixed prices 
established by government. These are essentially the only actions of the Board 
apart from the physical handling of the produce. It more or less waits for 
suppliers and customers. It is little concerned with whether its announcements 
reach all addressees or whether the marketing conditions set reflect actual 
conditions. Buying prices are usually fixed for long periods in advance without 
considering regional and seasonal differences. Therefore they often are 
poorly adjusted to the market. This is true also to a certain extent for selling 
prices. Only for beans were buying prices changed more frequently; in the 
12 recent past, however, price levels discouraged supplies to the Board. 
"O 
The conditions set by the MPB result in various shortcomings. For 
example, during peak seasons maize suppliers must line up for days and nights 
to deliver one lorry load. In deficit areas like Kitui, the MPB may sell only 
negligible amounts (see section 3,2,1), Beans supplied to the Board are usually 
shipped to Nairobi and auctioned to the highest bidder. Customers in rural 
areas may be left without supplies though beans prices there may be much higher 
than those realised at auction (see Hesselmark 1977, p, 6). Payment terms 
are usually cash, but there have been occasions when the Board ran out of money 
leaving the suppliers no alternative but to wait weeks or months until the 13 * financial problems were rectified. 
In summary, the market conduct of the MPB is exactly what one 
expects from a monopolist. To a certain extent, the organization alone cannot 
be blamed for its inactivity; it is not autonomous in its actions, especially 
with regard- to pricing, financing, export, and so forth. The MPB operates 
within the' framework set by government legislation and is subject to'~deicisions 
taken by'various government ministries. Thus it executes rather than sets 
policy. No matter who ultimately is responsible for the market behaviour of 
the MPB, the fact remains that the MPB's passivity has severe implications for 
the performance of the whole marketing system. This performance will be examined 
in the following chapters. 
12. This was and still is because of the current maize surplus. 
13. On March 26th, 1977, the Daily Nation (p.3) reported complaints of 
Uasin Gishu farmers that the Board had not paid them since January and therefore 
owned them a total of KShs. 20 million, 
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5. PERFORMANCE OF THE MAIZE AND BEANS MARKETING SYSTEMS 
In the short run, performance is determined by market structure 
and conduct, whereas in the long run performance interacts with and influences 
these marketing conditions. Performance will be evaluated according to the 
stated objectives of the controls. The analysis will include evaluation of 
operational efficiency, pricing or allocative efficiency, and security of outlets 
and sources as it relates to price stability, income and distributional effects. 
5.1 Operational Efficiency 
Operational efficiency concerns the costs involved in marketing. 
If a marketing system performs its functions at higher costs than necessary, there 
is scope for increasing operational efficiency. As will be shown in the following 
discussion, this is the current situation within the controlled maize and 
beans marketing systems. The possibilities for improving operational efficiency 
will be analysed separately for each of the main marketing functions although 
it is recognised that these functions are interrelated and often must be per-
formed together. 
5.1.1 Assembly and Distribution. The rural marketing system faces an extremely 
dispersed supply and demand situation. The result is a relatively expensive 
system based on numerous marketing functionaries who assemble and distribute 
produce on a small scale. This differs for large farm areas with a high? con-
centration of production where producers can directly supply depots or mills 
without any marketing intermediaries. Likewise, for urban areas with4 a larger 
concentration of consumers, distribution is handled on a larger-scale. Since, 
however, the dispersed pattern prevails in Kenya, the system of many market 
traders and agents (produce stores) is well suited to the marketing conditions. 
However, the question remains as to whether there is scope for reducing 
marketing costs within this system. 
The main assembly and distribution coast facing market traders and 
producers, apart from transporation costs which will be discussed latu.% is 
market fees. These fees are imposed -and collected by the County Council and 
are beyond the control of producers and traders. As Table 25 shows, they vary 
considerably between markets and districts, ranging from KShs. 1 to KShs. 5 
or more per bag. The fee within a market may be even higher if one takes into 
account that headloads are charged half -of the fee for one bag. Three headloads, 
the equivalent of one bag, would therefore be charged more than a full bag. The 
fees, therefore, seem to discriminate against those with small amounts for sale 
and those dependent on headload ir:.,.. ^ ort-. I n summary, these market fees -are 
purely a tax on marketed output by County Councils which bears no relation to 
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actual marketing services provided. The justification for such taxes which part-
icularly affect the lowest income groups and raise marketing costs needsi to be 
reviewed. 
5 
\ Table 25: Frequency Distribution of Market Fees for Maize and Beans 
KShs./bag Maize Beans 
1 - 2 27 22 
3 - 4 26 17 
5 and more 9 22 j 
Total No. of 
Markets 62 61 f '1 
gjT 
:j Source: Casley and Marchaiit; 19 78 p. 
In addition to market fees, a number of market traders pay fees for 
specific marketing services. Some markets provide stalls for traders where 
they can keep a limited amount of carryover stock from one market day to the 
next.1- 5% of maize and beans traders rented stalls for between KShs. l2 and 
* " ! KShs. 75 per month, the average being KShs. 20 per month. Another 5-a of market 
® T '• ! 
-traders used to keep, if necessary, carryover stocks in the open market or in 
shops around the market for which they paid between KShs. 1 and KShs. 5 
weekly..to a watchman or shopkeeper. However, some shopkeepers did not charge 
for this service. About 3.4% of the traders, who used to leave untensils and 
produce regularly in the market, paid-an average of KShs. 5 per month for a 
watchman hired jointly with several other traders. 
Such assembly and distribution costs were incurred by only a 
minority of market traders and even then not necessarily on a regular basis. 
%hese costs rarely amounted to more than KShs. 0.50 per bag and the expense 
is usually justified since it reduces the risk of losses especially as the scale 
of operation increases. Losses in.jthg. market were generally low, about 5% on 
average, since most traders dispose of their stocks very quickly. However, 
losses can increase considerably under adverse weather conditions due to lack 
,of shelter in open markets. Average losses under such circumstances were 
about 15%. 
j 
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Bribing must also be taken into account as a potential distribution 
cost. Interregional traders operating on a larger scale face the risk of being 
caught in police road checks. This usually results in payment of a bribe to 
police officers of between KShs. 5 and KShs. 10 per bag. Lorry traders face 
similar situations. They pay between KShs. 500 and KShs. 1000 per lorry 
which means about KShs.-' 1 and KShs, 2 per bag; they were caught in about 20-25 
percent of their transactions. Seven lorry traders reported bribing costs 
per year ranging from KShs, 10,000 to more than KShs. 250,000. The total 
2 
amount for all seven was more than KShs. 350,000. These costs would difimtely 
fall off under a free marketing system. 
Bribing costs were not simply a problem with regard to illegal 
movements of maize and beans. More than 90% of the MPB agents mentioned this 
or corresponding reasons for it in regard to deliveries to MPB depots. In 
fact, in some areas the problem was so severe that bribes were the major 
cost item for agents. Bribing is sometimes necessary for virtually all steps 
to get maize into the depots: obtaining movement permits, passing the gate, 
passing the moisture test, getting the lorry off-loaded and so forth. For some 
•I 
depots in Western Kenya, bribes were reported to range between KShs. 300 and KShs. 
3 
350 per lorry of KShs. 3 and KShs. 3.50 per bag. For other depots in Western 
and Central Kenya, bribes at peak times ran as high as KShs. 500 per lorry. 
These are the rates prevailing at peak delivery periods and therefore 
do not apply to all supplies. Bribes at other times ranged around KShs. 1 per 
bag. Problems for agents increase as soon as it becomes evident that a.depot's 
storage capacity is insufficient for all offered supplies. Traders and agents 
must then compete for the limited storage space. Either they bribe their way 
into the depot or they will be forced to keep their stocks since no other 
legal outlet for them exists. The only other alternatives are to sell at much 
lower prices to lorry traders or to get involved in illegal movements which is 
not a viable alternative for most agents. The size of bribes in these cases D •.....•• . „ . as 
2. The highest figure given was KShs. 40,000 per month. 
3. The breakdown given was as follows (KShs. ): permit 100, gate 50, 
moisture test 100, off-loading 60, and clerk 40. 
4. This figure was mentioned several times. Even after the temporary 
relaxation was announced, a lorry trader claimed that he had to pay KShs. 300 
for a permit valid for several days. Under the controls, permits were 
usually valid for 24 hours only. 
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can be viewed as the market price for the remaining storage capacity of 'the 
depot or, in other cases, for the time saved. These bribery costs are J 
economically justified if compared with opportunity costs to suppliers. 
! 
General assembly costs for agents and lorry traders are quite 
moderate compared to bribes. The major items are: rent for the store, licence 
fees and, in some cases, salary for a watchman. Average assembly costs per bag ... v. u - - !i • 
for MPJB agents were estimated by allocating general assembly costs and miscella-
neous overhead costs such as water, electricity, stationary and the like; according 
! 5 to the importance of maize and beans in total business revenues and then to the "' i . 6 ) proportion of maize and beans in total turnover. The average assembly costs r {• • . . ' • • - • • • • ' for agents ranges between KShs. 0.63 and KShs. 0.82 per bag of maize depending 
7 
on the zone (see Table 26). Among the most efficient agents (the top 25%), 
costs were considerably lower, on average KShs. 0.27 per bag. Lorry"traders 
proved more efficient perhaps due to economies of scale. They had overhead costs 
of KShs. 0.20 per bag which includes assembly for those not buying from primary 
assemblers and distribution for those not delivering to the MPB. 
J i r 
ikble 26: Major Assembly Costs (KShs. ) per Bag of Maize for MPB Agents by 
Sample Zones 
i I j 6 
Variable Costs Western Central Eastern Total,, 
( Kenya ]<Cenya Kenya Kenya i 
Store Rent .33 J.53 .31 .35 
licence .15 ,12 .08 .13 
Watchman .20 .08 .15 .19 
b i Miscellaneous .09 a* 09 .09 .09 
TOTAL .77 " ! .-82 .63 .76 
Notes: a. Allocation of overheads according to share of maize and 
o beans in business revenues and the proportion of maize 
and beans in total turnoyer. 
i 
a 
Cases were too few for a1;regional breakdown. 
i VVs" 
Source: Own"Compilation. i 
'5. The average share was 75%. 
fe. The average proportion for beans was 17%. 
f 
7. The calculations were done on a monthly basis; it was assumed that 
during the slack seasons stores would or could be used for different purposes. 
Thus, even if the store remained unused (which was not asked in the interviews) 
costs were not allocated to maize and beans assembly or distribution. 
- 70 - IDS/OP 31 
Due to lower turnover, costs per bag of beans were less than KShs. 0.25. 
Average costs for agents amounted to KShs. 0.23 per bag following similar 
regional variations as maize, whereas lorry traders' average costs were 
only KShs. 0.09 per bag. If one takes the value of each crop as a basis for 
allocating overhead, costs for maize would come down and costs for beans would 
go up. 
Since all methods overhead allocation are somewhat arbitrary and maize 
is really the outstanding product line, we will accept the above figures as a 
basis for examining the cost of possible alternative marketing arrangements. 
One possible alternative to the MPB agent scheme is for the MPB to hire employees 
to perform the assembly functions. Each would be responsible for several major 
market centres and for maintaining small storage facilities in each. How 
would the costs compare with the agent system? In the past, the MPB assumed a 
gross margin for agents of KShs. 2.50 per bag of maize. Deducting average 
costs of Kshs. 0.75 per bag for operating costs of small scale storage 
facilities and allowing for other costs on the order of KShs. 0.50 per bag 
the MPB would be left with about KShs. 1.25 per bag to pay the employee. 
If one assumes that product inspector level employees would carryout g 
these functions at a salary of KShs. 1,500 per month, the MPB would bre . even 
if each Product Inspector managed a turnover of 1,200 bags of maize per month 
or 300 bags per week. For beans, for which a gross margin of KShs. 6 per bag was 
paid in the past, the volume would range around 70 bags per week. The break-
even point would be even lower (about 200 bags of maize per week) if Product 
Inspectors could achieve the efficiency of lorry traders which is however not 
very likely. In any case, the above break-even volumes appear feasible for 
major production areas although certainly not for all zones. Furthermore, 
the above calculation assumes overhead for the active assembly periods only; 
this implies that stores were either rented temporarily or utilized for other 
purposes during other times of the year. The above alternative needs to be 
tested in the field including evaluation of its effect on bribes and final 
prices paid to farmers (see section 5.3). 
More important from the cost point of view than introduc g a new 
assembly system for the MPB in smallholder areas is the possibility of relaxing 
controls. The controls and the resulting monopoly position of the MPB un-
necessarily increase the length of the marketing chain. Mills and wholesalers 
8. This salary corresponds to a Grade 2 MPB Product Inspector including a 
house allowance of KShs 400 per month. 
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could for the most part be directly supplied as occurred during the tempor^y 
relaxation of controls. Mills are located in the vicinity of MPB depots, 
their major suppliers. Supplying the neighbouring depot and them shipping from 
. . . . 9 there to the mill adds an additional, economically questionable marketing channel. 
Wholesalers face a similar situation. 
Marketing costs therefore could be reduced significantly if direct 
sales to mills or distributors were permitted. Per unit costs for the MPB might 
increase, but this is not necessarilly so. Growing output requires the:expansion 
of current capacity, but with direct sales existing capacity would probably 
be sifficient. Furthermore, the MPB could extend activities for other produce 
neglected in the past because of maize. 
It is difficult to estimate total savings from a direct sales policy, 
because there is no information on the proportion and structure of fixed and 
variable costs within the MPB margin, Currently, the MPB works with costs of 
about KShs, 12 per bag of maize excluding railage (Unpublished circular, Maize 
and Produce Board 1979). Overhead on administration, storage and operation 
is calculated at KShs, 6 per bag and finance costs at another KShs. 6 per 
bag including the cost of holding the national reserve.10 
In the absence of a detailed study of the operation and cost structure 
of the MPB, which would be very useful, one can reasonably estimate that 
direct sales would result in a net saving of KShs. 2 per bag of maize and 
beans.11 This figure might be higher if it is taken into account that certain 
overhead costs are fixed for specific periods of operation. However, assuming 
a net saving of KShs. 2 per, bag and that 25% of current MPB sales bypassed if 
it were sold directly to mills and wholesalers, the potential reduction in 
total marketing costs on the basis of 1976/77 figures should be on the order 
of KShs. 3 million for maize and KShs. 600,000 for beans. The actual figure 
might be well above that level. Reduction of private costs could be even higher 
than this estimate because buyers of maize would save approximately KShs. 12 
'(overhead cost of -MPB) for each bag purchased from other sources. 
9. At Sagana, for example, the new mill is just opposite the depot. 
Maize supplied to the depot gets shipped across the road. However, the entire 
MPB margin including all overhead costs is charged. 
10. The national reserve serves the interests of the whole public and 
.therefore the entire nation not just maize producers and consumers should 
bear its cost. 
11. "-The working party studying the MPB (1969) calculated that fixed 
overheads are roughly-50% of"total overhead. Kenya, Final Report 1969, p. 34. 
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In summary, improvement of'operational efficiency in assembly and 
distribution depends largely on relaxation of controls on maize and beans 
marketing. If controls are relaxed, marketing costs can be substantially 
reduced. If not, the scope for improving operational efficiency is limited 
since present assembly and distribution structures seem to be quite well 
adjusted to the existing framework. The operational efficiency of the 
MPB employee alternative assembly system for smallholder areas needs to 
be tested. At the present time, however, lorry traders and agents operating 
on a similar scale are the most efficient assemblers in terms of overhead 
cost per bag. 
Lorry traders often perform the distribution function as well; 
usually this does not involve additional overhead costs except when selling 
to the MPB. Lorry traders seem to be the most efficient marketing channel 
for both functions. This holds true even if they concentrate on distribution 
buying from primary assemblers. For some, maize and beans marketing is part 
of a general wholesale business and therefore reflects the overall efficiency .. 
of wholesale operations. The same applies to general retail shops. The analysis 
of overall efficiency of those wholesale and retail operations is beyond the 
scope of this study (see Spliet 1978). However, wholesale and retail margins for 
maize are controlled and seem to leave no room for reducing distribution costs 
(Hesselmark and Lorenzol 1976, p. 176). 
5.1.2. Transport. Another crucial area with regard to the operational 
efficiency of the maize and beans marketing systems is the performance of the 
transport function, in particular within the informal sub-systems. Legislation 
restricts the informal sub-systems to the district level. Shipments of more 
than 10 bags of maize and beans within a district and more than 2 bags across 
district boundaries are prohibited unless delivered to the nearest MPB depot 
under a movement permit. 
The movement control regulations have severe implications for the 
mode of transport at the disposal of market traders and consequently for 
transport costs. Due to the restrictions, market traders and farmers shipping 
amounts beyond human carrying capacity (by head) are forced to break down 
their shipments into small lots and therefore are usually left with no alternative 
but to use buses and matatus or for short distances pack animals. Lorries and 
pickups which could be used jointly by several traders are out of question since 
under the controls their loading capacity cannot be utilized. Furthermore, 
it is virtually impossible to prove to police making road checks that the des-
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tination of the vehicle is within the district particularly since major markets 
are often located at or near district boundaries. These factors limit the ship-
ment volume" to a" maximum of 2 bags. As can be seen from Table 27, lorries and 
pick-ups, in fact, play almost no role within the informal system. Apart from 
the headload which is the transport mode of most small resident traders who 
do not move between markets, matatus, buses, and pack-animals (in Western Kenya) 
are the most common modes of transport. 
Table 27. Means of Small Scale Transport by Sample Zones (%) 
Means of Transport Western Central Eastern Total 
Head 28.6 24.0 50.9 28.2 
Hand Cart 3.3 5.6 3.2 4.1 
Animal Drawn Cart - 6.5 - 2.3 
Pack Animal (Donkey) 30.6 - - 18.1 
Bus 12.1 7.5 11.8 10.5 
Matatu 30.8 53.5 37.6 39.2 
Pick-up 0.1 8.8 5.6 3.5 
Source: Own Compilation. 
Transporting small volumes by bus and matatu means paying a personal fare 
and an extra fare for the produce which for one bag sometimes, especially in 
Western Kenya, exceeds the personal fare. Consequently, the transport costs 
are extremely high. This is worsened by the fact that traders tend to reduce the • 
transported volumes to below one bag because they are not well informed about the 
regulations and more importantly, because the limited transport capacity of matatu 
and buses makes it more difficult to get a ride with a larger load. Also, the 
fare for the produce is often less expensive for a bag which is only partially 
filled. 1 
All these factors contributed to the fact that itinerant maize and beans 
traders (before the increase of petrol prices in 1978) paid an average of 
KShs. 6.46 per ton/km (see table 28) for transport compared to Kshs. 2.95 per 
ton/km which MPB agents and produce storeholders using lorries and pick-ups 
paid. It is striking that small scale transport costs tend to increase as one 
moves from west to east whereas large scale transport costs follow the opposite 
trend. However, the range of variation (standard deviations) should also be 
noted. 
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Table 28. Transport Costs by Scale and Sample Zones (KShs. per ton/km) 
Sr.ali Lcaie' Large Scale 
(Market Trader) (Produce Stores) 
Zones Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Western 
Kenya 6.26 3,09 3.20 2.26 
Central Kenya 6.68 4.55 2.04 0.61 
Eatern. 
Kenya 7.23 4.99 1.66 0.92 
•TOTAL • 6.46 3.85 2.95 2.16 
Source: Ovm Compilation. 
f 
Irrespective of regional variations, the differences in transport 
costs between large and small scale traders is striking. Overall transport 
costs could be considerably reduced if more economic modes of transport were 
not discouraged by the present controls. A shift from bus and matatu to 
pick-ups (see Table 29) would cut transport costs on average by one half. 
A shift to lorries would bring costs down to almost one third the current level 
although this would only be possible for a portion of the volumes handled 
by the informal sub system. Nevertheless, under a marketing system free of 
movement restrictions even a shift to lorries can be foreseen within a 
reasonable time. 
Table 29: Transport Costs by Mode of Transport (KShs. per ton/km) 
Mode of Transport Mean Std Dev. 
Donkey3 3.33 N.A. 
Bus 6.79 2.71 
Matatu 6.78 3.99 
Pick-up^ 3.48 0.82 
Lorry •' 2.60 1.92 
Notes; a. \raders interviewed had their own donkeys. Price 
was inquired from other respondents. 
b. Not representative because of small number of cases. 
Source: Own Compilation. 
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Pick-ups and lorries are not only superior on medium and long hauls 
but even on short hauls. This can be derived from the double-log transport 
cost functions for small scale transport (bus/matatu) by market traders and 
large scale transport by storeholders (agents) and lorry traders which are 
shown in Figure 5. The original values for both functions are plotted in 
12 
Figures 3 and 4-. The functions computed are as follows: 
(1) Log(TRCgsc)=1.32 - 0.4-4 log (.TRD) 
with r=-0.70 and r2= 0.48 
(2) Log (TRC. , = 1.5 - 0.72 log (.TRD) isc) with r = -0.78 and r 2 = 0.60 
Where TRC = snail scale transport Cbus/matatLil ssc 
by market traders per ton/kilometer 
TRC^sc= large scale transport by storeholders 
• (agents) and lorry traders per ton/ 
kilometer. 
TRD = distance in kilometers. 
Substituting function (2) into (1) leads to a critical distance of D = 4.4 kilo-
meters. Thus., only for distances below 4.4 kilometers are usually covered 
with headloads by foot does small scale transport by bus or matatu seem to 
be more economical. 
For both functions, per unit transport costs are highly negatively 
correlated with the transport distance (small scale, -0.7 and large scale, 
r=-0.78) showing that per unit costs decrease with increasing distances (see 
Figure 3 and 4). Under the present situation, small distances are bridged and 
as a consequence more distant areas often are linked in multiple steps. If, 
therefore, more distant regions could be connected directly, which is to be 
expected with free movement, transport costs would come down. Long distance 
•haul lorries, for which per unit costs decrease at a relatively faster rate 
as distance increases than for other modes, would probably become the major 
means of transport. 
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On long hauls, distances of 150 kilometers or more, per unit 
transport costs would come down to KShs. 0.85 per ton/km (KShs. 0.08 per 
13 
bag/km) and even further. The cheapest mode of transport for long hauls, 
however, would still be the railways, used by the MPB, provided that the 
railway distance did not considerably exceed road distance. The average per 
unit railway transport costs calculated for the MPB was KShs. 0.20 per ton/km 
on average for 1976/77. Lorry traders in Eastern Kenya indicated that if 
allowed they would use the railway for their shipments. 
According to the data, movement restrictions are a major impediment 
to reducing transport and consequently marketing costs. Overall about 85% 
of maize and 80% of beans handled by market traders is shipped at least one 
trip averaging a distance of 28.7 (maize) or 33.8 (beans) kilometers. Thus, 
for recent years, total transport costs per annum within the informal system 
are estimated on the order of KShs. 70.9 million for maize and KShs. 7.7 million 
14 
for beans, if not more given the probability of multiple transport steps. 
If one assumes that initially under a decontrolled marketing system, 10% of 
the volume of transported produce shift to less expensive modes of transport 
such as pick-ups, total transport costs for maize and beans ceteris paribus 
would be reduced by more than KShs. 4.3 million or 5 to 6%. Taking into 
account that in the long run this percentage would increase, lorries would 
Increasingly be used, and that the elasticity of the transport cost function 
at the current transport distances is high, the potential savings within the 
informal system far exceed the estimate of KShs. 4.3 million. 
Savings within the formal system are also envisioned although on a 
smaller scale. The potential for savings will reflect the relative efficiency 
or inefficiency of the MPB's handling of interregional flows, shipments be-
tween depots and areas, of maize and beans. In some areas, for exairple, like 
Meru and Kitui Depot there are no direct transport links. These matters and 
15 their effect on total transport cost needs further study. 
1 3 . For a distance of 250 kilometers, per unit costs are KShs. 0.59 per 
ton/km or KShs. 0.05 per bag/km. These figures were derived from the_.cost.func-
tion (2) Figure 4 and are supported by information given by lorry owners during 
informal interviews. 
14. This is based on the assumption that: smallholder production =1.5 
million metric tons (MT), marketed output= 30%; beans production=l69,000 MT, 
marketed output=26%. 
15. H.K. Maritim is currently working on an interregional model of the 
Kenya maize market for his Ph.D. thesis. See H.K. Maritim 197 8. 
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Another factor to be examined is whether or not transport costs 
for large scale hauls are higher then necessary because of monopolistic structures 
in the transport market, lack of transport facilities (vehicles) in relation 
to demand or other distortions. MPB agents, who for the most part depend on 
1 cr 
other transporters, were asked about this. Only about 20% of them hired 
from only one transporter and only 23,2% of these (.less than 5% of the sample) 
did so because no other convenient alternative existed. For Western Kenya, how-
ever, particularly in some parts of Kisii and South Nyanza Districts, severe 
market distortions were detected. Although in theory transport alternatives 
existed, in practice there was no alternative but to use one specific transporter 
who had collusive arrangements with the depot managers. Whenever an agent 
tried to arrange transport independently, he was forced to wait outside the 
depot indefinitely until he gave up and went away. This certainly did not 
contribute to low marketing costs and.might be one of the reasons why average 
large scale transport costs in Western Kenya were higher than in other parts 
of the country, 
.Ano.ther reason might be the general supply, and demand ...situation 
which was mentioned as a transport problem more frequently in Western than in 
Central and in Eastern Kenya, although even there the market situation was the 
main problem mentioned (See Table 30). 
Table 30, Transport Problems for MPB Agents (Produce Stores) by Sample Zone 
Western Central Eastern Total 
No problem 21,6 26.0 43.2 25,2 
Demand/Supply 
for Transport 58.7 34,7 40.8 53.9 
Remote Location 13.6 13.1 8,0 12.6 
Transport Costs - 10.8 2.0 1.3 
Road Infrastructure - - 8.0 1.5 
Delays at Depot 6.3 13.1 - 5.7 
Police Checks - - 6.0 1.1 
Other - 2.3 - 0.2 
Source: Own Compilation, 
16. On average, less than 10% had their own means of transport. In 
Eastern Kenya, the percentage was 22.7%, in Central it was only 6.2% and in 
Western it was 8%, 52.7% of the lorry traders had their own vehicles. 
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If agents are located in remote areas, which was the second most frequently 
mentioned problem, they are at a disadvantage since transporters to such locations-" 
have difficulties getting a load both ways which would reduce costs considerably. 
Other factors mentioned which contribute to higher transport costs are bad road 
infrastructure and delays at the depot. Surprisingly, road infrastructure was 
mentioned only for Eastern Kenya whereas delays at the depot was mentioned by 
agents in Western and Central Kenya and not Eastern, However, delays at the 
depot due to congestion during the peak season are a general feature and 
therefore may not have been seen by agents as a transport problem. Yet, many 
were forced to wait several days at the depot incurring high opportunity costs. 
To avoid these costs, bribery is common. Regardless of who pays for bribes and 
lost time, agents or transporter, it adds to transport costs. 
In summary, in addition to movement restrictions, there are-various 
other factors contributing to relatively high transport costs. These factors, 
however, as is the case with movement controls, are part of the framework under 
which marketing functionaries are working and therefore beyond their control. 
The situation is to a certain extent similar with regard to storage whioh will 
be analysed next. 
5.1,3 Storage. Under the present regulations and structures, storage is 
mainly a function of the formal sub-system and within it that of the MPB. 
Market, traders usually do not have the facilities and working capital for storage. 
As described above, they only keep, if necessary, unsold stocks from one 
market day to another; this is considered as part of their assembly and dis-
tribution functions so related costs are ascribed there. 
MPB agents are not officially supposed to perform the storage 
function unless the Board cannot accept additional supplies — not uncommon 
in the recent past. The regulations state that all produce subject to the 
provisions of the Maize Marketing Act shall vest in the Board as soon as it has 
been harvested. In accordance with this directive, no storage premiums are 
paid to farmers or MPB agents and no credit facilities exist to provide supple-
mentary working capital for storage. Therefore, it is not surprising that quite 
a number of agents (19.5%) claimed they were not storing any maize and beans, 
mainly because of capital constraints (14,3%) and the regulations (7.1%). More-
over, 33% of those who stored, but primarily those in Western Kenya (38%), did 
so for a limited period only because depots had stopped accepting maize and 
beans due to lack of storage capacity. 
, - 82 - IDS/OP 31 
Storage of maize and beans by private individuals is thus officially 
discouraged. This is reflected in the capacity utilization of existing 
storage facilities. Table 31 shows that on average only 32.6% for maize and 
5.6% for beans of available storage space was utilized and merely for an 
average period of 8 weeks for maize and 13 weeks for beans. The figures for 
Central Kenya are highest with 47.1% (maize) and 17.9% (beans) of space 
utilized and storage periods of 12 weeks (maize) and 15 weeks (beans). Overall, 
the degree of capacity utilization is low particularly in view of the strain 
the MPB has experienced with regard to its own facilities. 
The storage capacity of MPB agents and other marketing functionaries 
such as lorry traders is considerable. The total number of licensed agents 
17 reported lies between 1,800 and 2,600 (Anderson and Pfost 1978; Kenya 1979) 
which means that with a mean working capacity of 404 bags per agent -(Tajple •-•••-
18 
31) the total available storage capacity of individual produce stores ranges 
between 65,000 and 100,000 tons. Compared to the MPB capacity in 1977 of 
544,500 tons (Manarelli, 1978, p. 77), this is quite substantial. If private 
storage capacity had been used to a fuller extent, some of the storage problems 
of the MPB would have been alleviated. 













Approximate Mean Storage 
Period in Weeks 
Maize Beans 
Western 288 32.4 2.8 8 15 
Central 45 8 47.1 17.9 12 15 
Eastern 646 28.2 7.3 3 6 
TOTAL 404 32,6 5.6 8 13 
Source: Own Compilation. 
17. Other even speak of 5000 agents (Weekly Review, February 23rd 1979, 
p. 33). As indicated earlier, in Murang&, Nyeri and Kirinyaga districts alone 
286 agents were registered. But most of them were not active. Thus, the total 
number is most likely nearer to 2600 than to 1800 or 5000. 
18. Lorry traders' mean storage capacity was 1,378 bags. This is not 
included in the above calculation. 
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A justified reason for discouraging private storage on a relatively 
small scale would exist if storage costs were higher than those of the larger 
scale Board, These storage costs, however, are not easy to calculate, parti-
cularly for multi-purpose stores such as the general produce stores of agents 
and depots. Nevertheless, an attempt to estimate approximate storage costs for 
produce stores was carried out on the basis of the survey data. These are 
shown in Table 32 to 35, 
In order to have a reasonable basis for comparison with the MPB figures, 
the new 1979 basic MPB buying prices for maize and beans, (KShs. 65 maize and 
KShs. 190 beans) minus an average gross margin for MPB agents was used for 
19 
calculating interest on working capital. Rent for hiring a store was taken 
as the main overhead cost since most agents did not own stores. For those who 
did, expected rent was taken as an opportunity cost and used for calculation. 
Figures on losses must be accepted with caution because they are based on re-
spondents' estimates and not on storage trials. However, they ranged from on 
average 2% for 2 months to 15% for 12 months. Compared to the figure of 2% 
to 3% given by the MPB for normal years, although no period of time Is "specified 20 
(see Weekly Review, Feb. 23, 1979, p, 34), the estimate show that with good 
storage management, ceteris paribus, storage costs could be even lower. 
With regard to storage management, traders seemed to have taken 
. . 21 necessary measures according to expenditure levels for such items as insecticide. 
The author observed in a number of cases that fumigation was necessary. However, 
most agents suffering storage losses had applied insecticides and on average 
had spent KShs, 2.06. per bag. This figure compares relatively well with KShs. 
2 per bag calculated by the storage engineer of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Hunt 1978). 
19. MPB prices of beans vary by variety. For convenience the prices 
of most common varieties in the major production areas, i.e. Rose Coco, 
Canadian Wonder,. and Mwezimoja were taken. Since 1977, the prices for Rose Coco 
were higher for central and Eastern provinces than for other areas. 
20, For years with particularly high losses the MPB reckons on 7% to 
10% loss. 
21. All but one who complained about losses had taken preventive measures. 
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Tables 32 and 34 present estimates of storage costs based on the 
assumptions that the stores were used to about 7 5% of capacity for maize and 
beans and the degree of capacity utilization for the two crops was in a 
proportion 2 : 1 (maize:beans). These assumptions are quite realistic. 
However, it was further assumed that the so determined 'working capacities' 
were used to 100% which does not reflect the actual situation. Yet in order 
to compare the relative advantages or disadvantages of private storage and 
MPB storage under changed regulations, this seems justified. In addition the 
behaviour of storage costs under lower degrees and different kinds of capacity 
utilization were analysed and are shown in Tables 33 and 35. 
Storage costs for maize and beans estimated in Tables 32 and 34 
have to be compared with the MPB overhead and total margin per bag. According 
to the regulations, the MPB alone is responsible for performing the storage 
function. Agents (produce storeholders) face a situation in which they have 
to deliver all supplies from farmers to the depot and later during the off-
season buy back supplies from the depot to sell to consumers. The spread between 
the MPB buying and selling price is therefore in effect the price the agent 
pays the MPB for performing the storage function. (The MPB margin however, 
includes other costs besides storage.) To this price, transport cost to and 
from the MPB depot must be added. Therefore, to evaluate the efficiency of 
the MPB agent performing the storage function, one must calculate the price 
22 
spread between the MPB ex-depot price plus transport allowance and the agents 
'into store' price (including new gunny bag) and compare it to the estimated 
storage costs of MPB agents. On the basis of the new proposed MPB buying and 
selling prices for maize the margins (price spreads) range between roughly KShs. 23 24 and KShs. 36 per bag depending on the zone. The lower figures apply to 
24 Central and Western provinces, the higher ones to Eastern and Coast provinces. 
The margins are still based on subsidized MPB selling prices. 
25 If the MPB sold at prices covering all overhead costs the margins above 
22. The MPB used to pay transport allowances to agents which differed 
with the density of the depot network in one region. With a higher density 
(e.g. Western Province) transport costs were lower. They discontinued this in 
1976. However, in the above calculation these must be taken into account. 
23. The prices were derived from a circular of the MPB after the Cabinet 
decisions of 15 February 1979. The buying price for all zones is uniform, 
whereas the selling price varies with railage costs throughout the year. 
24. The price spread for Coast Province is highest because of railage costs. 
25'. The MPB had a lower and a, higher option for overheads. Here, the 
lower one was assumed. 
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Table 32: Approximate Storage Cost of Produce Stores (MPB agents) Per Bag 
of Maize (KShs.) 
Storage Period (Months) 
Cost Variable 2 4 6 12 
Store rent3 0.85 1,71 2.55 5.10 
Treatment 2.00 2,00 2.00 3.00 
Inter est13 on 
Working Capital0 1.08 2.17 3.28 5.83 
Losses 1.10 2.75 5.50 8.25 
Total Costs 5.03 8.53 13.33 23.18 
Notes: a. Multi-purpose store, used to 75% for maize and beans, 
2/3 for maize and 1/3 for beans. 
b. 10% per annum or 0.8% per month (compound interest). • The MPB 
works with only 7.5% per annum. 
c Includes approximate 1979 buying price KShs. 57.50 per bag, 
new gunny bag KShs. 7.20, expenditure on treatment and monthly 
store rent per bag. 
Source: Own Compilation. 
would come up to KShs. 25 and KShs. 44.05 per bag. If these figures are 
now compared with the storage cost data in Table 32 and 33, one can safely 
conclude that for medium term storage of 6 months or less it is more efficient 
to allow and to encourage MPB agents or private produce stores to store 
rather than to deliver all stocks to the depots even if they have low rates 
of capacity utilization. Private storage of maize for a period of 6 months 
would save between KShs. 5 and KShs. 12.50 per bag, if all MPB costs wer^ -e 
included. Moreover, if one assumes conditions given for the first 5 alternatives 
in Table 33, which represent the most likely situations, private small scale 
storage could even compete with the MPB for long term storage except in those 
areas with a high density of depots (Western and Central provinces). Therefore, 
from the cost point of view, even private long term storage should not 
generally be discouraged. However, it is unlikely that agents will undertake 
it since their main reason for storage is seasonal price differentials which 
entials medium term storage only. 
With regard to beans storage, the situation is not quite as clear. 
Since the MPB has no fixed selling prices, it is difficult to compare the al-
ternatives. Taking into account that allocated overhead for beans is much 
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lower than for maize and that storage periods are usually short, one can 
assume that the MPB works with a smaller margin for beans than for maize 
although the. working capital required for one bag of beans is more than 
double the amount for maize. Nevertheless, the margin which the MPB requires 
27 
for beans should be at least KShs. 10 per bag , whxch leads to a spread 
between 'into store' price of agents and MPB selling price plus transport 
allowance of between KShs. 20 and KShs. 25 per bag. These lower price spreads 
have to be compared with higher storage costs for beans. Storage of beans 
Table 33. Sensitivity of Storage Costs Per Bag of Maize to Kind and Degree 
of Capacity Utilization (KShs.) 
Percentage of Degree of Storage Period (Months) 
Overhead Capacity 
Allocation3 Utilization 2 4 6 12 
50 100 5.03 8.63 13. 33 23.18 
75 5.31 9.20 14.18 25.88 
50 5.88 10.33 15. 88 28.28 
100 5.46 9.47 14.61 27.76 
75 75 5,89 10.32 15.88 28.30 
50 6,74 12.02 18.43 33.44 
100 5.89 10.32 15,88 28.30 
100 75 6.45 11.45 17,58 31.68 
50 7,58 13.72 20.98 38.48 
Note: a Dependent on kind of capacity utilization. Store exclusively used 
for maize storage corresponds to 100% overhead allocation, 
Source: Own Compilation. 
by agents or storeholders instead of the MPB seems to be relatively less 
favourable than for maize. However, medium term storage by agents seems to be 
advantageous if one considers that for the MPB only short term storage with 
negligible storage losses was assumed. Therefore, the data do not support 
the view that storage of beans should be left primarily to the MPB. 
26. The MPB in 1976/77 purchased 548,306 tons of maize and allocated 
about KShs. 6 of general overhead per bag. During the same period, it purchased 
11,123.tons of beans which had an overhead allocation of only KShs. 1.30 per 
bag. 
27. The MPB was not in a position to give the actual margins. But according 
to the scanty information on selling prices, the MPB price spreads for Rose 
Coco or Canadian Wonder in 1976-78 ranged between KShs. 6 and KShs, 29.50 per 
bag. The simple average amounted to- KShs, 18.14 per bag. 
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Table 34: Approximate Storage Costs.of Produce Stores (MPB agents) per Bag 
of Beans by Storage Period (KShs,) 
Storage Period 
4 6 12 
Cost Variable 
Store Renta 





















Notes: a. Multi-purpose store, used to 75% for maize and beans, 2/3 for maize 
and 1/3 for beans^ 
b. 10% per annum or 0.8% per month (compound interest). The MPB works 
with only 7.5% per annum. 
c. Includes approximate 1979 buying price KShs. 180 per bag (Rose Coco), 
new gunny bag KShs. 7.20, expenditure on treatment and monthly store 
rent per bag. 
Source: Own Compilation. 
So far, the relative advantage of small scale storage by private 
storeholders over the alternative of MPB storage has been analysized. It has 
been shown that, particularly with regard to maize storage, efficiency would 
be increased if storeholders were permited and encouraged to take over the short 
and medium term storage function. Efficiency would be even higher if lorry 
traders were included as an MPB alternative since their overhead per bag is much 
28 — 
lower than the average produce store. Also, storage efficiency could be 
increased if storage management aiid facilities were improved. Without the 
storage monopoly of the MPB, storage efficiency could be increased even further 
because some of the present storage and treatment costs would fall off under 
free marketing conditions. As mentioned above, a number of MPB agents kept stocks 
simply because the MPB stopped buying due to insufficient storage capacity. If 
allowed, they could directly dispose-of these stocks in deficit areas. For 
beans, the situation was even more critical than for maize since maize was 
considered higher priority by the MPB and therefore first to be accepted. In 
regard to maize, one must also consider that the MPB tries to get rid of old 
stocks first. In other words, it has a policy of 'first in, last out'. With 
28. The store rent per bag storage capacity fSr lorry traders was KShs.' 45 
per month of half that-of agents. . 
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Table 35: Sensitivity of Storage Costs Per Bag of Beans to Kind and Degree of 
Capacity Utilization (KShs.) 
Percentage of Degree of Storage Period (Months) 
Overhead Capacity 
Allocation Utilization 2 4 6 12 
100 9,07 17.73 25.68 50.90 
0.25 75 9,10 18.01 26.10 51.75 
50 9.39 18.58 26.95 53.45 
100 9.39 18.58 26.95 53.45 
0.50 75 9.67 19.15 27.80 55.15 
50 10,24 20.28 29.50 58.55 
Note: a Dependent on kind of capacity utilization. Store exclusively 
used for beans storage corresponds to 100% overhead allocation. 
Source: Own Compilation. 
such a policy, the MPB has to take a very serious stand on moisture content, 
because it must assume that the maize may be stored for a long time. High 
moisture content will lead to higher storage losses or if the maize is artificially 
dried (driers are available in two depots) to additional drying costs. ; For 
drying the MPB currently charges KShs. 5 to KShs. 5 per bag. In sum, savings 
could be considerable if direct disposal to mills or other areas was possible. 
Apart from this, the MPB could reject consignments where no drying facilities 
exist without the currently experienced negative consequences of additional costs 
to the supplier. 
In summary, potential savings on storage costs could be substantial 
if marketing regulations allowed private initiative. However, estimates of 
total savings are rather difficult because total storage costs also depend 
on the efficiency of interregional exchange— an important consideration given 
production patterns in Kenya. Estimates of total storage and transport costs, 
therefore, would have to be determined simultaneously under varying assumptions. 
29 
This is beyond the scope of this study. If one, to get some impression, 
assumes that MPB agents would be allowed and financially supported to utilize 
their storage facilities to a greater extent than in the past, this could mean 
that with the total storage capacity available and under the above stated 
29. For this type of calculation refer to the study of H.K. Maritim 1978. 
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30 assumptions, agents could retain an additional 20,000 to 25,000 tons £n the 
stores instead of delivering it to the MPB. This is about 20% to 25% of 
their seasonal turnover and corresponds to the amount they used to buy from the 
MPB during the off-season. This policy would reduce marketing costs on 
the order of KShs. 2 to KShs. 3 million per year. If in addition increasing 
I 
storage efficiency is considered, the potential savings are even greater,. 
5u 1,4 . Other Marketing Functions. In conjunction with.assembly, distribution, 
3 i - i i transport and•storage there are other marketing functions to be performed which 
might result in additional costs for marketing functionaries. Marketing trans-1'1' 
actions have to be financed and produce has to be weighed, measured, padked, 
graded-: and handled » ^ 
Financing costs depend on the value -of the produce hand led •-and the— 
rate of capital turnover. In this regard, private marketing functionaries 
are quite efficient. A high rate of capital turnover enables them to work 
with relatively small amounts of working capital which results in low 
financing costs (see section 3,1). Maize and beans traders realized an 
31 average monthly capital turnover ratio of 8.3; the highest ratio was 
in Eas-tern Kenya (11.9) followed by Western Kenya (8,5) and Central Kenya 
32 
(7.4-)." Assuming an opportunity cost of 10% interest on working capital, 
financing costs for market traders are usually not more than KShs. 0.10 per 
bag of maize and KShs. 0.30 per bag of beans-. The average monthly capital 
turnover ratio was 4.2 for agents and 5,8 for -.lorry traders which results, in 
average capital costs per bag of maize' of less-.Vffean KShs. 0,20 for "agents and 
KShs, 0.10 for lorry traders. Per bag of bearfersfSese-• costs are KShs. 0,30 for 
agents and KShs, 0.60 for lorry traders,--
Comparisons with MPB financing costs is difficult since the Board is 
the main holder of stocks including the national reserve of 2 million bags of 
•r-
maize. However, the Board is hardly in the position to achieve similar high 
ratios of capital turnover and low capital cost. It gave its average capital 
.Qosts per bag of maize as KShs, 6, Given this high cost, increasing the 
volume of produce fisrtttng through private channels-would"contribute to higher 
Operational efficiency in the marketing system, 
&0. Storage capacity 65,000 tops, extra 40% capacity utilization, which 
Cleans storage costs of about KShs. 13 to KShs. 16 for 6 months compared to a 
minimum price spread of KShs. 24 per bag. 
The medium value was 6,0. 
32, The market traders were operating with their own working capital. 
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A major cost item with regard to packing, weighing and handling 
is the depreciation on bags and other containers used. Maize and beans are 
handled in bags in both the formal and informal subsystems. /Usually 
depreciation of 100% of the value of a new gunny bag, currently costing 
KShs. 7.20, is assumed since the bag is sold with the produce. This may hold 
for the individual marketing functionary buying the bag, but it does not 
apply to the marketing system as a whole. 
Bags are often used several times and then sold as secondhand. This 
is done by private traders as well as the MPB. Actual costs are therefore 
lower than the 10.0% depreciation assumes. This is particularly true for 
storeholders, lorry traders and market traders who buy secondhand gunny bags and 
use them more than once since long term storage is not a concern. Storeholders 
and lorry traders may be more demanding about the state of a gunny bag which 
should be reflected in their depreciation allowance. Generally, however, 
cos.ts.for depreciation on bags are not more than KShs. 2,50, if the bag 
is not sold along with the maize or beans. In the latter case, the full 
value must be depreciated. The depreciation for the MPB, or traders who 
sell the empty bag after using it once is probably higher than KShs. 2.SO j 
but should not exceed half the price of the new bag, i.e, KShs, 3.60. Among 
market traders, bags are used by most itinerant traders. Depreciation on 
a new bag costing KShs. 7.20 ranges from KShs. 0.50 to KShs, 1, However, 
often good secondhand bags costing between KShs. 3 and KShs. 3.50 are u^ed. 
( 
With only a slightly lower lifespan, depreciation on these bags is between 
KShs. 0.30 and KShs. 0.60 per bag. 
Costs associated with other containers used are more or less 
negligible. Depreciation on all items used for weighing and packing 
33 
like debes, tins, kalabashes and baskets adds up to only KShs. 0,01 per bag. 
Depreciation on stand scales used by 59.8% of MPB agents and also lorry 
traders was not more than KShs. 0.05 per bag due to long life expectancy. 
Grading results in certain costs in the form of foreign matter 
and bad grains or beans removed from the stock which diminish its volume. 
It was difficult to obtain more detailed information about these costs through 
33. In a small supplementary survey, prices for scales, sieves and other 
utensils were asked. According to the information, the average value of scales 
amounted to KShs. 1830 which has to be seen against a life expectancy of far 
above 20 years. The latest value was given as KShs. 3025. A set of new volume 
measures with the same life expectancy was valued at KShs. 600 if bought in 
1978 and sieves with a lifespan between 5 and 10 years at around KShs. 150. The 
average values were KShs, 333 and KShs. 105 respectively. 
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interviews. It was possible to obtain estimates of grading losses 
for MPB agents only. According to MPB agents, who use sieves for grading, 
these losses ranged between .5 and 1 kilogram per 90 kilogram bag of maize 
and between 1 and 2 kilograms per 90 kilogram bag of beans. Under the hew 
MPB prices, this corresponds to approximately KShs. 0.30 and KShs. 0.60 per 
bag of maize and between KShs. 2 and KShs. 4 per bag of beans. For market 
traders, these losses are probably less both in quantity and value termss. 
Market traders do most of the handling work themselves so they, do 
not incur labor costs. Handling costs for storeholders and lorry traders, 
on the other hand, are a major cost item. This takes the form of wages 
paid to casual labour for loading and unloading the produce. For the survey 
period-, these were given as KShs. 0.30 per bag. Lorry traders or big storeholders 
who employed permanent labour had slightly lower (KShs. 0.25 per bag) handling 
costs. All other" miscellaneous handling costs""(depreciation of- equipment 
including bags and wages have been accounted for) should not exceed KShs'. 0.10 
per bag. 
All handling, packing, weighing, and grading costs are more orpless 
determined exogeneously for the marketing functionaries and therefore are 
not subject to major reduction. Reduction of these costs would only be 
possible if a change in the handling ;method, such as shifting from bag to 
bulk is not practical under the present market framework. 
5:. 2 Pricing Efficiency 
The assessment of pricing efficiency, often referred to as allocative' 
efficiency, is concerned with the pricing aspects of the marketing process. 
On the basis of theoretical considerations, prices are expected to be 
interrelated through space, time and form to costs. Profits earned in 
excess of opportunity costs of management and capital inputs are viewed 
as 'excess profits' which raise prices artificially (USDA/USAID, p. 47). 
.They are exploitative in nature and distort the allocation of scarce resources. 
The analysis of pricing efficiency will begin with an examination 
of efficiency at channel interfaces; in other words, to what extent do 
marketing functionaries pass on price changes to subsequent or preceding 
marketing channel levels. Second, the degree of interregional efficiency 
will be looked at in order to see whether geographically separated markets 
I < -
are sufficiently interlinked by arbitrage activities. Third, intertemporal 
efficiency will be assessed; to what extent prices are related to storage costs? 
Finally, an attempt will be made to roughly estimate the magnitude of excess 
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profits by contrasting the income of interviewed marketing functionaries against 
different assumptions about opportunity costs. 
5.2.1 Pricing Efficiency at Channel Interfaces . It is a widespread belief 
L 
that market traders are exploitative. In this section, the hypothesis is tested by 
examining interface pricing efficiency; in other words, whether or not price 
changes are passed on to other marketing levels. The degree of interface 
pricing efficiency is usually assessed using regression and correlation analysis 
to test to what extent profit margins of private marketing functionaries are 
statistically dependent on buying and/or selling prices (see Ruttan 1968 and 
Schubert 1973). If margins are independent of prices and thus constant in 
absolute terms, price changes are being passed on to the next market channel 
314 
level. Such a situation is consistent with the competitive market model 
(Ruttan 1968, p. 85) and does not prevail under exploitative pricing conditions. 
Independent margins are statistically indicated by a low correlation between 
the margins and prices and a slope coefficient of the linear regression equation 
which is not significantly different or is very close to zero. This corresponds 
to a situation in which selling and buying prices are highly correlated and the 
regression coefficient is not significantly different from or is very close to 1, 
A test of the relationship between margins and buying prices was 
carried out for maize traders (some of whom sell beans) on the basis of 909 
observations of maize net buying (excluding procurement costs) and selling prices 
for 1977 provided by the CBS through its Market Information Survey. The results, 
significant at the 0.1% level, are shown in Figure 6. As can be seeJn, selling 
and buying prices are highly correlated with each other; 70% of the variation 
2 
in selling prices is explained by buying prices (r =0.696lJ. The corjaasponding 
correlation coefficient between the profit margin and buying price is - 0.137 
indicating that in fact profit margins are largely independent of prices. This 
is also reflected in the slope coefficient for the regression equation in Figure 
6. Although the coefficient is significantly different from 1, the difference 35 in view of the market structures described in section 3 is relatively small. 
34. If only gross margins are available, it ia_,assumed that marketing costs 
under a situation of limited scale economies are independent of price. Thus, 
the supply function of marketing services is assumed to be highly elastic (Ruttan 
1968, p. 84). 
35. In view of the high number of observations (909), a high significance 
level was to be expected even in the case of minor differences from 1. 
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The hypothesis of exploitative market traders of maize (and beans) can be 
rejected on the basis of this evidence. 
For other marketing functionaries, such as produce storeholders 
and lorry traders, price series for regression analyses were not available. 
Yet even for lorry traders, though to be the worst exploiters, the hypothesis 
does not hold. For example, at a time when the MPB was selling maize at Kitui 
for KShs. 116 80 per bag ex-depot, lorry traders sold it for as low as KShs. 75 
per bag at the shop. This information was provided by distributors who bought 
from lorry traders and is therefore reliable. 
Rejection of the hypothesis of exploitative traders does not mean 
that high excess profits cannot or are not being earned. The data suggests 
that if excess profits are realized, it is primarily due to the non 
competitive framework of the marketing system which is unconducive to high 
pricing efficiency and not to the unscrupulous nature of traders. This 
explains the variation of margins shown in Figure 6 and the deviation from 1 of 
the slope coefficient. In view of the conditions found with regard to market 
structures, pricing efficiency at channel interfaces must be assumed to be 
fairly high. Traders, for the most part, work with constant profit margins and 
pass on price changes to other channel levels unless the competitive framework 
allows a different behaviour. 
5.2.2. Interregional Pricing Efficiency. Interregional pricing efficiency 
concerns the extent to which price differences between interrelated areas or 
markets correspond with transfer costs and therefore are correlated with each 
other. Under conditions of perfect competition, correlation of price movements 
for a given commodity in any two markets will be perfect, i.e. 1.00 (Lele 1968, 
p. 11). However, since conditions in the real world are not perfect, there are 
many reasons why correlations may be below 1.0. Among these are imperfect 
pricing efficiency at channel interfaces,Imperfect mobility, imperfect market 
transparency and imperfect homogeneity of product. In the previous section 
(see section 5.2.1.), it was shown that although pricing efficiency at channel 
interfaces is fairly high, it is not perfect. Mobility is a key factor in 
interregional pricing efficiency. Imperfect mobility Is primarily due to transfer 
costs.Prices in one market may fluctuate without without resulting in any 
36. 
lags. 
It also stems from time requirements for shipments which lead to time 
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arbitrage activity, unless the price difference between markets exceeds the 
transfer costs. The higher the transfer costs, the larger the range within 
which prices can vary in relation to prices in the other market and hence 
the lower the correlations will be (lele 1968, pp.11, 12). Nevertheless, 
with effective market integration (i.e. interregional pricing efficiency), 
correlation coefficients of above 0.9 are achieved (see Lele 1969, pp. 64, 
114, 165-167; Jones 1972, p.141). Generally, interregional pricing efficiency 
is assumed to be satisfactory if the coefficient is 0.70 or more (Gsaenger 
1975, pp. 212). 
Interregional pricing efficiency in the Kenyan maize and bean 
marketing systems, as reflected by correlation coefficients between price 
movements in CBS sample markets (see Map 1), can be derived from Table 36, 
37 and All to A14 (Appendix). Interpretation of the tables should be 
cautious since price movements for all 65 markets were correlated with each 
37 
other, regardless of actual arbitrage activities. Also, production and 
demand patterns in Kenya are so heterogeneous (see sections 2.1 to 2.3) 
that negative correlations are possible for areas separated by high transfer 
costs. On the other hand, negative correlations between more or less 
adjacent markets indicate that reasons other than transfer costs such as 
movement restrictions are responsible for the lack of market integration. 
Finally, market prices are not necessarily wholesale prices for which 
correlations tend to be higher. They represent wholesale prices for the 
most part only for surplus periods and larger secondary markets (see 
section 3.3.1). However, despite these factors likely to reduce the degree 
of correlation between markets, the tables do highlight the general performance 
of the maize and beans marketing system particularly if one looks at Central 
and Western Kenya separately with regard to interregional efficiency. 
As hypothesized in view of the marketing framework for maize and 
beans trade, market integration and thus interregional pricing efficiency 
seem to be rather low. In Central Kenya (Central and Eastern Province) only 
3 8 0.5% and in Western Kenya (including Rift Valley) only about 6% of corre-
39 
lations between movements of maize prices are significantly greater or 
equal to 0.7; 21.7% (Central Kenya and about 30% (Western Kenya) of the 
correlation coefficients ranged between 0.3 and 0.69 indicating a medium 
37. Prices however can be correlated with each other, if markets are 
related with each other through a third market. Thus, direct arbitrage is 
not necessary for a high degree of correlation. 
38. Many of those are based on a small number of observations (below 
20). See Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
39. Significant at 10% or higher. 

, - 96 - IDS/OP 31 
degree of correlation. A very high percentage about 70% (Central Kenya) 
and 64% (Western Kenya) show a weak negative or an insignificant relationship. 
The relationship between markets in Central and Western Kenya, separated by 
high transfer costs, follows the same basic pattern. 
The results for beans are slightly better in Central Kenya, the 
main production and consumption area, than those for maize. 3.1% of the 
coefficients are greater than or equal to 0.7 and 32.3% are between 0.3 and 
0.69. For the relationship between markets in Central Kenya and Western 
Kenya, they are also slightly better: 0.6% are greater than or equal to 0.7 
and 16.9% are between 0.3 and 0.69 compared to 0.5% and 9.1% respectively 
for maize. In Western Kenya, the figures for beans are worse than those for 
maize: 0.7% greater than or equal to 0.7 and 15.1% between 0.3 and 0.69. 
In time series analyses, if time lags are taken into account the 
correlations may .improve. However, for the weekly maize and beans prices 
in CBS sample markets, time lags consistent throughout the year were rarely 
40 
observed. Time lags only occurred for a few markets and for limited 
periods (Casley and Marchant 1978, par. 5.65). These could not be taken 
into account in the computer analysis although they might have improved 
the results slightly. Overall the general impression of low market integration 
given by Tables 36 and 37 would not have changed. Even correlations based 
on seasonal values (13 weeks moving average) show poor interregional pricing. 
In the case of maize, only 13.6% of the correlations for Central Kenya and 
16.6% for Western Kenya were significantly greater than or equal to 0.7; in 
the case of beans, these figures were 16.4% (Central Kenya) and 9.5% (Western 
Kenya) (see Tables All and A13, Appendix). 
Despite the apparent low market integration, arbitrage transactions 
do take place as shown in the Trader Survey. The affect market prices though 
very erratically as reflected in the correlations of residual values (see 
_ q _ - -
Tables A12 and A14, Appendix). • However, as* the results'of the originaLuand 
seasonal series suggest, arbitrage transactions are insufficient to effectively 
link markets. The actual extent to which they affect interregional pricing 
efficiency can be seen by examining specific cases in which a high positive 
correlation between markets was expected. 
40. See Footnote 2 
41. In total more than 20% of maize and beans price residuals were signi-
ficantly correlated either positively or negatively, with each other. 
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Karatina and Kutus markets in Central Kenya and Luanda and Oyugis 
markets in Western Kenya, for example, are known as important markets which 
should show a high degree of market integration with adjacent or linked 
markets. The results of the correlation analysis discussed below therefore can 
only be explained by severe distortions in interregional maize and beans trade. 
Karatina shows a negative correlation of maize prices with Kerugoya (-.31), 
Gakindu (-.14) and Sagana (-0.03), all adjacent markets (see Map 1), and shows 
a positive correlation of only 0.39 with Nyeri, an urban terminal market. 
A similar pattern emerges for Kutus market which is negatively correlated 
with Nyeri (-0,08) and has only a very weak positive relationship to Karatina 
(0.01), Sagana (0.02), Kerugoya (0.13) and Ishiara (0.30). No market in 
Central Kenya shows a correlation higher than 0.4. Due to the banning of 
maize transactions, the number of correlations between Kutus and Kitui markets 
is limited to Mwingi (48 price pairs) and Migwani (59 price pairs) for which 
some price information was available. Using 1975 price information for 17 
weeks, Kariungi found a correlation between the wholesale maize prices of 
Kutus and Kalundu (Kitui) markets of 0.8 (Kariungi 1976, p.60). However, 
correlations with two other major markets, Mwingi and Migwani, were found 
in this study to be negative (-0.13). 
The picture for Western Kenya is not much better. Although Luanda 
and Oyugis were not negatively correlated with nearby markets, the degree 
of positive correlation was low. The correlations for Luanda with Kibuye 
(Kisumu), Kibosua, Bondo, and Mumias, for example, were below 0,2 and with 
Ndere and Cheptual were only 0.36. Oyugis maize prices showed only an 
42 
insignificant correlation with those of Sondu (0.07) and Daraja Mbili (0.15) 
and a low though significant one with those of Kebirigo (0.38) an adjacent 
primary market. 
The results for beans, for which movement controls are less strict, 
are better than maize for Central Kenya. Karatina as well as Kutus markets 
have no negative correlations with adjacent markets and, moreover, correlations 
are relatively high. Karatina shows significant correlations of above 0.5 
with Nyeri (0.54), Kerugoya (0.55) and Sagana (0.70); only Gakindu is below 
that level (0.41). Kutus has correlations above 0.5 with Karatina (0.53) 
and Ishiara (0.56) whereas those with Kerugoya and Sagana are again compara-
tively low, 0.25 and 0,10 (not significant) respectively. The correlations 
of beans prices in Western Kenya more or less resembles those for maize prices. 
42. The time series for Nyanza markets unfortunately is incomplete so 
that the number of pairs is often less than those for the other provinces. 
This has to be taken into account when interpreting the correlations. 
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Interregional pricing efficiency in maize and beans marketing is 
obviously severely lacking. The degree of inefficiency is so high that it 
cannot be explained by common market imperfections. Movement controls which 
impede arbitrage activities are largely responsible for the situation. This 
is suggested by the above results as well as by the fact that the same 
kind of analysis for white and red potatoes, important staple food crops 
which are not subject to any kind of marketing controls, leads to much 
better results (Zettelmeyer 1979). More than 20% of the correlations for 
white potatoes and more than 30% for red potatoes are greater than or equal 
to 0.7. Central Province markets correlated with all other CBS sample 
markets results in 39.2% greater than or equal to a correlation of 0.7. A 
substantial number of coefficients are even above 0.9 which is not the case 
43 even once for maize and beans price correlations for the original series. 
Low market integration is likely to result in high excess profits. 
This can be ascertained by looking at existing regional price differences 
which should more or less correspond to transfer costs if excess profits are 
not being made. An examination of the maize and beans price data for CBS 
markets reveals that these price differences are considerably greater than 
transfer costs and therefore that excess profits are being enjoyed. Prices 
for maize in Meru District (Maua Kianjai, Ishiara) from March to May 1977, 
for example, fell as low as KShs. 27 to KShs. 45 and stayed at KShs. 45 to 
KShs. 55 during September/October, whereas at the same time maize at Machakos 
and Kitui markets (Mwingi, Migwani, Tala, Tawa) and also in Central Province 
(Sagana, Karatina, Kutus, Nyeri) was sold retail at KShs. 90 to more than 
KShs. 100 per bag; the price spreads were KShs. 45 to more than KShs. 60 per 
44 
bag. Such price differentials existed even between markets within adjacent 
districts, such as Maua and Mundantu (Meru Town); and Muthithi, Githumu, 
Kandara and Sagana, Karatina, Nyeri. Between the low price markets and 
Kawangware (Nairobi), price differences amounted to more than KShs. 90 per 
bag. In Western Kenya the situation is similar. At the same time that market 
prices for maize in Kisii fell to KShs. 30 to KShs. 50 per bag, market 
retail prices in Kakamega, Siaya and Busia District markets (Luanda, Bondo, 
Sio Port, Bumala) ranged between KShs. 90 and KShs. 150 per bag. These prices 
spreads must be compared with transport costs of KShs. 10 to KShs. 20 per bag 
on long hauls with lorries and KShs. 15 to KShs. 30 for short and medium 
hauls up to 150 km by matatu and bus. 
43. There is one exception. A significant perfect correlation (1.0) was 
computed for beans in 2 Mombasa markets (Majengo and Mwembe Tayari). It is 
likely, however, that this was a result of collusion or the enumerator. 
44. Kariungi (1976, p. 61) in 1975 found a similar situation with regard 
to transfers between Kutus and Kitui town (Kalundu market). 
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The potential for excess profits in beans marketing is also 
tremendous, In Central and Eastern Provinces, prices in Meru markets 
(Maua, Kianjai, Mundantu) from February through May ranged between 
KShs, 1.10 and KShs. 180 per bag at the same time that beans at Machakos, 
Nyeri and Kiambu district markets (Tawa, Kikima, Tala, Nyeri and Kiambu) 
45 
were sold retail at about KShs. 270 to KShs, 450 (Tawa, Tala), In 
Western Kenya, when prices were low in Kisii (Daraja Mbili) and South 
Nyanza (Migori), between KShs, 135 and KShs. 165 per bag, beans sold at 
KShs, 280 to. KShs, 450 in Kisumu, Siaya and Bungoma district markets (Ahero, 
Bondo, Bumala, Mumias, Kimilili), Thus price spreads of KShs, 90 to more 
than KShs, 300 existed and transport costs for beans are generally similar 
to those for maize. 
Interregional price differences exceed private transfer costs 
within both the informal and the formal subsystems. This, main.ly. applies to 
maize since beans distribution and retail prices are not controlled. The 
structure of controlled maize prices reflects the transfer costs of the 
MPB which with regard to the spatial pattern is biased towards the railway 
infrastructure and assumes that all surplus maize throughout the year is 
coming from Western Kenya. This neglects the fact that, for example, rural 
deficit areas in Eastern Kenya are able to get major supplies from adjacent 
areas in Central Province and from their own surplus zones of Meru and Embu. 
During the survey period, the official price spread between the farmers' 
price in Meru at MPB agents stores (;about KShs, 70 per bag) and the Kitui 
ex-depot wholesale price (KShs, 116 ,'80 per bag) was about KShs. 46 per bag 
which has to be compared with the transport cost cited above. The official 
retail price difference amounts to more than KShs. 50 per bag. Corresponding 
price spreads in Western Kenya, for example between Kisii and Kisumu, were 
KShs. 35 per bag. Actual price spreads, however, often were similar or even 
much higher than those in the informal system, because the MPB agents, due 
to the problems encountered at the depots, paid farmers at the market price 
rather than the controlled price, Farmers in Meru District claimed that 
certain MPB agents paid only KShs. 27 per bag (at the time of interview). 
Taking into the account the interaction of the informal and formal sub-
systems, interregional price spreads between Meru and Kitui within the formal 
channels amount to as much as KShs. 86 per bag. If one further considers that 
lorry traders directly supplied wholesalers and shopkeepers, the price spreads 
were even higher and considerably exceeded those within the informal sub-systems. 
This indicates that the maize marketing controls create inefficiencies of oper-
ation which result in a situation in which exploitation is possible. 
45, Schonherr and Mbugua (1976, p,29) in 1975 found price spreads between 
Nyeri and Murang'a on the one hand and Embu and Kitui on the other of KShs. 140 
to KShs. 185 per bag. 
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5.2.3 Intertemporal Pricing Efficiency. As in the case of interregional 
pricing efficiency, maize and beans marketing legislation is unconducive to 
high intertemporal pricing efficiency (seasonal price differences corresponding 
to storage costs). As pointed out earlier, private storage though less 
expensive on medium term than MPB storage is discouraged by the present 
system of controls. This affects intertemporal pricing efficiency negatively 
as shown in Tables 38 and 39. 
Table 38: Percentage Distribution of Seasonality Indices for Maize Prices 
in CBS Markets by Sample Zones. 
Indices Western Central Eastern Total 
Kenya Kenya Kenya3 
0.0 - 5 3.1 14.3 12.5 8.2 
5.1 - 10 34.4 38.1 - 31.2 
10.1 - 15 37.5 28.6 62.5 37.7 
15.1-20 12.5 4.8 - 8.2 
Above 20 12.5 14.3 25.0 14.8 
Note: a Except for markets in high potential areas, e.g. Kikima (Machakos), 
which were included in Central Kenya. 
Source: Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
These tables classify the seasonal pattern of time series maize and 
beans price data for CBS sample markets (January 1977 to September 1978) with 
regard to size of deviation from the price trend. This is expressed in a 
seasonality Index (SI) which is defined as the standard deviation of the 
trend-adjusted and seasonally fitted (13 weeks moving average) time series 
expressed as a percentage of the mean original price: 
S I = / ±/nZ (P - P )2 ... st s x 100 
where P = seasonally fitted price 
Pg = mean seasonally fitted price 
P = mean original price 
The index is dependent on the standard deviation and on the general price 
level in one market. The higher the index, the higher the seasonal variation 
for a given price level. 
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As can be seen from the tables, the seasonal price variation 
in the majority of markets seems to be quite substantial. In more than 
60% of the sample markets in the case of maize and more than 50% in the case 
of beans, seasonality indices are above 10. Quite a number of markets, 
particularly in Eastern Kenya, have indices above 20. Markets in Central 
Table 39: Percentage Distribution of Seasonality Indices for Beans Prices 
in CBS Markets by Sample Zone 
Indices Western Central Eastern Total 
Kenya Kenya Kenya 
0.0 - 5 14.3 10.5 11.1 12.7 
5.1 - 10 37.1 42.1 11.1 33.3 
10.1 - 15 31.4 25.7 - 31.8 
15.1 - 20 11.4 2.9 44.4 14.3 
Above 20 5.7 - 33.3 7.9 
Note: a Except for markets in high potential areas, e.g. Kikima (Machakos), 
which were included in Central Kenya. 
Source: Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
Kenya, where more secondary or terminal urban markets like Karatina, Nyeri 
and Kutus are included, on average have lower indices for both crops. 
Markets in Western Kenya on average have relatively higher index values 
than those in Central Kenya, but lower than markets in Eastern Kenya, but 
the number of CBS sample markets in Western Kenya is much higher than in other 
areas. 
46 Figures 7, 8, 9, 10 and A1 through A8 (Appendix) give examples 
of different seasonal patterns. They show the original price series (0), 
47 
a medium term trend (T), the 13 weeks moving average fitted seasonal 
values (S) and the residual values (R). Markets within or adjacent to areas 
with a short- and long-rains crop usually have a bimodal pattern often with 
relatively small price spreads (see Figures 8, 9 and A2 for Kiambu, Tala 
and Kebirigo markets). In other areas, time series of prices have only one 
peak and trough, but they tend to have larger price spreads (see Figure 7 and 
A5 for Bondo and Matiliku markets). 
46. For figures covering the other CBS sample markets see Schmidt, 
Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
47. The trend was computed as a linear regression line on the original 
data (not deflated). Since the time series is relatively short and does not 
cover a full 2 year period, it must be interpreted with caution. The same 
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Seasonal price spreads corresponding to indices above 10 are 
KShs. 25 per bag of maize (Kebirigo, Figure A2) and KShs. 60 per bag of 
beans (Luanda, Figure A7), For indices above 20, the seasonal price 
spreads are KShs. 100 per bag of maize (Bondo, Figure 7) and KShs. 180 
per bag of beans (Matiliku, Figure A5). Even for indices below 10, the 
absolute amount of the price spread may be high when the overall price 
level is high (above KShs. 80 per bag). For example, price spreads of 
KShs. 25 to KShs. 30 per bag of maize were found in some cases (Kapsabet, 
Figure A3) where indices were below 10. Price spreads for beans with an 
index below 10 may have been up to KShs. 60 per bag (Limuru, Figure 10). 
For indices above 20 actual price spreads of more than KShs. 140 per bag of 
48 
maize (Bondo) were observed in 1977/78. For beans, actual price 
differences of up to KShs. 360 per bag were found (Matiliku, Figure A5). 
These price spreads were then compared with private storage 
costs which for MPB agents amounted to between KShs. 13 and KShs. 21 per 
bag of maize for a period of 6 months depending on the degree of capacity 
utilization (see Chapter 5.1.3). For a.storage period of 8 .months which 
must be considered for markets with unimodal seasonal patterns, storage 
cost per bag of maize ranged between KShs. 18 and KShs. 25. For beans, 
six months storage results in costs of between KShs. 26 and KShs. 30 peb 
bag and for eight months it ranges between KShs, 40 and KShs. 46 per bag. 
According to Tables 37 and 38, temporal price differences in the majority 
of cases are greater and often much greater than these storage costs. 
Consequently, intertemporal pricing efficiency like interregional pricing 
efficiency is far from being achieved. The high instability of market 
prices shown in the figures certainly contributes along with discouragement 
of private storage to this lack of efficiency. 
48. Similar price spreads (Bondo) were found in Ndere and Muthithi 
markets (Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979). 
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5.2.4. Excess Profits. As suggested by the preceding chapters, due to the 
distortions in the maize and beans marketing system a sizable potential for excess 
profits exists. In this section, an attempt is made to assess the magnitude 
of excess profits realized within the private sector. This requires making 
certain working assumptions. Consequently, the resulting figures should be 
taken as crude estimates which suggest the order of magnitude of these profits. 
Excess profits in marketing are defined here as net profits earned 
49 
beyond opportunity costs of labour and working capital. Three different 
estimates of total net profits were computed based on the minimum (optimistic) 
average gross margins minus marketing costs of traders. The third estimate 
was based on a simple average of the average gross margins estimated under 50 the optimistic and pessimistic assumptions minus marketing costs (see Table 41). 
Opportunity costs were estimated by functionary and, in the case of market 
traders, by volume of produce handled. For market traders handling less 
than 10 bags per week, the opportunity cost (shadow price) of labour was assumed 
to be KShs. 17 5 per month which ~is"the minimum'wage for "permanent wage labour 
in the agricultural sector. In order not to overestimate excess profits for 
traders handling 10 or more bags weekly, double this amount or KShs. 350 per 
month was assumed; this corresponds to the minimum wage for the industrial 
sector in Nairobi. For MPB agents (produce storeholders), the salary of a 
Grade II MPB Produce Inspector, KShs. 1500 per month including house allowance, 
was taken as the shadow price of labour. Opportunity costs of labour for lorry 
traders were assumed to be the salary of a Grade I MPB depot manager, KShs. 
3500 per month. The shadow price for working capital was taken as 10 percent per 
annum for all market functionaries. 
The estimates, summarized in Tables 40 and A15 (Appendix), show that 
about 46% (pessimistic estimate) to 68% (optimistic estimate) or an average 
of 60% of maize and beans market traders earned excess profits. Moreover, 
49. For the definition of excess profits, see Schubert 1973, pp. 48-49 
and Bain 1968, p. 24. 
50. Gross profit margins given by interviewees seem to be quite reasonable 
and correspond to those calculated from the CBS Market Information Survey. 
Average margins were taken for the optimistic estimate. This estimate is 
assumed to be optimistic since traders who were reluctant or not able to give 
actual figures were asked to give the average margins they would like to make. 
This might have led to overstatement, but the figures compare favourably with 
the CBS data so not much overstatement is evident. 
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"these excess profits seem to be quite substantial, ranging on average between 
KShs. 545 and KShs. 758 per month; the medium estimate is KShs. 626 per'-'month. 
Excess profits amounted to between 48% and 53% (50% medium estimate) of gross 
profits. 
Regionally, the percentage of traders accruing excess profits and the 
magnitude of the excess profits generally increases as one moves from west to 
Table '40: Estimate of Excess Profits Earned in Maize and Beans Marketing, 1977 
Market Trader MPB Agent Lorry Trader 





in KShs* per 
month 545 5026 19,345 
in % of 
Sross 
Profit 47.9 , 31.2 61.3 
Medium 
Estimate*3 




in KShs. per 
month 
626 9717 22,294 
in % of 
Sross 
Profit 49.4 41.4° 63.1° 
Optimistic 
Estimate 




in KShs, per 
month 758 10,068 28 ,3 57 
in % of 
Sross 
Profit 52.9 38.3 55.2 
Hotes: a See text for assumptions with regard to opportunity costs and net 
profits. 
b Mean average of pessimistic and optimistic estimate. For the MPB 
agents and lorry traders, a third calculation based on former margins 
fixed by the MPB is included. 
c These values can be higher because of the different number of cases 
included in the calculations. In the calculations based on optimistic 
assumptions with regard to profit margins, more cases with marginal 
excess profits are likely to be included. 
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51 east (see Table A15, Appendix). Thus, on the basis of the medium estimate, 
about 55% of market traders in Western Kenya on average earned excess profits of 
about KShs. 326 per month corresponding to 47% of their gross profits, whereas 
in Eastern Kenya 82% of the traders earned excess profits on the order of KShs. 
1,380 per month corresponding to about 58% of their gross profits. For 
Central Kenya, 72% of traders earned on average KShs. 896 per month excess 
profits corresponding to 51% of gross profits. The ©regional trend apparently 
follows the size of operations recorded for the fdifferent sample zones (see 
Table 13). With regard to gross profit margins, it is the opposite: they 
decrease from west to east (see Table 41). 
Table 41: Mean Approximate Gross Profit Margins for Maize and Beans by Sample 
Zones 1977 (KShs. per bag) 
Western Central Eastern. Total 




Minimum 13.3 8.9 7.7 11.5 




Minimum 5.3 4.0 6.7 ' 5.4" 
Average 10.8 6.7 11.1 10.6 
Lorry 
Trader 
Minimum N.A. N.A. N.A. 6.0 
Average N.A. N.A. N.A. 11.4 
Beans Market 
Trader 
Minimum 19.2 17.9 15.4 18.2 
Average 35.2 28.8 27.6 31.1 
MPB 
Agent 
Minimum 13.2 6.8 9.7 11.2 
Average 23.0 11.4 17.5 20.0 
Lorry 
Trader 
Minimum N.A. N.A. ' ~ N.A. 11.7 
Average N.A. N.A. N.A. 20.9 
Source: Own Compilation. 
51. This does not hold for the percentage of traders under the optimistic 
assumptions. In that case, the percentage for Eastern Kenya was slightly lower 
than for Central Kenya (83% versus 85%). 
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Overall, the percentage of market traders earning excess profits over 
opportunity costs and the magnitude of these profits are quite high. Similarly, 
lorry traders, for whom the actual situation should be nearer the optimistic 
52 
estimates, enjoy substantial excess profits as expected. According to the 
optimistic estimate, more than 60% realized monthly excess profits on average 
of about KShs. 28,000 per month corresponding to 55% of their gross profits. 
Certainly those who operate on a large scale are able to derive a tremendous 
income from maize and beans trading within a short period. 
MPB agents seem to be in a less favourable position if, as defined 
here, excess profits for them are earnings exceeding KShs. 1,500. However, 
the estimates must be interpreted with caution. Since the agents are supposed 
to work with fixed margins, a number were reluctant to answer the questions on 
margins or to give figures other than the official ones. Margins are therefore 
most likely understated. Nevertheless, Table 40 shows that if agents work more 
or less within official margins, which are less than those indicated in the 
pessimistic estimates, only a minority of larger agents are able to realize ex-
cess profits. This holds even if agents' profit margins are increased.to the 
level of the medium estimate. Only if one assumes that agents pay farmers at 
going market rates which enables them to earn average margins (see Table 41), does 
the percentage of agents earning profits above KShs. 1500 per month increase 
to 45% (optimistic estimate). The average value for these profits is KShs. 10,000 
per month, although 80% of the agents with positive excess profits realized less 
than KShs. 4000 per month. In terms of gross profit, this amounts on average 
to about 38%. Regionally, according to the medium and optimistic estimates, 
the magnitude of excess profits decreases from west to east reflecting the 
53 differing size of operation and margins (see chapter 3.1 and Table 41). 
Finally, an attempt is made to estimate total excess profits earned 
within in the informal maize and beans marketing sub-system. This is 
done on the basis of average gross profit margins (see Table 41), medium estimates 
for excess profits expressed in percentage of gross profits if these are lower 
54 
than optimistic estimates, the relative share of marketed volumes handled 
by traders with positive excess profits (medium estimates) and their respective 
52. For lorry traders, average margins on which the optimistic estimate is based 
are not inflated as might be the case for market traders (see Table 41). Accord-
ing to the interregional price spreads, they rather seem to be understated. 
53. For the pessimistic estimate, in which only extreme cases of large agents 
are included, the figure shows the opposite tendency. This is mainly because one 
extreme case for Eastern Kenya is included in the pessimistic estimate, but is 
missing from the optimistic one. 
54. Otherwise the figures based on "optimistic" assumptions were taken. 
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shares within the marketing channel systems (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Marketing functionaries with positive excess profits are usually 
those with high turnover. The percentage of total volumes handled by them 
therefore even exceeds their proportion in the total trader population. 
Market traders earning excess profits (60% of the total) handled more than 
80% of maize and beans channelled through market traders. 20% of MPB agents 
who earned excess profits according to medium estimates handled about 70% 
of maize and more than 80% of beans channelled through MPB agents. Lorry 
traders with excess profits marketed more than 80% (maize) and 70% (beans) of 
channel volumes of lorry traders. On the basis of the channel structures 
which are dominated by market traders, total excess profits add up to an 
estimated KShs. 25 million for maize and about KShs. 4 million for beans; 
most, about KShs. 20 million for maize and KShs. 3 million-for beans, were 
earned by market traders. The figure for MPB agents ranges around KShs. 
3 million for maize and KShs. 0.5 million for beans, whereas for lorry traders 
total excess profits amounted to about KShs. 2.5 million for maize and only KShs. 
0.4 million for beans. All figures were based only on volumes originating from 
smallholders. Since lorry traders also medium and even large scale farmers, 
their total excess profits might be significantly higher than those shown above. 
In summary, excess profits earned within the maize and beans marketing 
system seem to be quite substantial indicating that improved pricing efficiency 
could lead to major savings. Once again in this context it should be mentioned 
that these high excess profits are largely due to the imperfections of the 
marketing framework created through government imposed controls and for the 
most part not due to the exploitative nature of traders. This, however, does 
not mean that all excess profits would disappear with the relaxation of controls. 
Other imperfections such as low market transparency (see section 3) also contri-
bute. Nevertheless, marketing controls are the major source of market distortions 
and low pricing efficiency. If government policy concerning interventions in 
maize and beans marketing were revised to replace strict controls with regulation, 
Considerable savings with regard to profits is envisaged. 
5.3. Security of Outlets and Sources. The provision of secure outlets for 
farmers and sources for consumers, particularly in the case of staple food crops, 
is usually viewed as an important objective of socio-economic development 
(Schubert, 1973, p. 41) and is generally a major concern of governments. It 
relates to the uncertainty or risk involved in the marketing process. Secure 
outlets and sources can be assumed if the marketing system provides regular 
marketing opportunities., if -farm prices- are not- depressed--and consumer-prices-
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are not inflated by inadequate marketing capacities or inefficiencies, and if 
marketing transactions are not impeded by highly erratic price fluctuations. 
From the discussion of the channel and market structure (sections 3.2 
and 3.3), it can be concluded that, except for some remote area with bad 
infrastructure, regul :'.' marketing opportunities are provided although often 
no choice exists between different types of outlets and sources. The most secure 
outlet and often also source for smallholder maize and beans producers is the 
effectively managed cooperative. However, cooperatives have only a small share 
in the market and therefore most small farmers are left with the option of the 
private trader or MPB agent. 
Given the absorptive capacity of private maize and beans marketing 
channels, a prerequisite for guaranteeing secure outlets, particularly for 
smallholders, is the ability of the MPB to take all surplus offered by farmers 
and agents without delay. This is crucial under the current system of strict 
controls. The monopoly position of the MPB makes it legally responsible for 
marketing all surplus beyond local requirements. The result is congestion at 
depots and strain on storage capacities. Moreover, as agents complained, depots 
often start accepting deliveries late because of moisture content and when 
filled to capacity they stop accepting produce altogether. Additionally, if 
supplies do not meet specific standards, especially with regard to moisture 
content, the consignment is rejected instead of being purchased at a lower 
price. For beans the situation was similar or even worse due to the priority 
given maize. When the storage situation became tight, deliveries of beans 
were deliberately discouraged by raising quality requirements. 
The situation is reflected in the complaints of MPB agents summarized 
in Table 42. Delays at the depot and the inability to deliver supplies because 
the depot stopped intakes are among the major problems mentioned by 51.2% and 
43.9% of agents respectively. Grading and drying (moisture content) was the 
most frequently mentioned problem (83%). It resulted in delays or bribes. 
Bribes, mentioned by 57.5% of agents, can in fact be viewed as a monetary ex-
pression of all the major problems encountered (see section 5.11). 
If the MPB fails to accept all existing supplies, sellers have no other 
legal outlet. Even under a relaxed system under which the MPB played a regulative 
function its role as buyer of last resort would be important. Furthermore, 
the failure of the MPB to cope with all supplies has severe implications for 
the objective of guaranteeing a pre-announced producer price. Presently, by-
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Table 42: Problems Encountered in Connection with Deliveries to the Maize and 
Produce Board as Stated by MPB Agents 1977 
Problem Frequency of 
Statements (%) 
1. Delay at Depot 51.2 
2. Depot stops intake 43.9 
3. Grading/Drying 83 .0 
4. Bribes 57.5 
5. Delay of Payment 7.9 
6. Other 2.5 
7. No Problem 3.2 
Source: Own Compilation. 
passing the MPB violates the marketing regulations and thus involves high 
risks. As a result, insufficient drainage of supplies from surplus areas 
occurs and prices are depressed in the surplus markets. This does not at 
the same time benefit consumers in deficit areas who face inflated prices (see 
section 5.2.2.). Even MPB agents are often in the position to pay the official 
government set price since their only other alternatives are: to keep in-
ventories for a unknown period, to sell to lorry traders at the going market rate 
or to bribe MPB depot officials (see section 5.11). Table 43 shows that in 1977/ 
78, the majority of MPB agents in fact paid farmers below the official price of 
55 
KShs. 70 per bag of maize. The same pattern was derived from answers of 
farmers interviewed in markets who were aware of prices paid by agents in their 
vicinity. According to them, agents' prices were as much as 75% below the 
official price and went as low as KShs. 27 per bag. The medium price was KShs. 
63 per bag. 
55. Table 43 does not differentiate between the agent and depot and in-
cludes prices paid during the off-season or in_deficit areas. The latter is 
indicated by a few cases in which a price to farmers of more than KShs. 90 
per bag of maize was recorded. If market prices rise to levels above the 
MPB prices, MPB agents who also sell to consumers may even pay these if it 
is cheaper and more convenient than getting supplies from the MPB depot. This 
is also true for beans. If, however, prices were recorded for surplus areas 
and for the main supply season only, the overall picture most likely would 
have been even less favourable. 
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Table 43: Percentage Frequency Distribution of MPB Prices Received by 
Smallholders, 1977/78 
Price per Bag Percentage of Sales 
1977 1978 
Less than 50 27 10 
50 - 69 27 64 
70 - 89 44 17 
90 and more 2 9 
TOTAL 100 100 
Source: Kenya Crop Forecast 1979. p. 4. 
The evidence given in the previous chapters is sufficient to show 
that government policy to control maize and beans marketing with the intention 
of providing a secure outlet.to farmers at a guaranteed price through the 
MPB has not been effective. Instead, the control have increased uncertainty 
since farmers cannot be sure of disposing of their inventories to the MPB nor 
of receiving the guaranteed price. This uncertainty is further increased if 
District Commissioners intervene in the marketing process by banning transac-
tions within the informal system which was the case in Kitui. The argument put 
forward for these intervention is that farmers in an area should keep their 
maize and beans for consumption during the off season instead of selling it 
at "throw away" prices to traders who may transport it out of the district. 
These actions seem to be based on an ideology of district level self sufficiency 
which given Kenyan production conditions is not very rational. Furthermore, it 
disregards the fact that small farmers have cash needs to satisfy especially 
after a particularly good harvest. The IRS 1974/75 data showed that farmers 
in drought affected areas had negative incomes. When are they supposed to 
balance these out if not at the time of a good harvest? Thus, if farmers have 
.produce to sell, they will sell it whether or not marketing transactions are 
banned. Moreover, if prices fall to the low levels claimed as a rational for 
the ban, it is not the fault of market traders who are punished by the ban but 
instead the inefficiency of the MPB or its agents. This being the case, farmers 
are left with only these inefficient outlets which give them poorer prices than 
they would receive in the markets. If the MPB and its agents are efficient, 
farmers will sell to them irrespective of banned market transactions. So why 
should market traders be banned from competing with the MPB agents? However, 
if the MPB is not efficient then the situation under the conditions of banned 
marketing transactions is much worse. Transactions are made illegally in secrecy 
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and will be carried out illicitly with negative consequences for the smallholder 
seller of maize or beans. Smallholders will still sell under these conditions 
because of their cash requirements. 
If the banning continues until the off-season, smallholders may be 
affected adversely a second time. As mentioned earlier, during the survey period, 
illicit inflows of maize to Kitui were sold wholesale at KShs. 75 to KShs. 80 
per bag to distributors and shops while at the same time the MPB sold at KShs. 
116.80 per bag ex-depot Kitui. Shopkeepers were nevertheless selling at 
controlled retail prices instead of lower market prices which would have benefited 
consumers. In fact at Mwingi where maize continued to be sold in the market, 
56 it was retailed at KShs. 1 per kg. corresponding to KShs. 90 per bag. In 
other areas of Kitui, due to the ban, consumers were forced to pay the controlled 
57 
prices ranging between KShs. 1.3 5 to KShs. 1.45 per kilogram. Therefore, in 
the case of distribution as well as assembly the banning of market transactions 
did not really help to increase the security of the community in the drought 
affected area. 
In other areas not subject to such interventions by the District 
Commissioner, controls on marketing and prices seem to be ineffective means of 
58 increasing the security of consumers. They are either redundant because 
price levels in markets are generally below controlled levels (Mukui, 1978, (106). 
or they are ineffective because price levels in markets by far exceed those 
59 
levels. One reason for this is the low integration of the formal and informal 
marketing system (see section 3.2). Also most probably margins fixed for 
distributors and retailers are too low which discourages them from buying additional 
supplies from the MPB (Hesselmark and Lorenzl, p. 176). Furthermore, price con-
trols for maize in the formal sub-system are often not very effective in rural 
areas (Mukui, 1978, p. 107); only in the major towns were they observed to 
provide consumers with stable, uniform maize prices. 
56. The author does not know why maize continued to be sold in the market 
despite the ban. 
57. For remote places, the District Commissioner allowed prices above the 
normal level due to higher transport cost. This was despite the fact that lorry 
traders also supplied these places at much lower prices than the ex-depot price 
at Kitui Town. 
58. This can be shown only for maize for which prices at the distribution 
level are controlled In the formal sub-systems. 
59. Busia, Bumala, Kimulot, Kiambu5 Muthithi, Tala, Kalawa, 
Matiliku, and Kikima markets (see Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 
1979). 
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Nevertheless, even in the towns, prices might have been lower given 
a functioning interregional exchange (see section 5.2.2.) without necessarily 
50 
being unreasonably unstable. Instability indices calculated for maize and beans 
prices in Nairobi and Mombasa markets (Burmar, Majengo and Mwembe Tayari) had 
very low values; 3.26% for maize prices in Burmar market was the highest. 
However, the instability of prices, particularly in rural markets, is usually 61 
very high reflecting an erratic supply and/or demand situation stemming from 
the impediments to arbitrage activities created by the movement restrictions. 
The percentage distribution of instability indices for maize and 
beans prices in CBS sample markets is shown in Tables and 45. More than 70% 
of markets had instability indices of above 10 for maize and beans and 26.2% 
(maize) and 28.5% (beans) had values even higher than 20 (see Figures 7 to 10 
Table 44: Percentage Distribution of Instability Indices for Maize Prices in 
CBS Markets by Sample Zones 
Indices Western Central Eastern Total 
Kenya Kenya Kenya3 
0.5 - 5 6.3 4.8 - 4.9 
5.1 - 10 18.8 23.8 - 18.0 
10.1 - 15 25.0 33.3 25.0 27.9 
15.1 - 20 28.1 14.3 25.0 23.0 
20.1 - 25 12.5 14.3 12.5 13.1 
Above 25 9.4 9.5 37.5 13.1 
Note, a Except for markets in high potential areas which were included in 
Central Kenya. 
Source: Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
and A1 to A8). Thus, erratic movements in these cases were as strong or even 
stronger than the seasonal ones; they resulted in fluctuations of about 0.50 
to 0.80 Kshs. per kg. of maize or KShs. 45 to KShs. 72 per bag, (see Figures 
A2,7,8) in the case of Kibirigo, Kiambu and Bondo (see Figures A2, 7,8) and 
up to more than KShs. 1 per kg. or KShs. 90 per bag in the case of Kimulot, 
60. These were calculated similarly to those for seasonal movements. 
61. About 30% of maize and beans market traders complained about erratic 
supplies as one of their major problems. 
62. For more cases, see Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
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Bumala and Matiliku markets (Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979). 
For beans, erratic price fluctuations of KShs. 1 to more than KShs. 2 per kg. 
or KShs. 90 to more than KShs. 180 per bag were observed in Tala, Limuru, 
6 2 
Matiliku, and Oyugis (see tables 9,10, A5, A6). Regionally, the instability 
of prices was highest on average in Eastern Kenya, followed by Western and 
Central Kenya (see Tables 44 and 45). This supports the argument that the 
source of instability Is the degree of seasonal fluctuations. 
Table 45: Percentage Distribution of Instability Indices for Beans Prices 
in CBS Markets by Sample Zones 
Indices Western Central Eastern Total 
Kenya Kenya Kenya 
0.0 - 5 - S.Q 11.1 3.1 
5.1 - 10 27.8 25.0 - 23.1 
10.1 - 15 30.6 45.0 33 .3 35.4 
15.1 - 20 19.4 15.0 33.3 20.0 
20.1 - 25 13.9 10.0 11.1 12.3 
Above 25 8.3 - 11.1 6.2 
Note: a Except for markets in high potential areas which were included in 
Central Kenya. 
Source: Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
In summary, the erratic price fluctuations result in immense uncertainty 
for maize and beans farmers, consumers and traders. The objective of stabili-
zing prices for the benefit of producers and consumers through the formal sub-
system is certainly not achieved. Cn the contrary, all available information 
suggests that the present controls on channels and movements are more des-
tabilizing than stabilizing. 
62. For more cases, see Schmidt, Zettelmeyer, Casley and Marchant 1979. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, the functioning of the maize and beans marketing 
systems with special regard to the interaction of the formal (controlled) 
and informal (uncontrolled) sub-systems is analyzed. The marketing system 
has been increasingly faced with problems which raise the question of whether 
structures set up during colonial times remain appropriate in a changed socio-
economic environment and whether they are able to cope with the present level 
of marketed output. This is of major concern because maize and beans are 
the two major stable foods of the low income sections of Kenya society. Maize 
and beans production, despite a rapidly growing population has in recent years 
slightly exceeded self sufficiency. 
It has been suggested that Kenya decontrol maize and beans marketing 
in order to overcome major problems. This recommendation was made in the last • 
two Development Plans and is also contained in the newly issued 1979-83 Plan. 
Despite this, no definite actions have been taken except for a brief period in 
1977/78 for maize, It is likely that uncertainty with regard to the costs 
and benefits of the relaxation of controls and scepticism with regard to the 
performance of the private marketing sector are among the major reasons for 
the reluctance of the government to implement the recommended reforms. Therefore 
this study attempts to reduce this uncertainty by analyzing the operation and 
effectiveness of the present marketing systems with emphasis on the private sector, 
largely synonymous with the informal sub-system, and its interaction with the 
formal system. 
The evaluation is guided by the stated objectives of the controls: 
to benefit producers and consumers. Achievement of these objectives requires 
that the marketing systems operate at lowest possible costs (operational 
efficiency), prevent exploitation of farmers and consumers (pricing efficiency) 
and provide secure outlets for producers and sources for consumers. Following 
a description and analysis of the framework, structure and conduct of the 
marketing systems, performance of the system-is analyzed in terms of these 
subgoals. Survey information of the Central Bureau of Statistics and data 
gathered by the Maize and Beans Trader Survey carried out in markets with the 
assistance of the FAO/Kenya Government Marketing Development Project provide the 
empirical base for the analysis. 
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The results of the study can be summarized as follows: 
The maize and beans marketing systems are faced with a heterogeneous 
production, supply and demand pattern particularly with regard to scale and 
regional and temporal distribution. Smallholders dominate maize and beans 
production. Maize is also produced to a significant degree by large scale 
farmers; although they account for only 30% production, they contribute about 
50-55% to the total marketed maize output. The maize marketing system is therefore 
confronted with two groups of suppliers, almost equally important in terms of 
total marketed supply, but with differing needs as far as marketing services 
are concerned. The large scale farmers' supply is relatively concentrated both 
geographically and in terms of the number of producers and therefore is relatively 
easy to handle. This is not the case with smallholder supplies of both maize 
and beans which are dispersed geographically and across a large smallholder 
population. 
The diversified production conditions in Kenya contribute to the 
complexity of the production and supply pattern. Maize and beans are widely 
grown in almost all agricultural zones and throughout the years. Harvest times 
differ considerably between provinces and even adjacent zones within a province 
or district. They are therefore complementary so that inter- and intraregional 
flows can contribute significantly to balancing supply and demand over the course 
of the year. This becomes even more important if one considers that rural 
demand, particularly for maize, exceeds by far the urban demand. Retained 
production of smallholders covers only about 60-65% of family maize consumption 
and about 80% of family beans consumption. Rural market demand for maize and 
beans therefore accounts for about 80% for maize and 60% for beans of total 
market demand. The regional distribution of rural demand follows more or less 
the distribution of production. Major production areas for maize are the High 
Altitude Grassland Zone of Rift Valley Province and the Coffee zones in Western 
and Central Kenya. Beans production is concentrated in the Coffee and Lower 
Cotton zones of Central and Eastern Province. 
Controls imposed on maize and beans marketing prohibit free exchange 
between surplus and deficit areas. They give the Maize and Produce Board a 
legal monopoly to handle all surplus beyond local requirements. This is enforced 
through movement restrictions requiring movement permit for all shipments across 
district boundaries which exceed 2 bags. 
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Channel structures of the maize and beans marketing systems reflect 
the supply and demand pattern, the impact of controls and the general marketing 
infrastructure. The controls separate the marketing systems into the informal 
and the formal sub-systems. The major channels for smallholders and rural 
consumers are those of the informal sub-system. These channels consist of 
relatively small scale traders, mainly women, who operate locally at roadsides 
or in the rural markets which are easily accessible for smallholders and 
consumers and where prices fluctuate according to supply and demand. Of minor 
importance are stores and cooperatives operating as MPB agents in the formal 
system. Prices for these outlets and sources are controlled by the government . 
Large and medium scale producers usually directly supply one of the MPB depots in 
their vicinity or one of the depots of the KFA which act as a sub-agent for the 
MPB in Rift Valley Province. The MPB in turn domestically supplies mills, other 
processors and, to a lesser degree, distributors particularly in urban areas. 
In summary, the formal system largely serves large scale producers and the 'milling 
industry whereas small scale producers and rural consumers are mainly dependant 
on the informal sub-system. 
There is theoretically a division of activities between the two sub-
systems . The informal sub-system is confined to local marketing activities 
whereas the formal one is supposed to handle all surpluses beyond local needs 
and consequently to perform the intra - and interregional exchange between 
surplus and deficit areas. In practice, however, both sub-systems interact and 
overlap to a considerable extent. MPB agents go into local markets and buy at 
current market prices. Market traders ship significant (in aggregate) volumes 
across district and provincial boundaries and lorry traders (produce wholesalers), 
operating on a larger scale, supply mills and link more distant surplus and 
deficit areas with each other, All these activities constitute violations of 
the control regulations. In fact, lorry traders officially do not exist since 
there is no legal provision for their role. 
Market structures in terms of number and size are fairly competitive 
except in the case of the MPB's legal monopoly. Usually at all channel levels 
one finds a sufficient number of competitors none of whom is big enough to 
control the actions of others,. The structures vary considerably, however, with 
the points of sale or purchase, markets, regions and over time. Furthermore, 
in a significant number of places no real alternative to the informal system 
exists for smallholders—contrary to common assumption—since there is no active 
MPB agents In these cases, the informal and formal system are more or less 
isolated from each other, Apart from this, market structure imperfections 
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are associated with market transparency rather than the number and size of 
competitors or market entry. Market transparency is severely restricted by the 
absence of uniform measurements, weights and standards in markets and uncertain-
ties about weights and grades at MPB depots. The degree of market information 
about market conditions outside the local area of operation is low except for 
lorry traders. This is largely due to movement restrictions which prevent 
inter-actions with those areas. 
Market conduct reflected the type of marketing functionary and the 
corresponding competitive environment. Market traders for maize and beans 
generally seem to have a passive attitude towards price competition, but not 
due to collusive behaviour. They are oriented towards getting a target margin 
(absolute terms) which is subject to adjustment according to the market situation. 
Cash payment is their most important action parameter. The majority of MPB agents, 
though officially not supposed to compete through prices except in the case of 
beans at the distribution and retail levels, also seek a target margin. But 
they, too, are rather passive in pricing and as in the case of market traders 
usually not because of collusive arrangements. Like market traders, for MPB 
agents cash payment is by far more important than pricing. Extension of credit 
to smallholders which opens the possibility of price discrimination generally 
has no relevance for them. The most competitive minded marketing functionaries 
are found among lorry traders though they were often operating in an environment 
unconducive to open competition. In contrast, the MPB is the most passive 
marketing functionary which reflects its monopoly position. To a large extent 
however, the MPB itself is not to be blamed for this because it is not autonomous 
in its actions. 
The marketing systems for maize and beans are far from operating at 
lowest possible cost and therefore operational efficiency could be improved 
considerably. Major savings are predicted in assembly and distribution, 
transport and storage if controls are relaxed. Forcing all surplus through the 
MPB means that a significant proportion of marketed volumes must pass "throu'gh"-
an additional channel level which increases costs unnecessarily. Mills and 
distributors can often be supplied directly by MPB agents, large farmers, 
cooperative's and lorry traders (assemblers). The argument that under such 
conditions per unit costs of the MPB would increase and therefore the service 
of the MPB would become more expensive and require higher subsidies is not very 
convincing. First, only part of the MPB overheads are fixed (about 50%). 
Second, the current problem is insufficiency of existing capacities; major 
expenditures could be saved by a slower rate of capacity expansion. Third, the 
i ; : < ; ' " ! "f • n 
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MPB has in the past concentrated on handling of maize, with a relaxation of 
controls, it could extend its activities for beans and other produce so far 
neglected. Finally, most existing storage capacity is in the form of multi-
purpose warehouses which could be leased or used for storing other commodities. 
Thus, in sum, the potential negative effects on MPB per unit costs are not 
an adequate argument against relaxation of controls. The potential for 
reducing total marketing costs for maize and beans by allowing direct sales 
would initially be on the order of KShs.3.5 to 4 million. Savings in private 
marketing costs would be much higher, because millers and distributors would 
save the total margin now paid to the MPB. 
Assembly and distribution costs could be further reduced by allowing 
alternative channel outlets to the MPB and smoothing supplies to MPB depots. 
Under present conditions, congestion at depots during peak seasons and the fact 
that no other legal outlet besides the MPB exists lead to the practice of 
paying bribes (equal to private opportunity costs) ranging between KShs.l to KS 
KShs. 2 per bag also had to be reckoned with for illicit transactions (those 
bypassing the MPB.). Whether or not assembly costs can be reduced further by 
replacing the MPB agent system with mobile assembly units employed by the MPB 
can not be definitely answered. In major smallholder surplus areas, it can not 
be ruled out. Generally, the decentralized agent system and the network of 
markets seems to be well adapted to the dispersed supply in smallholder areas. 
Another crucial area in which the present control system has negative 
effects on the operational efficiency of the maize and beans marketing systems 
is transport. The movement regulations discourage the use of economic modes 
of transport. Volumes within limits exempted from controls ( 2 bags) result in 
transport by bus and matatu unless other transport is approved by the MPB. 
Consequently, large (in aggregate) volumes shipped within the informal sub-system 
are transported on a small scale with means which on average are twice as expensive 
as alternative means such as pick-ups and lorries. Even on short hauls, buses 
and matatus are more expensive than the alternatives. With the relaxation of 
movement restrictions, an initial saving of about KShs. 4.3. million annually, 
most of it for maize (around 4 million), was estimated based on prices before 
the increase in 1978/79; this is the equivalent of 5-6% of total transport costs. 
Additional savings within the formal system are predicted, if its interregional flow 
pattern is improved. However, the impact of this on total transport costs requires 
further study. 
As in the case o± transport, private storage is impeded by the control 
regulations. Agents or other private- storeholders are not supposed to perform 
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genuine storage functions . This is reflected in the uniform MPB buying price 
for the entire year. Moreover, no financial support is given to agents for 
storage. The result is that private storage capacity of agents and others is 
not fully utilized. From an estimated storage capacity for agents of 65,000 to 100, 
metric tons, only 33% was used for storing maize an average period of 8 weeks and 
on on average about 6% was occupied by beans for 13 weeks. 
Underutilization of private storage capacity contributes to poor 
operational efficiency. At least in the medium term, it would be more 
efficient if agents were allowed and supported to store inventories of maize and 
beans for the off-season instead of delivering all season supplies to MPB depots 
and then buying them back later as presently occurs. Potential savings are 
estimated to be on the order of KShs. 2 to KShs. 3 million per year. Storage 
efficiency could be further increased if the MPB were bypassed. In that case, 
moisture content particularly for ::.aize would not be as crucial since the MPB would 
no longer need to assume that all maize intake would be stored for a long period. 
Also, agents would no longer be forced to keep inventories because of full depots. 
In sum, operational efficiency seems to be considerably lacking. 
This is mainly due to structures and operations imposed through controls. If 
these were relaxed, potential savings on marketing costs of more than KShs. 10 
million per year are expected. In the long run, these can be assumed to be even 
greater. 
Pricing efficiency is similarly affected by controls. Instead of 
preventing exploitation, the controls facilitate it to a-. greater extent than 
a decontrolled system. Mainly due to the impediments to; intra- and interregional 
trade, markets for maize and beans are poorly integrated as indicated by low 
correlations between maize and beans prices in different markets. Furthermore, 
huge price differences are found between markets, even adjacent ones, which often 
considerably exceed small and large scale transfer costs. This is even true 
for the regional structure of controlled prices. These price differences could 
not occur under reasonable conditions of market integration. Similarly, large 
intertemporal (seasonal) price differences exceeding storage costs are found. 
These regional and temporal price differences which exceed transfer 
and storage costs allow scope for considerable excess profits to be earned. 
Excess profits are defined here as profits earned beyond opportunity costs of 
labour and capital and therefore they are not necessarily excessive profits 
although this may be the case for certain transactions. Opportunity costs of 
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labour and capital and therefore they are not necessarily excessive profits 
although this may be the case for certain transactions. Opportunity costs of 
labour were assumed to be KShs. 175 or KShs. 350 per month (depending on the 
size of operation) for market traders, KShs. 1500 for MPB agents and KShs.3500 
for lorry traders . The opportunity cost of capital was assumed to be 10% for 
all market functionaries. Based on these assumptions, excess profits are estimated 
to total about KShs, 25 million for maize and KShs. 4- million for beans. Market 
traders who handle most of the marketed output of smallholders earned most of 
these. 
In view of these excess profits, traders might be blamed for being 
exploitative, unscrupulous and so forth. However, fairly high pricing 
efficiency at channel interfaces does not support such views. A regression 
analysis of maize buying and selling prices confirmed the expectations derived 
from analysis of market conduct. Traders work with constant profit margins in 
absolute terms and thus tend to pass on price changes to other channel levels. 
Therefore, excess profits must be explained largely by the distortions in 
interregional trade and storage. The assumption that producers and consumers 
under a relaxed and undistorted marketing system would be left to the mercy of 
unscrupulous traders is certainly not justified. 
Finally, controls do not help to increase the security of smallholders 
and rural consumers. Instead, they do the opposite. Smallholders can not rely 
on getting paid the government fixed producer price. Furthermore, farmers and 
rural consumers (during the off-season these two parties may be identical) who 
largely depend on markets as the outlet and source of maize and beans are faced 
with highly erratic price fluctuations which also affect traders. The resulting 
uncertainty, therefore, is tremendous. Banning of maize and beans marketing 
does not protect producers and consumers from the uncertainties of free marketing. 
To the contrary, it is detrimental to their interests. 
In summary, the analysis of the maize and beans marketing systems 
suggests that the objectives of controls are not being achieved and in fact 
the present system of controls contributes to marketing inefficiencies. The 
analysis shows that the control legislation has created a marketing framework 
which is conducive to low operational efficiency reflected in high marketing costs, 
low pricing efficiency reflected in poor market and seasonal integration and high r 
excess profits, and high instability of market conditions. 
The population affected by these inefficiencies is smallholder maize 
and beans producers and rural consumers. These two groups are in many ways 
identical since only a part of consumption needs are met by a producer's 
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retained production. In addition, urban maize and beans consumers who 
primarily belong to the low income groups must pay higher prices than those 
which would prevail if the parastatal marketing organization, the Maize and 
Produce Board, competed with private marketing channels. Those who benefit from 
the present regulations are large scale farmers and the milling and other maize 
and beans processing industries. This is because large scale farmers usually 
have direct access to MPB or KFA depots, and the processing industry has no 
problem passing on higher buying prices to consumers in the case of maize and 
maize meal through controlled selling prices. Therefore, the inefficiencies of 
the maize and beans marketing system have severe negative income distribution 
effects. The rural and urban poor, supposedly the beneficiaries of controls, 
are actually paying for a scheme which largely favours those who are already 
better off. This is in effect an inequitable tax. 
In order to achieve the stated government objectives., controls on 
maize and beans marketing should be relaxed as envisaged in the three Development 
Plans" and as suggested by previous studies. (See Kenya Co-ordinating Summary 
of Major Technical Studies, Committee of the Marketing Development Project, 1978. 
pp. 66-69 and other sources cited page 66) The relaxation of maize and beans 
marketing controls is the first step and a pre-condition for improving marketing 
effectiveness. Concommitantly, other changes should be considered. Farmers, 
traders, storeholders and cooperatives should be free to sell either to the 
MPB or to any other outlet they think fit. Nobody should be granted a monopoly 
and movement controls should be removed completely without introducing any kind 
of new permit system even on a short term basis. With such a relaxation, the 
role of the MPB would change. It would run a stabilization buffer stock scheme 
with floor and ceiling prices . It would have to accept all surpluses which 
the private sector cannot absorb at the minimum guaranteed producer price and 
would have to supply the private sector with maize and beans at the ceiling 
price when private channels were unable to meet demand. In addition, the MPB 
would be responsible for maitaining a strategic maize reserve in the national 
interest. 
The margin fixed by selling and buying prices is crucial to running 
a buffer stock scheme. The MPB should therefore be in a position to react more 
flexibly to market conditions than in the past. Also, it must perform the 
stabilization function efficiently. If it cannot, no major improvements will 
be achieved; this was the case during the temporary relaxation in 1978. At that 
time, farm and market prices for maize were depressed due to the inability of 
the MPB to take all surplus supplies offered. The MPB must play a more active 
role in the marketing of maize and beans and should increase its integration 
with the informal system. In this regard, training programmes for MPB staff would 
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be helpful', Furthermore, the elimination of corrupt practices at depots 
is required. 
In order to smooth out supplies to and consequently prevent congestion 
at depots during the peak seasons, the introduction of temporal price differences 
(storage premiums) should be tested. Such price differentiation must be designed 
very carefully. Due to overlapping zonal production conditions, it might only 
be appropriate for specific zones and depots or for a limited time. With free 
movementi of maize and beans between areas, the situation at depots might be 
sufficiently eased without introducing price differentials, 
Free movement of maize and beans might also affect the efficiency 
of private storage since interregional exchange may be more economical than 
holding inventories, this depends on the area. Whenever appropriate, private 
and cooperative storage on medium term should be encouraged so as to use 
currently underutilized storage capacity and to increase storage efficiency. 
To this end, financial support and training in efficient storage management 
should be provided. The bonded warehousing system suggested elsewhere (See 
Kenya 1976, Maize and Pricing in Kenya,p.90) might be an appropriate solution 
to the financial problems and should be tested. 
For an improved integration of the formal system, mobile teams 
employed by the MPB in conjunction with a network of small stores at strategic 
market centres might be worth considering. They could buy directly from major 
markets at guaranteed prices and bring in supplies if required during the off-
season, However, whether the costs of such a scheme could be met out of its 
operations remains to be analysed and tested. 
The functions of the proposed mobile teams could also be performed 
by cooperatives. If effectively operated, cooperatives seem to be the most 
secure outlets and sources for smallholders. All support should therefore be 
given to the development of effective cooperative maize and beans marketing. 
Cooperatives should, however, not be given a monopoly position as an agent of 
the MPB because smallholders would then have no alternative outlets if cooperatives 
failed to meet their requirements. 
In order to intensify competition within the informal and between 
it and the formal system, market transparency should be improved through the 
introduction of uniform weights and measurements. As an initial step, traders 
operating in the markets could come together and agree on two or three different 
sizes of tins presently used as standard measures, Other measures or manipulations 
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of the measures would be prohibited. Such a step would immediately improve the 
Situation:sines certain'tines ere 2 easily related to standardized metric 
measurements. 
The suggestion that traders meet to resolve problems in their market 
raises the possibility of forming market committees in which producers, traders 
and consumers would be represented. Such market domittees are found in Pakistan 
and India. They might help to improve market conditions through participation 
of all affected groups. Banning of maize and beans transactions is no solution 
to the problems of the affected population and should therefore be stopped. 
Finally, freeing of prices (at the distribution and retail level) and 
possibly maize meal should be considered. Controlled maize prices have been 
a major cause of distortions. They would increasingly become so under a freed 
marketing system. The benefits of increased marketing efficiency are not likely 
to be fully passed on to consumers if inappropriately high prices justified 
by controls continue since buying prices of wholesalers, retailers and millers 
probably are lower than assumed when determining the controlled prices. 
In summary, the course of action suggested above is expected to 
significantly improve the maize and beans marketing efficiency. It would have 
particularly positive effects on incomes of smallholder maize and beans producers 
and rural and urban low income consumers and thus would be in concurrence with 
the objective which received highest priority in the new Development Plan 1979-83: 
to alleviate rural and urban poverty. 
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Table A2: Maize Production Large Farms 1976 by Province 
Area (ha) Production (MT) 
Central and Nairobi 1,171 4,332.7 
Coast 13 48.1 
Eastern 381 1,409,7 
Nyanza 296 1,095.2 
Rift Valley 72,339a 267,654.3 
Western 127 469.9 
TOTAL 74,327 27 5,009.9 
Note: a Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Nakuru on average account for 
about 90% of total large scale maize production. 
Source: Derived from Statistical Abstract 1977, pp. 128-129, and 
0. Hesselmark, 1376, Maize yields in Kenya 1975. 
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Table A 4- Beans Harvest Time 
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X X X X 
X X X X 
NANDI mm X X X X 
KERICHO Upper Lower 
X X 
X X 
TRANS NZOIA - XX X X 
WESTERN 
PROVINCE 
BUSIA _ XX X X XX X X 
BUNGOMA Upper Lower 
XX XX XX X X 
X X X X X X X X 
KAKAMEGA Upper Lower 
X X XX X X X X 
X X X X XX X X 
NYANZA 
PROVINCE 
SIAYA _ X X XX X X 
KISUMU _ XX X X X X X X 
SOUTH NYANZf . _ X X X X X X X X 
KISII Jpper Lower 
XX X X XX X X 
X X X X 
Source: Derived from Kenya Crop Calendar 
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Table A5: Average Value per Holding Consumption By Per Capita Household 










Other Crops 152 
Beef 25 
Other Meat and Poultry 9 5 • 
Milk 300 
TOTAL Consumption of Home 
Produce 1,297 
Purchased Items 
Dairy Products and Eggs 46 
Grains, Flour and Roots 498 
Meat and Fish 236 
Fats and Oils 83 
Sugar and Sweets 172 
Fruit and Vegetables 88 
Drinks and Beverages 140 
Salt and Flavouring 35 
TOTAL Food Purchases 1,297 
Clothing 324 
Appliances and Utensils 25 
Furnishings 40 
Miscellaneous 158 
TOTAL Non-food Purchases 547 
TOTAL FOOD EXPENDITURE 2,595 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDI-
TURE 3,450 
Number of Households 1,483,422 
Average size per House-
hold 6.97 
Low Income Medium Income High Income 
0-499 500-1499 over 1500 
KShs. KShs. KShs. 
258 399 566* 
16 17 22 
38 48 36 
97 178 299 
48 126 262 
100 168 222 
22 26 30 
76 101 126 
136 325 663 
791 1,388 2,226* 
38 48 57 
435 539 514 
204 239 317 
51 92 136 
132 181 248 
75 98 85 
116 134 228 
32 37 36 
1*083 1*368 1,621 
222 355 486 
13 32 38 
28 45 55 
291 483 896 
554 915 1,475 
1,874 2,756 3,847* 
2,429 3,671 5,452 
538,732 752,325 192,362 
7.45 6.88 5.98 
Source: M.M. Shah 1978. 
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Table A7: Point of Purchase for Major Marketing Functionaries During 


































Market 96.3 67.5 8.0 8.4 










Table A15: Estimates of Excess Profits Earned in Maize and Beans 
Marketing by Sample Zones 1977a 
Market Trader MPB Agent 
Western Central Eastern Western ( entral Eastern 
Pessimistic 
Estimate 





per month 290 768 1,042 3,089 7,184 21,617b 
in % of 
Gross 
Profit 47.5 48.1 49 28.8 49.2 37.4 
Medium 
Estimate 





per month 326 896 1,378 10,835 7,576 5,641 
in % of 
Gross 
Profit 47. 3 50.9 57.6 44.1 50.5 23.2 
Optimistic 
Estimate 





per month 422 1,026 1,779 11,738 7,333 2,366 
in % of 
Gross 
Profit- 49.6 55.3 65.3 40.5 39.5 26.0 
See footnotes for Table 40. 
Without one extreme value the figure is 4,636. 
Notes: a 
b 
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